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This dissertation draws from research in memory studies, discourse analysis, 
ethnographic methods, and human rights rhetoric to argue that analysis of on-the-ground 
discourses in the form of lived narratives advances how we think about human rights. 
Eleven Bosnian Americans who came to Salt Lake City, Utah as a result of the Bosnian 
war in the mid-1990s were interviewed. I examine how participants share stories about 
prewar, wartime, and postwar life, and how trauma emerges from those narratives in the 
form of “traumatic breach” and “(dis)placement trauma.” My findings suggest that a 
practice of human rights is more effectively understood as lived, accounting for the 
enduring embodiment of trauma manifest throughout these collected, lived narratives, 
rather than as physical, static manifestations of violence. As opposed to universalist 
conceptions of justice put forth by The Hague, this research pays attention to local 
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HISTORIES OF A WAR: MEMORIES, IDENTITIES, NARRATIVES 
 
They don’t want you there but you can’t leave.  They don’t want to let you go… but… so 
what are you supposed to do? I mean you’re stuck.  You’re nowhere. And I remember for 
ten years after the war, always dreaming I’m back in Banja Luka and I can’t leave. But 
people! I’m an American citizen now. You can’t keep me here anymore and you can’t 
kill me. I’m not one of you anymore. I’m an American citizen. I want to go back. I have 
my job. I want to go back. Many times that dream, … that recurring dream coming back 
until maybe five, six years ago.  
 




 War trauma does not have a particular shape or language or tone. It is not linear; it 
might be unspeakable, it might not be knowable, but it is always embodied in the 
everyday lives of the people who endured the war. These are the primary findings from 
this dissertation’s research. These findings are significant because they reveal the current 
international transitional justice mechanisms’ inability to adjudicate various types of 
trauma.  While the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
can label certain traumas as war crimes or crimes against humanity, the positivist 
language of the law renders the ICTY ill-equipped to handle everyday, embodied 
instances of trauma carried by diasporic populations of Bosnian Americans. While the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 All participants’ names have been changed. 
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ICTY is the main adjudicating body “bringing war criminals to justice; bringing justice to 
victims” (www.icty.org), it is not attuned to the personal, private needs of those who left 
as a result of the war.  
 
Significant Contributions 
Using ethnographic methods and narrative analysis, this dissertation makes two 
significant contributions to studies of human rights theory and adjudication: First, human 
rights work must be rearticulated as living human rights practice, without relying on The 
Hague or the ICTY and thus be unyoked from moral concepts of justice as constructed by 
the legal language of common law systems. Current approaches to human rights neglect 
the everyday lived experiences of different types of trauma and focus instead on physical, 
temporal violations that can be heard in a tribunal.  In this study, for example, a 
discourse-analytic framework shows how instances of “traumatic breach” and 
“(dis)placement trauma” are examples of human rights violations that erupt in narrative 
and are ignored by larger human rights systems and the language of the law, primarily 
because these systems must focus on how to create legal precedents (establishing rape as 
a war crime at the ICTY, for example) and because they must focus on showing physical, 
systematic, ethnically-motivated traumas in order to establish a pattern of human rights 
abuse to designate atrocities as “war crimes” (Hagan, 2003).  
A second contribution, equally important, and from which the above findings 
emerge, is a dynamic method that blends ethnographic interviews and narrative discourse 
analysis for the purpose of studying “on-the-ground” or “living” enactments of human 
rights in shifting, linguistically emergent interactions. Previous methods of analyses of 
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human rights issues have been based on rhetorical analyses of policies or large-scale 
organizations, quantitative analyses accounting for numbers of abuses and corresponding 
adjudications, linguistic analyses of legal texts, and/or highly theoretical analyses of the 
nature of human rights. With the exception of the work of Soyini Madison (2006, 2010, 
2011), Julie Mertus (1997), and Kay Schafer and Sidonie Smith (2004), previous and 
current methods of human rights analysis do not take into account lived traumas that 
persist long after the initial traumatic event, nor do they employ discourse analysis to 
explore how language-in-action resonates in lived narratives and alongside larger human 
rights discourses. As an open-ended heuristic, narrative discourse analysis focuses on 
language-in-action, connecting that language to social structures, showing how language 
and the world are mutually constituted (Johnstone, 2008). Thus, performing narrative 
discourse analysis on the ethnographic interviews I collected connected participants’ 
language-in-action to larger narratives about war, diasporia, identity, and trauma. The 
merging of the two methods allows for ethical, “response-ably” engaged research with 
interviewees by analyzing language-in-action in interview transcripts with a continual, 
reflexive return to the ethnographic, embodied affectations of the interview setting. 
This chapter will first provide an explanation of the “Academic Problem,” 
including a brief background on the ICTY. I will then give an overview of the chapters in 
this dissertation. Next, I give a brief history of the Bosnian war, including background on 
how the war started according to a variety of sources, including how the participants for 
this dissertation describe the history of the war. I also show how narratives about war are 
complicated by competing histories. I then give a brief background of the local Bosnian 
diasporic community and prefigure the remainder of the dissertation.  
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Explanation of the Academic Problem 
An example of trauma that is overlooked by the ICTY is exemplified in Amir’s 
recurring dream, provided at the beginning of this chapter.  He says, “They don’t want to 
let you go… but… so what are you supposed to do?  I mean you’re stuck.  You’re 
nowhere.” This dream characterizes a common narrative thread that manifests within 
each individual participant’s stories about living through the Bosnian war—the feeling of 
being “stuck ” in place, or existing in a space that feels like “elsewhere,” (Minh-ha, 2011) 
or feeling like you are unwanted in your city but also that you are not allowed to leave. 
These themes emerge within participants’ narratives and become oriented in reference to 
language about place, identity, nation, and trauma.  
In narrative, trauma does not present itself linearly, chronologically, or even as 
one specific thing. Rather, discussions of trauma emerge in between stories, in between 
sentences and words, underneath narratives about other things, interactionally constructed 
alongside stories about family, nostalgia, personal and collective histories, and belonging. 
When people share memories from the war, trauma is always interlaced within stories 
about other things. People talk around traumatic experiences; they share memories that 
are traumatic, but their language-in-action is not specifically about “trauma,” as it would 
be recognizable within the language of the law. That is, the ICTY, and the common law 
system upon which it is based, is intent on finding physical manifestations of war, not 





The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former  
Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
The ICTY is the contextual backdrop against which I juxtapose the trauma 
emergent in the interviews I collected. The ICTY, through the international, institutional, 
and economic power of The Hague, has situated itself as the primary constructor of peace 
through the dispensing of justice (Anders, 2012; Carlson, 2013). Furthermore, as part of a 
growing movement in the “’therapeutic turn’ in international humanitarian law,” the 
ICTY participates in an (arguably new) concept of “healing” that is predicated on the idea 
that talking and repairing justice are often one and the same act (Anders, 2012; Zulaika, 
2003). Specifically, the ICTY uses performances of fixed ethnic/national/religious 
identity to promote a particular type of healing (justice) for a specific type of “war 
trauma” that is easily recognizable within the positivist language of the law. However, 
war and its aftermath leaves people with multiple types of trauma, many of them invisible 
within the discursive confines of legal language that necessitates visible trauma to 
constitute a “war crime.”2 
The ICTY was established in 1993, and is the first organized tribunal of its kind 
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials (Hagan, 2003). Set up under the United Nations 
statute that oversees the International Criminal Court (ICC), it operates out of The Hague 
and has a local tribunal in Sarajevo, which prosecutes lower-level war criminals (Hagan, 
2003; Meernik, 2003, 2005; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). The ICTY is still in operation and 
is currently prosecuting Radovan Karazdic (former leader of the Serbian Democratic 
Party) and others. The tribunal recently announced it would close its prosecutions in 2016 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 More explanation of the ICTY and its discursive deployments of justice are in Chapter 2.  
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and move all Bosnian-related war crimes trials to the war crimes court in Sarajevo 
(www.icty.org).  
Although the ICTY provides a contextual backdrop for this dissertation, my 
primary research focus is on what “cannot be articulated in legal language” (Felman, 
2003) and on that which the ICTY neglects: the lived experiences of Bosnian Americans 
who are living with everyday, embodied trauma years after the war is technically over. If 
human rights are understood to be rights that guarantee peace, happiness, or prosperity, 
then talking about them only at the abstract, institutional level tells us little about how 
people affected by these discussions are living the day-to-day realities of displacement, 
war trauma, and shifting identities. And, equally important is exploring the mutually 
constitutive nature of local and institutional discourse to see how institutional talk and 
local, on-the-ground talk inform and are informed by one another. That is, the ICTY 
constructs a legal language paradigm to which local Bosnian Americans often feel 
compelled to speak when they talk about peace and justice, but, at the same time, based 
on my interactions and interviews, not much value seems to be placed on the work the 
ICTY is doing. Some variation of these two utterances is often juxtaposed within the 
interview setting and is emblematic of general sentiments about the ICTY: “The war 
crimes court at The Hague is a joke. And the sentences war criminals receive are too 
short.” That is, Bosnian Americans in Salt Lake City find little value in the justice 
procedures at the ICTY; yet, they also grapple with talking about what justice would look 




Rhetoric and Memory Studies: Intersections and Gaps 
Scholarly disciplines that address human rights violations, policies, and 
adjudications also neglect lived experiences and language-in-action of local communities. 
For instance, within the fields of rhetoric and writing studies, it is a given that the 
language of human rights discourse is rhetorical and that “rights” are discursively 
constructed (Doxtader, 2003, 2009, 2010; Hesford, 2011; Lyon, 2011, 2013; Powell, 
2012; Slaughter, 2009). But despite the work that has been done on the rhetorical nature 
of human rights discourse, less work has been done as research within populations 
affected most by this question. That is, rhetoricians who work on questions of human 
rights often focus on the rhetorical/theoretical potentialities of human rights discourse, 
arguing within the parameters of human rights law (Dunne & Wheeler, 1999; Mertus & 
Helsing, 2006; Reidy & Sellers, 2005); or within parameters of women’s legal rights 
(Hesford, 2011; Merry & Engle, 2009); or within the parameters of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) document (Arendt, 1976; Doxtader, 2003, 2010, 
2011a, 2011b; Lyon, 2011, 2013). Most of the work within the field of rhetoric being 
done on human rights discourse investigates institutions or global/international powers. 
Accordingly, there is a lack of scholarly research that explores on-the-ground discourses 
of people who have been in war, paying attention to local (as opposed to global) 
particularities as crucial rhetorical groundwork for theorizing the experiences of people 
who have been through war.  
Meanwhile, scholars of memory and identity who also work within larger realms 
of human rights and trauma studies argue that memory is a social process and posit a 
constitutive link between constructions of memory and constructions of identity (Aguilar- 
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San Juan, 2009; Climo & Cattell, 2002; Douglass & Vogler, 2012; Hawlbachs, 1980; 
Nora, 1989; Sen, 2006; Thompson, 1991). Yet, these theories lack attention to language-
in-action and the ways in which language constructs contingent, interactional identities 
that index ideological linguistic forms such as “nation,” “history,” and “justice” in 
reference to human rights. Thus, this dissertation merges disciplinary lines of inquiry 
(memory studies, human rights rhetoric) and merges methodologies (narrative discourse 
analysis, ethnographic interviews) to show how “traumatic breach” and “(dis)placement 
trauma” emerge within the linguistic interaction of lived experience and speak to how 
human rights discourse affects and is affected by the people experiencing its policies.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 outlines the general problem of the dissertation by introducing and 
describing the story of the Bosnian war, the creation of the ICTY, and the creation of the 
Bosnian American diaspora all as part of the larger context surrounding this project. The 
focus of this chapter is to contextualize the historical, current, and future settings wherein 
the interviews for this project took place.  
Chapter 2 surveys the work in human rights rhetoric, specifically as it relates to 
trauma, memory, testifying, and narrative. This chapter argues that although human rights 
rhetoric deals with large-scale instances of traumatic memory, the field in general lacks 
on-the-ground, lived narratives of people whose rights have been violated and are living 
with that everyday reality, which is where theories on memory and identity, and the link 
between the two as related to trauma, will be helpful in theorizing human rights locally.  
Chapter 3 argues that ethnographic interviews and discourse analysis are 
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complementary, rich methods for analyzing how people talk about war trauma. This 
chapter suggests that ethnographic methods allow for richer analysis of nondiscursive 
features, while discourse analysis looks at language-in-action, in collected narratives, to 
provide a nuanced view of the interview setting and transcriptions of those interviews.  
Chapter 4 uses theories from Chapter 2 and methods from Chapter 3 to investigate 
how concepts from narrative theory (Bruner, 1991; Labrov, 1978) demonstrate the 
emergence of “traumatic breach” in narratives. This chapter suggests that trauma emerges 
within narratives in relation to a presumed stability of narrative and narrative coherence, 
exemplifying the “breach” that makes certain experiences particularly traumatic, 
embodied, and enduring.  
Building upon Chapter 4, Chapter 5 suggests that “(dis)placement trauma” can be 
seen as another linguistically emergent concept of trauma. This chapter explores how 
(dis)placement trauma constructs and is constructed by identifications with place in 
diasporic stories about the Bosnian war.  
Chapter 6 builds upon concepts in Chapters 3 and 4 by suggesting that narratives 
about war trauma reveal what legal focuses on human rights might be missing—that 
which “cannot be articulated in legal language” (Felman, 2002). This chapter synthesizes 
the findings of this dissertation and suggests implications for future research on human 
rights and war trauma.  
 
Constructing “What Happened” 
In 1991, war broke out in the Balkan area now known as the former Yugoslavia. 
An accurate count of war casualties is a contentious matter. Numbers of deaths vary from 
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97,000 to 200,000 people depending upon who is counting and how “war casualty” is 
defined3 (Hagan, 2003; Subotic, 2009). The difficulty of obtaining counts of deaths, 
rapes, and displacements that are consistent across sources speaks to the complex, 
rhetorical nature of constructing “what happened” during and after a conflict. The 
Bosnian war from 1991-1995 is rhetorically positioned and described in a multiplicity of 
ways by historians, politicians, academics, and Yugoslavians. As is generally understood 
in sociolinguistics and in rhetorical theory, language is not mere rhetoric, nor is it a mere 
vehicle for power. It is power in and of itself as it creates and constitutes the world 
(Butler, 1997; Conley & O’Barr, 2005; Ehrlich, 2001; Matoesian, 2001). Thus, language 
used to describe war is ideologically positioned through its usage, construction, and 
enactment, and has real-world functions in everyday realities. For example, terming that 
specific time period from 1991-1995 as the “Bosnian War” is different from calling that 
same time period the “Bosnian Conflict” or “Balkan Conflict.” That is, “conflict” 
functions differently than does the term “war.” Furthermore, to this day, scholars disagree 
about whether the Bosnian war was a civil war or an act of perpetrated ethnic cleansing 
by one side (Serbia) intent on destroying the other (Bosnia) (Armatta, 2010; Malcolm, 
1996).   
 
Collective Memories of War Intertwine With Personal Memories 
As shown by the participants in this research, the collective history (or memory) 
of the Bosnian war is where storytellers start when explaining how they came to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This blog provides a comprehensive account of the incomprehensibility of nonaccounts in regard 
to war statistics. http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com 
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United States. This first example is from Adnan, who starts his personal war story with 
the historical beginning of the war: 
Well, um, … in 1992, war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started, or in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Uh, there have been, um, an aggression against, uh, …. 
internationally recognized country of Bosnia, so it's o-, often confused like a civil 
war, but it's not really a civil war because, uh, Serbian forces, um, attacked Bosnia 
and started committing ethnic cleansing, genocide, and, um, other ways of, uh – 
other means to, uh, spread Serbia, which was their republic.  So, um, we never 
thought there would be actually a war in our country […] (Interview with Adnan, 
2014) 
 
Another example comes from Tarik, who, like Adnan, starts his personal war story with 
the collective story of his people. Tarik explains the impetus and the crux of what has 
created the Bosnian diaspora.  
So what happened was the war kinda started in Slovenia where they declared 
independence and they didn't, you know want them to split or whatever.  But the 
Serbs didn't have any really, [pause] ah, association with, with Slovenia and didn't 
necessarily have any of their people live there.  So they didn't really care so they 
just let them do whatever they want.  Then Croatia decides to declare 
independence and you know the whole huge part in Croatia that had Serbs there.  
So Serbia, Croatia, … war starts between them.  They pretty much take, … you 
know a good third of them.  And then Bosnia declares independence and, you 
know the whole thing that happens … how they both want a chunk of it.  And 
Bosnia has a huge Serb population.  So what basically happened was this, … you 
know great exodus where, you know, where the Serb majority is, ah, any of the 
minority Croatians or Bosnian Muslims leave and then just this whole swap.  You 
know now there's a lot more drawn lines of where who is.  There's still major 
cities, you know Sarajevo and we have more diversity.  But before all that even 
happened, before it reached Bosnia, … no one at all thought it would escalate to 
where it did. (Interview with Tarik, 2014) 
 
Both examples demonstrate the disbelief expressed by other Bosnians that the conflict 
would escalate to a full-blown war. This retrospective disbelief, coupled with the 
diasporic displacement that has led tens of thousands of Bosnians to all corners of the 
Western world, is at the crux of trauma that I argue is insufficiently addressed by human 
rights rhetoric and international justice mechanisms. As this dissertation will 
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demonstrate, “traumatic breach” and “(dis)placement trauma” are discursively emergent 
within narratives that rely on prewar nostalgia, war as unexpected breach, and subsequent 
displacement.  
Significantly, diasporic identity is contingent upon a collective history/memory of 
the war’s origin (I will parse out the differences between “memory” and “history” and 
“collective” and “personal” in Chapter 2.) As I will show in this dissertation, setting an 
orientation (a Labovian term I discuss in Chapter 4) as a stable Yugoslavia emphasizes 
the breach that occurs as a result of the war’s beginning.  Without the war and its 
accompanying trauma and displacement, there is no reason for leaving Bosnia; without 
the origin story of Serb aggression, terrorizing neighbors, and massive displacement, 
there is no “now” that reflects back onto a “then.” As Andreea Ritivoi (2002) writes, 
“The past with its quiet routine [has] been replaced in the present with the turmoil of the 
war” (kindle location 657). That turmoil is introduced through the lens of a war’s history; 
there is no other way because that turmoil defines how people make sense of their lives 
now (Ritivoi, 2002). As collective, cultural memory of the larger Bosnia diaspora, a 
reference to a particular historical script enables this group of 11 Bosnian Americans to 
tap into a shared history that explains the persistence of traumatic memory (Caruth, 1995; 
Halbwachs, 1980). This process of memory making occurs through the telling of “the 
story” (their story) in an interview setting, which is itself not a retelling but a telling for 
the first time in a new context (Johnstone, 2008). Meaning, these interviewees tell the 
history of the war from a script but the story becomes something else in the context and 
process of explaining why and how they are at a coffee shop or in their living room, 
sharing the story of their trauma. The connections between traumatic memory, history, 
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nostalgia, and identity and how they inform one another will be explored in Chapter 2. 
For now, it is enough to assert that collective histories of the Bosnian war are continually 
intertwined with personal memories of Bosnians themselves.  
 
Fragments of Bosnian Histories 
As might be expected, the telling of the war’s history is invariably the same 
among participants. And their histories intertwine with the histories offered in the many 
books on the history of the former Yugoslavia or the history of the Bosnian war. My 
understanding of the region, its history, and its war, comes from a variety of fragments 
that have been oscillating in and out of my consciousness since the war started in 1991. I 
was neatly insulated from “over there” like probably most other Americans, and the same 
age as several of the Bosnian Americans interviewed for this project were when they first 
heard that war was coming to their town. In 1995, when President Bill Clinton decided to 
drop bombs on the Yugoslav army after the genocide at Srebrenica, I watched people 
cheer the end of the war on CNN. In the latter part of the 1990s, I recall barely thinking 
about the Bosnian refugees who were trickling into the school system in the greater Salt 
Lake County area. It wasn’t until 2007, when I moved to Sarajevo, that I started to piece 
together what I was seeing then with what I remember from my younger years. Stories 
Bosnian Americans in Salt Lake City shared with me and with each other over the past 
year resonate both with books on the region and with histories I heard firsthand while 
living in Sarajevo.  
In his review of several texts on Bosnia’s history and the beginning of the war, 
Campbell (2000) argues that two predominant interpretations of the conflict prevail: 
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“One is the tale of a civil war in which antagonism between various groups emerges for a 
variety of reasons. The other is of international conflict, in which aggression from one 
state threatens another” (p. 267). Campbell argues that these two interpretations make up 
the majority of historical narratives about the war and that both appear to have political 
purposes and material consequences. The major themes across the various fragments that 
inform my understanding of the region’s history can be divided into three particular 
threads that comprise the cultural script that is the history of the Bosnian war: 1) Before 
the war, life was peaceful, and then seemingly overnight, people began hating one 
another; 2) When Yugoslavia started to dissolve after the fall of communism (around and 
between 1988-1990), Serbs took up arms to keep Yugoslavia together and to establish a 
greater Serbia; 3) Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were forced out of the country and are 
now displaced all over the world. Interweaving with these themes, I will provide a 
contextually brief background of the region and the war, explaining the rhetorical 
situation this dissertation enters into. Along with this history, culled together from the 
multiplicity of fragments that inform my understanding, is a description of the Salt Lake 
City Bosnian diaspora community and the ICTY—two of many situational contexts 
resulting from the war and its aftermath.  
 
A Brief Background: The Bosnian War and a Diasporic Community 
The Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
Since before World War I, the region of the former Yugoslavia has had its borders 
redefined over and again by powerful interests—both domestic and foreign. Along with 
this near-constant changing of physical borders come shifts in ideologies, mythologies, 
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and vernacular histories. Thus, a “definitive” summary of the 1992-1995 conflicts is near 
impossible to write. This specific time period, from 1992-1995, within this particular 
region, is but a moment in space and time that cannot be separated from its peoples’ 
complex, competing and ongoing histories. As Campbell (2000) argues, any offered 
history decides what to privilege and what to neglect, and only postfacto do events have 
meaning as part of a historical record.  
Popular and scholarly books on the war in Bosnia inevitably include at least one 
chapter devoted to Yugoslavia’s history. They explain how in 1991, the Republics of the 
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Kosovo) started to break up after the fall of communism. Slovenia and 
Croatia were the first to leave. When the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) tried 
to secede, the Serbian entities within the former Yugoslavia took up arms to keep the 
remainder of Yugoslavia together and to establish a “Greater Serbia” (Hagan, 2003; 
Malcolm, 1996; Scharf, 1997; Subotic, 2009). Previous to the war, Bosnia was made up 
of various, self-identified religious and ethnic groups; the main three were Muslim 
Bosniaks (44%); Orthodox Serbs (31%); and Catholic Croats (17%) (although most of 
the Bosnian Americans I spoke with express being unaware of those identities as static or 
fixed or even outwardly recognizable). By the end of the war in 1995, the three ethnic 
groups had largely migrated to regions along ethnic lines, in large part due to the Dayton 
Peace Accords, which inscribed boundaries for territories based on 
national/religious/ethnic heritages (Hagan, 2003; Malcolm, 1996; Scharf, 1997; Subotic, 
2009).  
Alongside Slobodan Milosevic, who died while on trial at The Hague, Radovan 
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Karazdic founded the Serbian Democratic party (the SDS) in Bosnia. Under his 
leadership, the SDS eventually became its own territory within Bosnia—Republika 
Srpska—and played a role in laying crucial groundwork for the war (Hagan, 2003; 
Malcolm, 1996; Scharf, 1997; Subotic, 2009). Milosevic and Karazdic desired a central 
Serbian state to be carved out of Croatia and Bosnia. This desire for a greater Serbian 
state involved the forcible removal of nonSerbs throughout Bosnia and Croatia. From 
1992-1995, the region experienced horrific crimes against humanity. Surrounded by 
mountains filled with Serbian paramilitary nationalists (often called Chetniks), along with 
the Serb-controlled Yugoslavian army, the civilian population of Sarajevo lived under 
daily mortar and sniper attack for three years (Hagan, 2003). The Siege of Sarajevo, the 
Foca Rape Trials, and the genocide at Srebrenica have become key symbols of the war, 
both individually and collectively possessing the power to act as metonymy for 
nationalistic Serbian aggression within Bosnia and Herzegovina.4  
 
Peaceful Neighbors Turned Overnight 
This history is echoed and personalized in several war memoirs written by 
Bosnians, two I will reference in particular since I was able to meet and speak with both 
of the authors: Kenan Trebinčević’s The Bosnian List (Trebinčević & Shapiro, 2014) and 
Jasmina Dervisevic-Cesic’s The River Runs Salt, Runs Sweet (Dervisevic-Cesic, Rogers, 
& Vogel, 2003). Both of these memoirs provide a history of the war through personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a more detailed discussion of the region’s history, including ethnic genealogical lines, 
religious conversions, and shifting territorial boundaries, see Noel Malcolm’s book, Bosnia: A Short 
History, which focuses on a history of the (perceived) ethnic tensions in the area; or Judith Armatta’s book, 
Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic, which explains the history of the war in 
the context of the ICTY’s attempts at adjudication. 
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memories, family memories passed down, and cultural/collective memories. 
Trebinčević’s memoir, in particular, embodies the competing, complex histories 
surrounding narratives of war as he attempts to grapple with personal and collective 
histories both currently and in the past. His memoir threads back and forth from his 
childhood war memories in the town of Brcko in Bosnia near the Serbian border, his 
adolescent memories as a newly arrived refugee in Connecticut, and his current thoughts 
on Bosnian life and politics. Trebinčević’s book (2014) also expresses the betrayal many 
Bosnian Muslims felt when their Serb or Croat neighbors turned on them during the war. 
Trebinčević’s sentiment is echoed in other memoirs (such as in Dervisevic-Cesic (2003)), 
institutional sources, and in the interviews I conducted. In their interviews with Bosnian 
refugees, Weine, Becker, McGlashan, and Laub (1995) found similar emphasis on 
“shock” and “betrayal” by neighbors that seemed sudden and unprovoked. These are the 
sorts of questions that circulate: Did my neighbors always hate me? Or did they decide to 
hate me one day? This confusion exacerbates the betrayal described by many sources and 
is emblematic of how “traumatic breach” (discussed in Chapter 4) emerges within 
narratives about prewar life and endures throughout diasporic narratives.  
A narrative of life as peaceful and people as united before the war also resonates 
throughout narratives collected for this dissertation. For example, as Samira says, “Where 
I lived, um, on my street where I grew up, people were united no matter what religion 
you were. They were united” (Interview with Samira). Similarly, in Mertus and 
Tesanovic’s (1997) collection, The Suitcase: Refugee Voices from Bosnia and Croatia, 
Bosnian refugees describe friendly neighbors who seemingly overnight turned into 
enemies, stealing their homes and belongings and taking them to detention centers. 
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Weine et al. (1995) portray similar stories of unexpected betrayal in their interviews with 
Bosnian refugees. And Samantha Powers (2013) credits the overnight betrayal to 
nationalist rhetoric put forward by Serbian controlled media and politicians. But other 
histories (Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2013; Kaplan, 1993; Trebinčević & Shapiro, 2014;) 
describe relationships in the region as always turbulent yet controlled or tempered by 
communism’s secular enforcements, meaning even if religious/ethnic tensions existed, 
under secular communism, people could not express those sentiments because they could 
not outwardly practice religious expressions that might incite ethnonational pride 
(Malcolm, 1994). However, any theory about tensions in the region comes with a set of 
intersecting alternatives that demonstrate the complex history of Yugoslavia. 
 
Complicating the Narratives 
The idea that the region has always and inevitably been in turmoil along ethnic 
lines capitulates to Huntington’s (1993) Clash of Civilizations theory, which relies upon 
fixed, singular, ethnic identities that are predetermined, predestined to be at war. But as 
Sen (2006) writes in response to Huntington, “our differences do not lie on one 
dimension only” (p. 45). Rather, differences are complicated through intersecting 
economic, class, gender, and religious lines. For instance, in current history (within the 
last 50 years), Bosnian Muslims have not been an outwardly religious people. Without 
exception, everyone I interviewed described himself or herself, and the other Muslims 
they know, as secular Muslims, indexing ethnonational identifications rather than 
religious ones (see interview transcripts in Appendix C and D). Similarly, Malcolm’s 
(1994) book describes economic and class differences that mapped onto ethnonational 
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lines, but not solely along ethnic identities. The region is too multifaceted, too 
multicultural, and too vibrant to succumb to one easy origin narrative for the war.  
Prewar narratives disseminated by Serbian political leaders, like Milosovic, lived 
and breathed inside the cultural milieu and memory of many ethnic Serbians living in 
Bosnia. As Hagan (2003) argues, “Real as well as imagined struggles have been a 
recurring feature of the Balkan region through the centuries, including a frequently 
remembered defeat of the Serbians by the Ottomans on the Field of Blackbirds in Kosovo 
in 1389” (p. 10).  This defeat from the 14th century persists in the cultural memory of the 
region, aligning Bosnian Muslims with the historical Ottomans, complicating ethnic 
tensions with layers of Serbian nationalism, Kosovo’s disputed sovereignty, and Bosnian 
identity. Hauser (1999) provides another narrative about the war’s beginnings, explaining 
how Serbians might have risen to military prominence because of economic divisions 
amongst rural and urban areas that prompted many rural, ethnic Serbians to climb up the 
ranks of the military, leaving the majority of the weapons and weaponry training in the 
hands of the Serbs. This argument is further complicated by the fall of communism. 
During Tito’s reign at the time of communism, civilians were not allowed to own guns; 
therefore, the majority of guns were in the hands of the national army—a national army 
that, after the fall of communism, came under the control of a Serbian government, and a 
Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic (Hauser, 1999).  
There are many other heteroglossic (Bakhtin, 2010) narratives about the war that 
work together and against one another to create differing versions of blame and justice, 
including narratives about Bosniak Muslims as religious fundamentalists intent on 
turning Yugoslavia into an Islamic state, or descriptions of Orthodox Serbs wanting to 
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“cleanse” Greater Serbia to reclaim the territory lost during the Ottoman empire, or 
histories that portray Catholic Croats as recreating a nationalistic Croatian federation that 
resembled a Nazi wing of the Croat military that terrorized Serbian and Bosniak civilians 
during WWII (Hagan, 2003, 2006; Hauser, 1999; Subotic, 2005). There are also stories I 
heard firsthand about Muslim civilians feeding Serbian babies to lions in the Sarajevo 
zoo before the start of the war. 
Another potent, visual example of the heteroglossic nature of war’s accounts is an 
ongoing debate about an iconic photograph of a Bosnian Muslim, Fikret Alic, in a camp 
at Trnopolje in the Prijedor region of Bosnia (Vulliamy, 1992). Alic stands at a barbed 
wire fence, his shirtless chest showing an emaciated rib cage poking out beneath his skin. 
The image was taken by a British journalist, Vulliamy, and was instrumental in 
drumming up international support for intervention in Bosnia. However, another group of 
journalists from the British magazine, Living Marxism, questioned the veracity of the 
image, claiming the photojournalists from The Guardian staged the shot to resemble Nazi 
concentration camps (Campbell, 2002; Deichmann, 1997; Vulliamy, 2000). The dispute 
was taken to court where Living Marxism was successfully convicted of libel, ceasing its 
existence as a publication. The narratives and controversy surrounding this one image are 
emblematic of the polyvocalities of the war’s history (Campbell, 2002). However, mass 
graves, signed extermination orders, and rape camps are not ambiguous in their fact of 
violence or discrimination. Neither are the persistent, embodied trauma participants all 





Description of Local Diasporic Community 
Officially and institutionally, the war ended with the brokering of the Dayton 
Peace Accords in 1995, which proscribed discrete territorial boundaries for each of the 
ethnic groups within the region5 (Hagan, 2003). Currently, each territory has its own 
president, the three “presidents” rotating terms of leadership for ultimate fairness. 
Without exception, all of the Bosnian Americans I interviewed lamented the current state 
of politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and described the situation as untenable. Two 
women I interviewed expressed these feelings of dissatisfaction when I asked why they 
found the tribunal court at The Hague (the ICTY) to be useless—a sentiment they had 
previously expressed. But instead of talking directly about the ICTY (a system they 
described as utterly inadequate), they reference the political situation in Bosnia and how 
it relates to Bosnian identity: 
Azra: I don’t either. I just know we have a flawed constitution. That's what 
I know. 
Samira: That's true, yeah 
Azra: I know 'cause the constitution doesn't make any sense. 
 [Azra Laughs] 
Azra: There's three presidents. 
Samira: Yeah, oh my God 
Azra: And, in order to be elected, you have to identify as one. So if you 
don't identify as one of the three groups, what the heck are you? 
 
(Interview with Azra and Samira, 2014) 
What the heck are you? This theme runs through the interviews and is directly 
related to and informed by how people understand the collective history of a people. This 
desire to identify oneself and others as something concrete, recognizable, and singular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Appendix A for a map of how the Dayton Accords shifted the borders in Bosnia.  
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never discursively strays far from the thread of Bosnian history in the interviews I 
collected.   
During the war and its aftermath, multiple diasporic Bosnian communities were 
created as people fled out of their country to escape the war, including a community of 
over 10,000 Bosnian refugees in Salt Lake City, Utah and surrounding suburbs. Many 
Bosnians went to a temporary refugee settlement program in Western Europe (often 
Germany) before coming to Utah. The Utah chapter of the American Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Association (ABHA) actively promotes cultural events. Salt Lake City is also 
headquarters to the Bosnian American Professional Association (BAPA), which enables 
young Bosnian American professionals to network with one another and with Bosnians 
still living in Bosnia—in other words, BAPA aims to connect the larger diaspora of 
younger professionals. There is also a vibrant Facebook community of Bosnian 
Americans who live in Salt Lake City. During a flood in Bosnia several years ago, the 
local Bosnian American community in Salt Lake City raised money to support rebuilding 
efforts in parts of Bosnia that had been destroyed by flooding.  
There are two Mosques in the greater Salt Lake City area, including The Islamic 
Society of Greater Salt Lake. Out of the 11 people I interviewed, only one of them has 
attended a service at a Mosque since moving to Utah. In general, it seems as if most of 
the Bosnian American community in Salt Lake City has attempted to distinguish itself 
from Islam and “other Muslims.” Edin said he was “not that type of Muslim” when he 
talked about the wine he makes from grapes in his yard. And both Edin and Tamara 
talked about how worried they were about backlash toward their community after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. The community was also prepared for anti-Muslim 
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backlash after a local Bosnian American teenager, Sulejman Talovic, shot and killed 
multiple people at the Trolley Square mall in Salt Lake City.  Talovic’s aunt told 
reporters, “We are Muslims, but we are not terrorists” after several witnesses claimed 
Talovic shouted “Allahu Akbar” during the shootings, although the veracity of those 
claims was never discovered.  
For the most part, in Salt Lake City, the local Bosnian America community is 
relatively integrated into the population. Most of them have lived in Salt Lake City for 15 
years or more. Many of them attended high school and college in Utah, making Salt Lake 
City the commonality that unites various diasporic experiences. The ABHA has a 
community center in Millcreek, a Salt Lake City suburb, where members of the 
community gather for fundraisers, dance parties, holiday celebrations, and other events. 
There are also several Bosnian-owned eateries in Salt Lake City, including two sidewalk 
cafés, a sandwich shop, a local market that sells Yugoslavian goods, a bar, and at least 
two other Bosnian restaurants that are always crowded with members of the Bosnian 
American community.  
 
Conclusions 
As I will explain in the next chapter, the constitutive dance between memory and 
identity also includes overlaps between private and collective memories and between 
local and institutional communications of trauma. This dissertation focuses on how these 
particular collected narratives, as part of a diasporic Bosnian community, demonstrate the 
emergence of trauma through discourse and extradiscursive features as part of theorizing 
human rights outside the realm of law. It is important to understand (insofar as it is 
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possible) a brief history of the region, the multiple communities coming out of the region 
because of the war, and how the local Bosnian American community is contextually 
situated to speak about trauma. The history of Yugoslavia is multifaceted and polyvocal; 
each time I am conversing with someone from the local Bosnian community, I am 
reminded again how complicated and nuanced this history is and continues to be. The 
process of understanding and expressing empathy is continual, as is the story of this war 






HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC, MEMORY, AND TRAUMA 
 
Introduction 
In the modern Western world, a concept of humans-with-rights was written into 
the moral code of foreign affairs in the 1948 version of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). While this document codified how an international community 
might talk about rights—as given versus inherent; as within-a-nation versus as-a-refugee; 
as universally male—it is merely one rhetorical fragment within the large, complex 
system of symbols, discourses, laws, and artifacts we call “human rights.” In this project, 
I am concerned with how people share narratives about the Bosnian War and how 
traumatic memory emerges in language and in everyday life years later, focusing on one 
often neglected facet of human rights rhetoric—lived, everyday narratives of people 
whose rights and lives were disrupted by war. To explore this neglected component, I 
have collected interviews using ethnographic interviewing methods and then performed 
narrative discourse analysis on the audio and the transcripts of the interviews.  
 
Purpose of This Chapter 
This dissertation relies on the merging of several disciplinary theories, each of 
which are prolific and nuanced on their own. However, each scholarly conversation also 
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reveals certain gaps that, when merged with other interdisciplinary conversations, this 
dissertation attempts to fill. This chapter surveys the scholarly work that has been done 
on human rights rhetoric and demonstrates how research from cultural memory studies 
provides a richer exploration into how trauma emerges through language in lived 
experience and what this means for any study of human rights rhetoric.6 First, I will 
survey theories of human rights discourse through the fields of rhetoric and writing 
studies and show how human rights discourse is deeply rhetorical. I will then show how 
those theories of human rights discourse speak to/with/for/against research that links 
memory and identity, focusing specifically on how memories, as told through narrative, 
are constructed by language-in-action. Attention paid to language-in-action within 
personal narratives demonstrates how features of “trauma” emerge in linguistic 
interaction between participants and within the acts of sharing and listening. Lastly, this 
chapter will explore how nostalgic memory and displacment rhetorics pull the above 
scholarly fields together, showing how work within diasporic communities is at the crux 
of human rights. 
 
The Rise of Human Rights 
The notion that people are naturally endowed with “rights” and that all humans 
have those rights by nature of their common humanity is a concept that can be traced in 
written documents from the Magna Carta, to the Bill of Rights, to the UDHR (Brown, 
1999), continuing on into UN statutes and NGO mission statements. In 1776, the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chapter 3 more specifically discusses methods of interviewing and discourse analysis; this 




States Declaration of Independence claimed all persons are “endowed” with inalienable 
rights. In 1948, the preamble of the UDHR claimed “recognition of the inherent dignity” 
within the “human family is the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world” 
and that those inherent rights should be “protected by the rule of law” (UDHR, 1948).  
As Sen (2004) and others have pointed out, this notion has hardly been “self-
evident” since these inalienable rights applied only to a particular segment of society—
property-owning, White, Western, Christian males (Charlesworth, Chinkin, & Wright, 
1991; Merry, 2009), nor were they always and already protected by the rule of law.  It is 
similarly so in international law and human rights policy, which relies upon the same 
standard of personhood codified in the UDHR. The “human” theorized in the 
signification “human rights” is inextricably bound up with identity assumptions based on 
a privileged “white, Western/Northern European, Judeo-Christian, heterosexual, 
propertied, educated, male” (Hernandez-Truyol as cited in Peach, 2005, p. 90). For 
example, Sally Engle Merry’s (2006) book, Human Rights and Gender Violence, explains 
how the rise of human rights has largely ignored the crimes perpetrated against women 
because the “human” in human rights was always and already universally male (Peach, 
2005). This is not to say that human rights philosophy and law are not well intentioned or 
that they have not achieved many groundbreaking accomplishments. But it is vital to note 
how human rights is invoked within the international rule of law to promote a particular 
way of envisioning personhood and identity, thereby effecting a particular type of justice 
for an exclusive conception of person. This type of justice focuses on discrete instances 
of violence that can be accounted for with eyewitnesses or physical wounds, neglecting a 
large swath of human rights violations that do not emerge or manifest in this way. 
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The story of the rise of human rights in the Western imagination is also the story 
of international law, for without legal language and backing, human rights do not exist to 
be violated (and prosecuted) as such. The UDHR declared it the role of the law to 
dispense and protect human rights. This presents a host of larger issues stemming from 
conversations about whether rights are inherent or given (Donnelly, 1999; MacLeod, 
2005; Martin, 2005), and if they are given, by whom? (Sen, 2004). Are they bestowed by 
a “creator” as the U.S. Declaration of Independence suggests? Are they dispensed and 
protected by international governing legal bodies, as the UDHR suggests? Or are they 
simply self-evident and natural, inextricably conflating global and local needs in a “soft” 
rhetoric that fails to implement real, material change (Sen, 2004)? These are the types of 
questions addressed throughout scholarly work on human rights rhetoric and discourse.  
 
Rhetorics of Human Rights 
To describe human rights as rhetorical means to view rights not as inherent 
within a person, but rather as created and authorized through language in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), produced through enactments of human rights 
law at the United Nations, watched and critiqued by peripheral, nongovernmental 
agencies, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, adjudicated through 
an International Criminal Court (ICC), and used by media outlets to describe atrocities 
happening elsewhere (Doxtader, 2003, 2009, 2010; Hesford, 2011; Lyon, 2013; Powell, 
2012; Slaughter, 2009). Scholars who study the rhetoric of human rights discourse, or 
human rights rhetoric, use these rhetorical contexts as artifacts and data sets for studying 
how theorizations of human rights are operationalized through discourse and/or 
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nondiscursive practices.  
Most scholars agree that the concept of “human rights” is a construct, produced 
through and by language that constitutively creates the “right” even as it describes it 
(Doxtader, 2010). Without the discourse (or rhetoric) of human rights, war crimes cannot 
be designated as such; mass rape, for example, is horrendous but not a war crime until it 
is proven to be systematic and ethnically motivated (Merry, 2009; Mertus, 2003; Power, 
2013). Atrocities that impinge on human dignity are constructed while they are 
simultaneously named. To view human rights as rhetorical, then, or as rhetoric, rather 
than as given or legislated, is to analyze how language constructs and positions people 
within a system of rights that designates a “giver” and a “receiver” and how those actions 
codify and enact how people are represented, and how they can/will represent themselves 
(Hawes, 2010; Hesford, 2011).  
Rhetorical scholars have made room for rhetoric within the field of human rights, 
as evidenced by the proliferation of work in the past 50 years; however, most of this 
research examines the rhetorical nature of human rights discourse. Less work has been 
done within communities affected most by the role of human rights. That is, rhetoricians 
who work on questions of human rights often focus on the rhetorical/theoretical 
potentialities of human rights discourse, arguing within broadly defined parameters of 
human rights law (Dunne & Wheeler, 1999; Mertus & Helsing, 2006; Reidy & Sellers, 
2005); women’s legal rights (Hesford, 2011; Merry & Engle, 2009); or the UDHR 
document (Arendt, 1976; Doxtader, 2003, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Lyon, 2013; Powell, 
2012). Inevitably, these categories and scholars overlap and are interconnected. Much of 
the work being done on human rights discourse investigates the rhetorical production—
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the “social and rhetorical process of incorporation” (Hesford, 2011, p. 7)—of institutions 
or global/international powers. Thus, there is a lack of scholarly research that explores 
on-the-ground discourses of people who have been in war, paying attention to local (as 
opposed to global) particularities as crucial rhetorical groundwork for theorizing human 
rights.  
The theories of several scholars in these areas have contributed to my 
understanding of the rhetoricity of human rights. The main premises of these arguments 
draw from two overlapping threads: 1) human rights as rhetorical, and 2) human rights as 
a living practice.  
 
Human Rights as Rhetorical 
Scholars in rhetoric have made swift strides in positioning human rights discourse 
as culturally constructed and contingent and also as constructing flows of power (Lyon & 
Olsen, 2011). In opposition to the universalism constructed by positivist legal systems 
and United Nations policy, rhetoricians have argued that legal definitions of personhood, 
rights, and justice are concepts constructed by and through language and do not exist as 
universally applicable or inherent to all peoples. For instance, Doxtader’s prolific work 
on reconciliation, specifically his book With Faith in the Works of Words (2009), which 
rhetorically analyzes the work of reconciliation in South Africa, positions 
“reconciliation” within human rights work as a rhetorical construct that appears to float 
as a possibility: “Reconciliation begins with the question of how to talk about talk in the 
midst of violence without end” (p. 85). Rather than see “reconciliation” as a noun or as an 
objective to achieve, Doxtader argues that reconciliation is a process and a “mode of 
31 
 
struggle” (p. 40), simultaneously signifying a multiplicity of meanings and functions to 
different people depending upon how, when, and where it is used in practice. Rhetorical 
scholars, such as Doxtader (2011b), Hesford (1999, 2011) and Lyon (2011, 2013) explore 
how words get pushed, pulled, and stretched according to the social contexts they 
produce and emerge within. They argue that words not only take on different meanings in 
different contexts, but that they also produce those contexts through previous usages and 
future potential iterations.  
A 2011 special issue of Rhetoric Society Quarterly (RSQ) dedicated its contents 
entirely to human rights rhetoric, focusing specifically on “Traditions of Testifying and 
Witnessing.” Contributors to this special issue include Arabella Lyon, Lester C. Olson, 
Jacqueline Jones Royster, Molly Cochran, Mari Boor Tonn, Cindy Patton, Erik Doxtader, 
and Wendy S. Hesford (2011). The scholars in this issue of RSQ address the “human 
rights scene of (mis)recognition” as a system into which people are interpellated as they 
become victims of human rights abuses and as they receive “rights” granted to them by 
an institutional power (Doxtader, 2011b; Hesford, 2011). Utilizing rhetoric to explore the 
“hierarchical significance of word, definitions, redefinitions, symbols designating social 
groupings, myths, rituals, [and] symbolic images” (Lyon & Olson, 2011, p. 205), they 
also address what Hesford calls “distinctions of geopolitical scale and scope” recognizing 
the qualitative and ontological differences between human rights law and on-the-ground 
experiences of people for whom human rights law and policy exists. This RSQ issue is a 
prime example of how a rhetorical approach to human rights has become positioned as an 
ethical imperative and how “the moral appeal of human rights has been used for a variety 
of purposes” (Sen, 2005, p. 315).  
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The field of rhetoric is “uniquely positioned to offer particular insights into the 
language of human rights declarations, covenants, and the symbolic action of human 
rights claims, laws, norms, aspirations, and deliberations” (Lyon & Olson, 2011, p. 204). 
Demonstrative of this imperative is David Campbell’s work on (meta)narratives in/of 
Bosnia (1998), which argues for a rethinking of international paradigms about ethnic and 
national identity and a radical rethinking of the ethics of experiencing alterity. Campbell 
positions the war as not (merely) a clashing of cultures (similar to Sen’s (2009) argument 
rejecting Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory) but as a complex clash of 
sociopolitical, socioeconomic, cartographic, religious, nationalist narratives that also 
interweave amongst neoliberalism and international perspectives of others. Similarly, 
Lynda Boose’s (2014) article “National Counter Memories: Crossing the River Drina: 
Bosnia Rape Camps, Turkish Impalement, and Serb Cultural Memory,” traces collective, 
historical Serb cultural memory as part of its rape warfare strategy, thus suggesting that 
even the most heinous acts of war, of human rights violations, are rhetorically situated 
within cultural memory and myth. Rhetoric, then, finds its place within human rights 
because it enables tracing and analysis of the rhetorical and discursive practices that 
authorize violence and codify nationalism.  
 
Human Rights as Living Practice 
Within the field, there is also research that “approaches human rights as a living 
practice” (Mertus & Helsing, 2005). Mertus’s and Helsing’s (2005) collection, Human 
Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding, 
theorizes human rights as an integrated practice requiring an integrated approach for 
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peace. They promote a rhetorical view of human rights as a living practice intersected 
with law and transitional justice mechanisms. Scholars approaching human rights as a 
living practice work to “disrupt myoptic narratives” (Hesford, 2011) through personal 
autobiographical narratives and storytelling from people who have experienced human 
rights violations. This work often reveals counter narratives that complicate traditional 
ideas about diasporic experience, war trauma, and what qualifies as human rights 
discourse (Hesford, 2011; Minh-ha, 2011; Schaffer & Smith, 2004a).  
 
Storytelling and Performance 
Within the last 50 years, international activists, scholars, and lawyers have pushed 
for an expanded version of personhood conceptualized by international human rights 
policy (Mertus, 2006; Smart, 2002; Stark, 2000). Part of the push for this work includes 
an increased interest in storytelling as a form of justice (Merry, 2006; Schaffer & Smith, 
2004a, 2004b). Often, storytelling takes place as testimony in a court of law (such as at 
the International Criminal Court or the ICTY at The Hague) or at local truth 
commissions—the most famous of which is South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), but which also includes truth commissions in Guatemala, Peru, 
Timo-Leste, Morocco, Argentina, and about 20 other countries around the world 
(Hayner, 2011). Additionally, nongovernmental groups, such as Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International, use storytelling to draw attention to worldwide injustices. 
However, as Hayner (2011) and Shaw and Waldorf (2010) note, TRCs have less 
institutional power than tribunal courts. Often they have fewer legal resources and less 
authority and legitimization within the realm of international law structuring human 
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rights policy (Hayner, 2011). Additionally, as noted by Felman (2004), “What has to be 
heard in court is precisely what cannot be articulated in legal language” (p. 4). Thus, 
storytelling, as a mechanism of justice is given little attention in human rights policy 
except as a feminized practice in contrast to the masculine positivism of common law and 
canon law that international law is based upon (Charlesworth et al., 1991; Goodrich, 
1996). That is, the intersecting rise of women’s human rights alongside storytelling as a 
mechanism for human rights justice has, in some ways, defined noncourt testimony 
(storytelling) as “soft” instances of human rights violations in opposition to fact-driven 
testimonies solicited for a legal tribunal. The law necessitates corroboration and a 
multitude of witnesses to identify human rights violations (to identify trauma as 
traumatic) thereby structuring and constraining the types of testimonies that are valid 
within a court of law thus also structuring and constraining human rights policy, 
implementation, and adjudication (Conley & O’Barr, 2005; Constable, 2009; Ehrlich, 
2001; Matoesian, 2001; Sarat & Kearns, 1996; Slaughter, 2009; Smart, 2002).  
However, Schaffer and Smith (2004a) argue that the rise of “human rights” as a 
global, moral concern, and the rise of personal narratives, coincide in their ability to 
“recognize and bear witness to a diversity of values, experiences, and ways of imagining 
a just social world and of responding to injustice, inequality, and human suffering” (p. 1). 
Schaffer’s and Smith’s (2004b) claim that “personal storytelling” has “motivated the 
rights agenda” (p. 3) speaks to the large amounts of research dedicated to theorizing acts 
of testifying and witnessing within human rights courts. As previously mentioned, 
Doxtader’s (2003, 2010, 2011a) work on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 
explores the rhetorical nature of reconciliation as well as the words used to enact it. 
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Similarly, Shaw and Waldorf (2010) apply a critical lens on global justice mechanisms 
and argue that personal storytelling creates local opportunities for culturally appropriate 
justice interventions. Hayner’s (2011) explores the challenge of truth commissions in the 
context of localized commissions within the past 2 decades and focuses specifically on 
the role of testifying and witnessing and the possibility of retraumatization. Felman and 
Laub (1992) investigate, among other topics, ethical implications of bearing witness to 
atrocity and listening to stories of trauma, focusing on the literary nature of testimonial 
practices. While these scholars are not explicitly discussing human rights as per the 
UDHR, their attention to storytelling as a mechanism for justice relates to human rights 
work done within the field of rhetoric and demonstrates the importance of including 
personal narratives as theoretical context for human rights discourse.  
As a living practice, human rights can also be theorized through a lens of 
performativity. While my research in this dissertation is not focused on performativity or 
routed through that theoretical lens, the work of scholars in cultural performance studies 
have influenced my thinking about how memory is shared and how human rights might 
be theorized differently. Performance has influenced anthropology and ethnography 
(Conquergood, 1992) and has been influenced by these same fields along with rhetoric. 
Catherine Cole’s (2010) book, oriented around performativity in South Africa’s truth 
commission, also addresses the imperatives of storytelling as performative justice. In a 
similar vein, Taylor’s (2003) book, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural 
Memory in the Americas, demonstrates how memory is performed as a living practice. 
Most significantly, Taylor’s theorization of the archive/repertoire binary reveals what is 
missing from much of human rights research—voices of people who have been affected 
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by policy, and a theorization of human rights from the bottom-up. Her piece (1997) on 
performance and nation-ness is influential in current scholars’ work on the rhetoric of 
nation. 
Madison’s research (2006, 2010) on performing human rights as activism 
demonstrates the power that can occur through performativity in method, analysis, and 
activism. Finally, the ethnographic theorist underpinning most of the scholars cited 
above, Conquergood, is influential in all aspects of this dissertation—from method, to 
theory, to analysis, to writing. His (1992) article, “Ethnography, Rhetoric, and 
Performance,” posits the connection between the three-mentioned disciplines as the “new 
disciplinary reach of the new ethnography of performance” (p. 19). He references Victor 
Turner’s resuscitation of theatre through the philosophy of language (via J.L. Austin’s 
speech act theory) as a pivotal point in performance studies, moving from making, not 
faking to Bhabha’s retooling of performance as breaking and remaking (Conquergood, 
1992).  
These texts fill a significant gap within the work on human rights rhetoric done by 
scholars in the fields of rhetoric and composition studies. Folding performativity and 
storytelling into the study of rights incorporates the “lived practice” of being human into 
the study of human rights, merging personal experience, storytelling, discourse, plus 
“extra-discursive features” (Hawhee, 2006) into institutional discourses about human 
rights. The intersections of these overlapping fields, the “elsewhere” (Minh-ha, 2011) and 
the “repertoire-like” nature of the in-between (Taylor, 2002), reveal the academic gap 




Living Practices of Diasporic Movement  
and Displacement 
Approaching human rights as a living practice also comes in the work of scholars 
who work on displacement and diasporic movement. Landmark, groundbreaking cultural 
theorists such as Stuart Hall (1990), Homi K. Bhabha (1994, 2013), and others have 
articulated the influence diasporic movements and displacements have on identity. The 
work of Katrina Powell and Trinh T. Minh-ha have been most salient to how I am 
situating my research.  
Powell (2012) focuses on rhetorics of displacement by exploring narratives of 
people who are forced into relocating along with media representations of displacement. 
Although her work is not about human rights, per se, she is offering a theory of rights in 
terms of the people who are displaced and forced to relocate. She argues that the moving 
of bodies is also the moving of identities, a complex “identity construction within 
relocation” that reconfigures how we might theorize human rights (p. 300). Powell’s 
work merges nicely with scholarship in cultural memory studies that links identity 
construction to place. She articulates a notion of “moving identities” that are mutually 
constitutively constructed alongside locations.   
Minh-ha’s vast, creative body of work also focuses on displacement and diasporic 
movements; her work provides personal, nuanced counter narratives about refugee 
experiences and the embodiment of these experiences, specifically in regard to trauma. 
Her book (2011) Elsewhere, Within Here: Immigration, Refugeeism and the Boundary 
Event expresses how shifting identities make up the refugee experience. Minh-ha’s book 
is a collection of photography, poems, personal essays, and theory, and is a salient 
example of the power of personal narrative in connecting memory, storytelling, and 
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identity to human rights rhetorics. Powell and Minh-ha’s work, along with others 
mentioned, reflect the role personal narratives and the sharing of memory through 
storytelling can have in theorizations about diasporic communities who are also often 
victims of human rights abuses.   
 
Summary of Gaps in Human Rights Literature 
By and large, a lack of on-the-ground research within communities affected by 
human rights policy and theory speaks to the types of data scholars of human rights 
rhetoric appear to privilege. Human rights rhetoricians deal with documents, testimonies, 
and institutions that label human rights within the parameters set by the UDHR and legal 
definitions of personhood. However, it is my contention that communities outside of 
these labels, such as relocated individuals from diasporic communities, are also “doing” 
the work of human rights. Narratives shared by Bosnian Americans about war 
experiences are also theorizations and expressions of how human rights get talked about 
and deployed even when they are not talked about in institutional settings.  
Despite deeming human rights discourse as ripe for a rhetorical approach, 
rhetorical scholars still put emphasis on human rights discourse as it exists within the 
confines of legal institutions, government bodies, or nonprofit associations. Human 
Rights Watch’s publication on justice and human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
focuses entirely on the judicial system and how the UDHR’s definitions of human rights 
function on or for people from BiH. Lyon and Olson (2011) argue that rhetorical inquiry 
into human rights “examines how audiences identify with both rights themselves and the 
individuals or communities whose rights have been violated” (p. 203). Yet, this point, 
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while rhetorical, does not attend to how those whose rights have been violated talk about 
human rights in their everyday lives. Arguably, this confines rhetorical inquiry to the 
realm of persuasion, asking, in essence, how does human rights discourse convince 
audiences that it is wrong to violate the rights of other humans? While a crucial 
conversation, I propose we can do more to privilege and listen to personal narratives in 
addition to asking how narratives affect larger conversations about human rights.  
 
Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of Identity 
Accounting for memories is a crucial part of human rights work because the 
prosecution of human rights violations is dependent upon victims sharing stories about 
atrocities. Thus, scholarship in memory studies intersects regularly with scholarship on 
trauma, testifying, witnessing, and narrative/storytelling. To theorize human rights as a 
living practice, it is necessary to study how different people remember and talk about 
traumatic experiences and how those memories become embodied in everyday life. 
Cultural memory studies scholars theorize how speakers share traumatic memory and 
how the act of sharing, combined with acts of listening and witnessing, contributes to 
conversations about human rights, justice, peace, and identity. For instance, scholars have 
explored relationships between individual and collective memories (Climo & Cattell, 
2002; Halbwachs, 1980, 1992; Nora, 1989; Thompson, 2000; Wertsch, 2002) and how 
those memories constitute (and are constituted by) practices, constructions, and 
enactments of identities (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009; Huyssen, 2003; Minh-ha, 2011; 
Ritivoi, 2002; Smith & Watson, 2001; Taylor, 2003). Other scholars work specifically on 
traumatic memory and how it is shared and heard (Caruth, 1996; Douglass & Vogler, 
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2012; Edkins, 2003).  
I will specifically discuss how these theories revolve around language as the 
means of representation for the sharing of memory. This section will first survey the 
relevant literature on collective and personal memory, tracing the various categorizations 
of types of memories. I then survey the work done on traumatic memory, focusing on 
language as constitutive of identity, the sharing of memory, acts of listening, and the 
embodiment of trauma. Lastly, I examine intersections between diasporic memories, 
displacement, and nostalgia.  
 
Collective and Personal Memories 
 Connections and distinctions between “types” of memories are articulated in a 
variety of ways. In his seminal work, On Collective Memory, Halbwachs (1980) 
identifies what he calls three types of memory: autobiographical, collective, and 
historical. He uses the term “autobiographical memory” to refer to events experienced 
personally.  Other scholars call this “personal memory” (Aguilar San-Juan, 2005; Cimet, 
2002), “individual memory” (Campbell, 2008), or “private memory” (Felman, 2002).  
Halbwachs identifies “collective memory” as events that were rendered to an individual 
by other members of society. This is also referred to as “generational memory” (Hareven, 
1978), “social memory” (Aguilar San-Juan, 2005; Climo & Cattell, 2002), and “public 
memory” (Huyssen, 2003). Hareven (1978) uses the term “generational memory” to 
“encompass the memories which individuals have of their own families’ history, as well 
as more general collective memories about the past” (p. 137), that is, she suggests 
memories can be inherited when combined with collective memories also constructed 
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throughout the process.  
 
A Third Space? Between Private and Public Memories 
Aguilar-San Juan (2005) theorizes “social memory” as a space between personal 
and what she calls “official memory,” marking a third space that exists within Taylor’s 
(2002) “repertoire” of memory and performance. Aguilar-San Juan argues some groups 
have more power to produce social memory than do others, which makes the production 
of memory always a process and a struggle over narrative. And, although Halbwachs 
identifies a third type of memory, “historical memory,” which is history shaped through 
the work of historians, other scholars do not necessarily make those same distinctions 
between “historical memory” and “collective memory.” Pierre Nora (1989) distinguishes 
between “memory” and “history” by claiming memory is “borne of life” while history is 
problematic, reconstructed, and incomplete (p. 8). Often, memory scholars will suggest 
that a third space exists between private and public memory. Edkins (2003) suggests 
social memory draws from private and collective memories and is in constant struggle 
until one centralizing authority fixes meaning (through language, for example) for a 
period of time. She uses the example of war memorials to display how official memory 
attempts to fix public memory, and how social memory then resists fixation when it 
disrupts the official meaning of the memorial. And Climo and Cattell (2002) collapse 
social, historical, and collective memory into one strand, arguing that this type of 
memory is “provisional,” malleable,” contingent,” and is “negotiated and contested; 
forgotten, suppressed, or recovered; revised, invented, or reinvented” (p. 5).  
Disciplinarily, each categorization of memory is marked by its own artifacts for 
42 
 
study—institutional discourses, court proceedings, war monuments, personal narratives, 
testimonials, etc. Regardless of the terms used, most scholars agree that collective and 
personal memories inform one another and cannot cleanly be separated into disparate 
categories. The boundaries cannot so clearly be drawn between personal/individual, 
collective/social, and institutional/dominant memory. Most importantly, the mutually 
assured construction of these categorizations constitutes and is constituted by identity 
practices manifest through discourse, place-making activities, and embodiment.  
 
Separating Memory Strands 
As Nora (1989) might argue, history is perceived as an objective view of the past, 
but history is always “historical memory.” When personal and social memory turn into 
official memory, the past is often normalized or silenced, trapped in a dialectic between 
remembering and forgetting (Nora, 1989). Social power, in the form of language or 
place/space, secures authority over the past (Campbell, 2008), making it seem as if there 
is only one dominant narrative of history. For instance, in a legal setting, the lines 
between individual and collective must be clearly, legally drawn, and private traumas 
must be communicated to construct collective memory and identity (Felman, 2002). For 
instance, the ICTY must communicate trauma in order to make an argument about “what 
happened” during the war and what the aftermath means for the nationstate. This requires 
concerted, purposeful translation of private, individual instances of trauma into collective 
traumas that must be collectively assimilated by not just the former Yugoslavian 
countries, but by an international audience as well. The communication of trauma by the 
ICTY is thus a constitutive act of identity formation for the nation-state, through the 
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articulation of (distinctly separated) memories. To do this legal work in a trial, traumatic 
memories must be specifically separated into individual versus collective memories for 
the main purpose of displaying war atrocities as individualized, (to hold individuals 
accountable and as separate from ethnonational identities)7 but then also as collective 
trauma to move the individualized crime to a systematic war crime as something a nation, 
and an international audience, should “collectively” care about (Felman, 2002). This 
separation of traumatic memories works to construct a particular type of identity that can 
then be rearticulated in the context of a collective identity.  
Thus, even though private and public memories are tangled, it is necessary to 
portray them as separate in adjudication. However, the individual is always situated 
within a particular collective, which is always immediately, socially shaped (Halbwachs, 
1980). It is only within a social context that memories are remembered in the first place, 
that the beginnings of an articulated “I” are moved to a “We” (Archibald, 2002). Because 
individual and collective memory is always social, the construction of it is always 
political also; there are power differentials in how memories get constructed, in who gets 
to speak, in who gets to translate individual memory to collective or social memory 
(Aguilar-San Juan, 2005; Climo & Cattell, 2002). Thus, memory is an active process of 
negotiating, selecting, remembering and forgetting (Natzmer, 2002). The past can be 
constructed and reconstructed through the memory repertoire, but this is all part of the 
push and pull of identity and memory and the fight over history (Taylor, 2009). Historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Many of the Bosnian Americans interviewed for this dissertation expressed a similar desire to 
separate those who committed atrocities from the major ethnic group perpetuating the violence; thus, they 
often referred to those doing the harm as the Chetniks rather than the Serbs in order to distinguish between 
the ethnonational civilian population and the fundamentalist militias committing atrocities. 
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memory is thus shaped by the personal stories that are told and by those that are silenced 
and forgotten (Climo and Cattell, 2002; Natzmer, 2002).  
 
Traumatic Memories 
Among those scholars who specifically analyze the link between trauma and 
memory, my research incorporates three theorizations of trauma by Edkins (2003), 
Caruth (1996), and Smith and Watson (2001) that explain trauma as an event and as a 
process. Edkins articulates trauma as a breach in the assumed safety in the community or 
state power. She sees trauma as a transitional moment wherein the experience is 
unassimilated, inarticulatable, and persistent. As Edkins (2003) notes, the communication 
of trauma forces a rearticulation of identities—both individual and collective. Similarly, 
Caruth (1996) sees trauma as an experience that is not fully assimilated (or interpreted) as 
it occurs. For Caruth, it is this uninterpretable quality that makes trauma traumatic—the 
inability to make sense of it both in the moment and in the “aftermath,” which makes the 
unassimilated trauma traumatic long after the initial event. Utilizing the concept of 
Freud’s theory that trauma is a “double wound,” Caruth claims trauma is in the event and 
in the aftermath and that personal trauma is connected to collective trauma in the actual 
telling of trauma, which is memory. Similarly, Smith and Watson (2001), claim traumatic 
memory is an “abstract cluster that can be scripted and exorcised.” Thus, not only is 
trauma abstract, unassimilated, and persistent, but it is also an experience that is 
susceptible to conforming to particular scripts, which makes it transformative in a 
multiplicity of ways. The push and pull of “meaning” and “interpretation” that trauma 
undergoes during its moment of volatility is where identity formations can take place 
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through a variety of contexts (Smith & Watson, 2010) and a loosening of discursive links 
(Butler, 1997). Institutional narratives impose meaning upon trauma for particular ends, 
and survivors of that trauma also negotiate the dominant narrative along with their own 
narratives and scripts to make sense of “what happened.” This process is crucial in the 
constitution of identity and memory (Schaffer & Smith, 2004a, 2004b; Smith & Watson, 
2010).  
 
Language, Memory, and Identity 
One of the available means of representation for communicating traumatic 
memory is through language—either writing, talking, listening to another, and or through 
listening to what is not said (Glen, 2004). Because language has constitutive power in and 
of itself, and is not merely the vehicle for power, nor the representation of power, 
language has the power to constitute identities through its usage (Butler, 1997). That is, 
because language and identity construction are always interactional, the construction of 
an identity can be imposed upon someone by someone else through language (as in a 
courtroom by a lawyer to a witness) (Butler, 1997; Ehrlich, 2001). Also, though, identity 
can be enacted through language by someone who wishes to present a particular identity 
for a particular moment (Butler, 1997; Taylor, 2002).  
Thus, the notion of identity and its construction and enactment is deeply 
complicated. As Sen (2006) claims, identity is always multiple; yet, distilling 
multiplicities of identity into a singular identity enables and authorizes violence. The 
singularization of identity, wherein it becomes fixed and categorized for the purposes of 
“othering,” legitimizes violent behavior. Sen argues that this focus on singular identity is 
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constructed and reinforced by media, policies, nationalist rhetoric, leaders, and a variety 
of social factors.  He argues that Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory, 
which posits that people’s religious and cultural identities will be the primary source of 
conflict in the post-cold-war world, relies upon faulty assumptions about civilization and 
identity, and segments people into civilizations that are fixed and singular. Along with 
Sen’s theories, what is most harmful about the fixing of a singular identity is the fixing of 
identity as existing separate from social practice and culture. When there is no way to 
enact identity through memory or social practices (such as language) because it is seen as 
existing a priori and not as a socially constituted, interactional construct, agency is 
restricted.  
As previously mentioned, Boose’s (2014) tracing of mythologized Serbian 
nationalism and its manifestation in rape warfare, addresses what Sen refers to as the 
illusion of a singular violence constructed by a nation-state and circulated in collective 
memory for the purposes of fomenting violence. For instance, language used by nation-
state authorities often imposes a dominant, collective memory upon a group of people, 
thus constructing a collective (perceivably unified) identity for them also. Language 
functions within a social, cultural context, thus culture plays a role in constructing 
memory and identity, but it does not solely determine it (Sen, 2006; Soh, 2008). For 
instance, Sarah Soh’s (2008) book, The Comfort Women, explores representations of 
Korea’s comfort women during the Second World War and how those representations 
constitute and constrain the identities of the women (Soh, 2008). Despite their 
multiplicities of identities, representations of their roles can restrict which identities they 
can enact. The constitution of identity can thus occur through language, as in the sharing 
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or silencing of traumatic memory. 
 
Sharing Memories and Acts of Listening 
To understand how identity is constructed within the sharing of narratives, and to 
demonstrate how the sharing of narrative is most salient to my research in this 
dissertation, the concept of a “second voice” must be theorized as part of the interactional 
process of sharing memory (Campbell, 2008). That is, memories become memories in the 
context of a speaker and a listener, through the sharing of language. Memory is always an 
interactional, shared process wherein our sense of self is constituted (Campbell, 2008). 
Thus the construction of memory, like language and through language, is always 
contingent upon the social world for its meaning. However, the categories involved in 
sharing memory—context, identity, trauma, history, selves, etc. are unstable categories. 
They are all interactionally constructed over and again in the moment of communication, 
none of them existing a priori to the communicative situation at hand. What this means is 
that language is the means by which identity becomes constructed, but language is 
dependent upon social contexts, practices, and formations for its meaning. This makes the 
sharing of traumatic memory highly volatile and fluid, and, thus, moveable and 
transformative in generative ways. That is, for example, if confession is an act of 
utterance (Zulaika, 2003), then that act becomes constitutive of identity simultaneously as 
the social context comes into being also.  
Sharing memory is how we come to form a sense of self and a relationship with 
others, which is also how identities are co-constructed in the moment of telling 
(Campbell, 2008). What happens, then, when the memories that are shared are traumatic? 
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If the history of a trauma takes place through listening by/to another (Caruth, 1996), and 
if talking and repairing justice are often one and the same act (Zulaika, 2003), then “talk” 
possesses a constitutive function, meaning language (“talk”) constitutes the speaker as the 
speaker is talking (Butler, 1997). The constitution of identity is enacted in the utterance 
through the act of Althusserian interpellation, which necessarily implies an interlocutor, 
but not automatically a “listener” (Butler, 1997). However, in the act of sharing memory, 
the “second voice” (Campbell, 2008) is the interlocutor who simultaneously constructs 
memory, identity, and context in the act of doing research and engaging with people and 
institutions; therefore, listeners are compelled to think about how performances and 
constructions of memory and identity are also empathy practices. That is, if we are all 
interactionally constructing one another’s identities, and we are all implicated in one 
another’s trauma (Caruth, 1996), then we are ethically compelled to reflect on how those 
memories and identities are being constructed by and through us. This is especially true 
in dealing with traumatic memories as these articulations are volatile and traumatic not 
only in the event, but also in their telling (Butler, 2005; Campbell, 2008; Caruth, 1996; 
Edkins, 2003). If we take seriously Caruth’s statement that the history of a trauma takes 
place through sharing, and that we are all implicated in one another’s trauma, then 
Butler’s theories of identities becoming constituted in the act of utterance through 
interpellation complicates the role the sharing of memory plays in this process. Laub and 
Felman’s (1992) work on testimony and acts of listening, specifically Laub’s chapter on 
the “vicissitudes” of listening, suggests an always and already ethical (and fraught) 
relationship between speakers of trauma and listeners of trauma. Laub argues that (even) 
trained psychologists experience hazards when listening to testimonies that bear witness 
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to atrocities; she suggests those experiences be integrated into the listening process, to 
further bond and empathize with narrators. 
As Campbell (2008) has argued, much of the scholarship on memory studies 
focuses on the telling and not the listening. Here, Foucault’s (1997) piece “Self-Writing” 
is helpful and provides nuance to the notion of the constitution of the self through “talk.” 
Foucault posits that the formation of the self comes through an interactional writing 
process with others and not through traditional modes of self-discovery encouraged by 
civic and religious leaders, such as journal writing or scripture study. Rather, Foucault 
suggests that it is the sharing of memories through language wherein a sense of self or a 
sense of identity becomes constructed, thus emphasizing the importance of “listening” as 
part of the memory process.   
 
Constraining/Disruption 
When survivors of trauma must communicate their experience, that 
communication is constrained, informed, and constructed by the means of representation 
available. Thus, the expression of trauma is a complex, interactional process that 
becomes even more complicated when it is institutionally constrained (as in a legal 
setting) and when individual memories are constrained by institutional or collective 
memories, as discussed by Douglass and Vogler (2010), Nora (1989), and Climo and 
Cattell (2002). Because the construction of memory is inextricably linked to notions of 
identity, and vice versa, the communication of trauma is also bound up in the constitutive 
dance between memory and identity, which makes the communication of memory, 
identity, and trauma always and already externally constrained and interactionally 
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negotiated (Douglass & Vogler, 2010).   
The efforts of institutions and authorities to constrain language use or to fix 
language or meaning (as in a legal setting) also co-constructs identities through the 
(non)communication of trauma (Edkins, 2003). That is, what is not said or what cannot 
be said is as constitutively important as what is or can be said. Relations of power are 
produced through and reflected in language because language is a system that relies on 
the associations and connotations each word brings with it (Edkins, 2003). This is not to 
say that the interactional process of constituting an identity is not always constrained, but 
what is important here is an analysis of how this happens—how language use is 
constrained, structured, transformed, disrupted, reinvented by various structures and how 
the enactment of identity through the sharing of memory is then constrained as well. For 
example, in her article on No Gun Ri female survivors, Choi (2010) suggests that the 
women she interviewed are able to articulate their trauma through the filter of 
motherhood because it is the most accessible (and, presumably, expected) script for them 
to reference (Choi, 2010). Rather than see this reference to script as only restrictive, Choi 
also sees the women as strategic employers of a particular script to articulate trauma in a 
way they might not have been able to otherwise. That is, she sees transformation and 
disruption where others might only see submission to a dominant narrative. This is why it 
is crucial to listen to how traumatic memory is shared, and not just what is shared (Choi, 
2010; Smith & Watson, 2009). What words are used? What narratives are referenced? 
How are those narratives constructed, and how do they construct a particular identity? 
How does trauma emerge within discursive interactions? 
But survivors of trauma also find ways to disrupt the narratives constructed by 
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authorities. For example, Douglass and Vogel (2003) talk about survivors using “strategic 
lies” and “approximate truths” to disrupt the normalizing structures that govern the 
sharing of traumatic memory within the system of law. They give examples of witnesses 
who shift the positionality of the witness from “I” to “We” to call attention to larger 
systems of violence rather than keep a trial about an isolated incident. For instance, 
Douglass (2003) argues that Rigoberto Menchu’s testimony about atrocities committed in 
Guatemala have truth value as strategic lies and approximate truth even if the veracity of 
her story has been questioned. She explores the Western world’s response to Menchu’s 
text and the claims that her testimony is not wholly accurate and argues that Menchu 
rhetorically shifted the act of testifying from “I” to “We” in order to draw attention to the 
crimes in Guatemala. She uses examples from other trials (such as police brutality in 
New York City) to show how a falsity can be seen as a “lie” when it might also be read as 
a strategic truth to draw attention to a larger crime.   
 
Embodiment of Trauma 
Because memory is enacted and trauma is also embodied, bodies can be sites of 
memory and can also constitute identity. Bodies speak in different ways – deceased 
bodies speak differently than living bodies (Caruth, 1995), and a multiplicity of deceased, 
and traumatized bodies speak differently than one deceased body, as is evidenced by war 
crimes trials’ precedents constructing genocide as a war crime against multiple peoples.  
Bodies can also enact memory through bodily practices, rituals, language, and 
inscriptions and provide an interesting way to theorize the link between embodiment and 
identity, especially in the communication of trauma. When bodies are visibly marked by 
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trauma, they speak differently also, and identities become constituted by the perceptions 
of others through the sharing of memory that comes from a visibly traumatized body 
(Caruth, 2009; Edkins, 2003). Similar to how Edkins argues that the diagnosis of PTSD 
sometimes pathologizes and, thus, depoliticizes survivors of trauma, the speaking of 
trauma from a traumatized, “marked” body enables the constitution of identity to function 
in different ways; a fixed identity is often imposed on survivors, positioning them as 
“victim,” distilling the multiplicities of identities into one dominant identity (Sen, 2005).  
In psychiatric work with recently resettled Bosnian refugees, Weine et al. (1995) 
found that 65% of the refugees interviewed for the study were clinically diagnosed with 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The authors suggest that the effects of 
genocidal/ethnical cleansing atrocities should be studied long term to assess the amount 
of “massive psychic trauma” emergent in this population (p. 536) and that “trauma and 
atrocity may leave their imprint on the traumatized refugee in ways that escape 
classification […]” (p. 536). That is, the embodiment of trauma is difficult to classify or 
categorize; survivors know they carry it but have difficulty describing, assessing, and 
sharing it because trauma is often unable to be assimilated or comprehended (Caruth, 
1995; Felman & Laub, 1992; Weine, Becker, McGlashan, & Laub, 1995). What is clear, 
though, is that traumatic experiences are embodied in everyday life and they endure long 
after the initial traumatic events, often manifesting discursively as confusion, fragmented 





Nostalgic Memory and Displacement 
In this dissertation, the role of nostalgic memory plays a significant role in how 
storytellers share memories about the former Yugoslavia. For instance, it is often through 
nostalgia that narrators “make strange” the realities of life during a war or the realities of 
living as a displaced person in a new country. Nostalgia balances against strangeness, 
demonstrating how speakers view their former lives, enabling them to live in two places 
at once—a peaceful former Yugoslavia, and a current existence as American citizen. 
Often there is guilt associated with nostalgia, especially if speakers have relatives still 
living in Bosnia. Ritivoi (2002) argues that displacement and the resulting adjustment 
traumatically affects immigrants’ mental health (kindle location 81). She theorizes 
nostalgia in terms of “homesickness,” a term that refers to the origins of the word as 
pathologically discussed in the immigration experiences of the post-World War I era. She 
argues that homesickness or “nostalgia” exists with the “inevitable disjunction between 
the ‘host culture’ and the ‘culture of origin,’” forcing a discussion about diasporic 
experiences in terms of falsely dichotomous relationships with memory—either 
assimilation or outsider-ness (kindle location 138). Rather, she posits a concept of 
nostalgia as a search for self, by simultaneously experiencing the old life alongside the 
new—a “dialectics of change and sameness” (kindle location 307).  
Most important is the indication that nostalgic memory is crucial in constructing 
identities as part of embodying a previous (prewar) life, living in a current (postwar) life, 
and anticipating future (post-postwar) lives as multiple potentialities (kindle location 
299). The three categories of nostalgia explored by Ritivoi relate most closely to the work 
this dissertation undertakes 1) nostalgia as “cheerful remembrance of the past […] and 
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slightly negative attitude toward the present,” wherein the speaker recognizes that a 
return is impossible; 2) nostalgia as analysis of one’s experiences wherein the speaker 
“considers questions regarding the accuracy and relevance of the content of reminiscing”; 
3) nostalgia as attempted understanding and analysis of self by reflecting upon “the very 
significance of the occurrence of nostalgic recollections” (kindle location 652). 
Interestingly, participants interviewed for this project express each “type” of nostalgia 
explored by Ritivoi in her attempt to understand the origins of nostalgia as medical 
pathology.  
In this dissertation, nostalgia emerges in the Bosnia diasporic community as an 
undefinable third space (Bhabha, 2005), an “elsewhere” (Minh-ha, 2011), and/or a 
“conjunction” (Schaffer & Smith, 2004a). It exists within the “comma” that Minh-ha 
(2011) claims allows refugees to simultaneously live here, there, and elsewhere, in a 
“double exile” but also in a double belonging. Without nostalgic memory about the 
former Yugoslavia, storytellers would not engage with the idea of return—an 
unimaginable proposition in reality for many of them, but, yet, a potentiality that is 
comforting in its existence all the same.  
Powell (2012) argues that nostalgia is one of the ways in which those who are 
displaced can speak against institutional narratives that work to “other” diasporic 
communities or to impose particular notions of citizenry. She writes, “The rhetorical 
strategies used by the displaced to speak back to those narratives include nostalgia, a 
particular sense of home, belonging, citizenry, and the right of return” (p. 304). More 
narratives that incorporate nostalgic memories alongside (and overlapping with) 
traumatic memories are needed to theorize the variety of ways in which human rights can 
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be discussed through personal narratives, memories about war, embodied trauma in 
everyday life, and memories about home. Schaffer and Smith (2004b) argue personal 
narratives often express nostalgic memory when confronted with the legal “right of 
return” in order to demonstrate a sense of belonging (p. 309). Thus, nostalgia, as shared 
through personal narratives and memories, is not (only) the cheerful reminiscence of a 
past, but is also a statement about belonging and national identity. Diasporic memory 
provides a symbolic sense of community where shared memories combine to build a 
sense of unity, blurring the “surface distinction between family and community, self and 
collective, past and present, and space and time” (Francis, Kellaher, & Neophytou, 2002, 
p. 122). In the case of the Bosnian Americans interviewed for this dissertation, nostalgia 
also operates as a way of demonstrating citizenship for a Bosnia that exists as “Bosnia,” 
as an imaged nation that emerges within prewar nostalgia and in descriptions of land as it 
used to be. 
As memory scholars argue, memories are layered and threaded through past and 
present experiences and are constructed in the moment of their telling (Archibald, 2002; 
Campbell, 2008; Caruth, 1996; Cimet, 2002; Edkins, 2003; Hawlbachs, 1980; Nora, 
1989; Thompson, 1988; Zulaika, 2003). Thus, a notion of Bosnian identity is inextricably 
linked to memory, and memories about place and family co-construct a sense of identity, 
although both memories and identities will always be changing. For example, Bosnians 
who have lived in the United States for over 15 years now and who arrived during 
identity-forming teenage years may have vastly different memories and experiences than 
those who came to the United States at a different age, under different circumstances. 
Making a life in a new place and, yet, always remembering the old place with a sense of 
56 
 
nostalgia necessitates place- and space-making activities along with a purposeful 
negotiation about how much of a particular cultural heritage to remember (Aguilar-San 
Juan, 2009).  
 
Conclusions 
Scholars of memory and identity argue that memory is a social process, and posit 
a constitutive link between constructions of memory and constructions of identity 
(Campbell, 2009; Halbwachs, 1980; Nora, 1989; Thompson, 1991). Yet, these theories 
lack attention to language-in-action and the ways in which trauma emerges within 
linguistic interactions. Along those same lines, scholars who study narratives of 
displacement, diasporic memories, and links between nostalgia and identity (Hall, 1990; 
Minh-ha, 2011; Powell, 2012; Ritivoi, 2002; Schaffer & Smith, 2004a, 2004b) also often 
overlook the language-in-action used to describe these experiences. Thus, this 
dissertation argues for an “enunciation” of lived experiences as human rights discourse, 
theory, and rhetoric (Hall, 1990). A space of enunciation forces an articulation of human 
rights as a living practice by paying attention to the spaces wherein people tell stories 
about war. In this way, enunciation is an “acknowledgment of [language’s] discursive 
embeddedness and address, its cultural positionality, its reference to a present time and 
a specific space” (Bhabha, 2006) and also refers to the relationship between identity and 
language, positioning identity “as a ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in 
process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (Hall, 1990, p. 222).  
Thus, to construct a theory of human rights as a living practice, narratives about 
prewar, war times, and postwar lived experiences must be included. Hall (1990) argues 
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that cultural identity is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being.’ It belongs to the 
future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, 
time, history, and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But 
like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation.  
Cultural identity is crucial to this project because it is through associations with 
identities, nations, families, or religions that participants link trauma. The participants in 
this project have profound theories on human rights that include more (and less) than 
what is traditionally talked about in theories of legal human rights or within the language 
of the UDHR. I argue that human rights discourse, and human rights rhetoric can also be 
found in emergent linguistic interactions of personal narratives. As Johnstone (2004) 
claims, “Like all talk and all action, narrative is socially and epistemologically 
constructed: through telling, we make ourselves and our experiential worlds” (pp. 644-
645). Thus any theory of human rights discourse as rhetorical must include scholarly 
analysis of narratives told by the people most affected by deployment of human rights 
policy.  
Schaffer and Smith’s (2004b) book, Human Rights and Narrated Lives, details the 
rise of life narratives in the human rights agenda movement and argues that personal 
narratives are “potent vehicles” for advancing human rights claims. However, these 
authors also argue that legal guidelines and restrictions of veracity placed upon personal 
narratives once they enter into the institutional system of human rights adjudication and 
justice restrict the types of trauma and the types of narration that can be shared: 
The pressure to conform the “messiness” of personal testimony to the protocols 
for codification of a human rights abuse, to contain it within a standardized, often 
chronological, format that more easily addresses the series of questions the 
inquiry has established as critical to the goal of documenting a particular human 
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rights issue, subsumes local knowledge and conceptual frameworks for 
understanding different cultural experiences and traditions to the national and 
international frameworks of human rights law. Finally, the reduction of testimony, 
of remembered experience, to evidence, judged either as purely factual or 
mendacious, obscures the ways in which narratives of suffering offer bits of 
evidence that cannot be reduced to evidence (Hesford and Kozol 5).  
(Schaffer & Smith, 2004b, p. 37) 
 
Perhaps the reason there are so few uses of personal, everyday narratives as human rights 
rhetoric is that the bureaucracy of official testimony, combined with the flows of power 
that structure international law and rights policy, turn storytellers into victims and flatten 
experiential narratives into fact-based testimonies conforming to legal discourse (Conley 
& O’Barr, 2005; Constable, 2009; Matoesian, 2001). While Schaffer and Smith’s (2004b) 
book discusses the role of lived narratives in motivating and changing human rights 
work, their focus is on how narratives throughout the various international human rights 
adjudications have recalibrated the landscape of human rights work. It is not, as such, a 
privileging of the voices that share narratives, perhaps for the institutional reasons 
mentioned previously. 
However, a collection of interviews from Bosnia and Croatia, in an edited 
collection by Mertus, Tesanovic, Metikos, and Boric (1997), reveals how powerful 
personal narratives from affected communities can be in theorizing human rights. The 
Suitcase, collected, compiled, and edited by Mertus et al. (1997), centers the voices of 
refugees from BiH and Croatia as they share stories, poems, memories, dreams, and 
pictures that speak volumes about on-the-ground human rights and the embodiment of 
trauma in everyday life.  This book provides a crucial viewpoint into the neglected voices 
of the people whose lives are affected by war and by human rights policy. Most 
importantly, perhaps, this book is a collaborative effort amongst Yugoslav journalists 
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(Tesanovic, Metikos, and Boric), human rights lawyers (Mertus), and the refugees whose 
voices are centered. In a similar effort, this dissertation proposes a rearticulation of 
human rights theories based on ground-up, lived experiences of the people most affected 
by human rights discourse. Also, this dissertation includes the narratives of participants 
who are remembering experiences from 15 to 20 years prior, demonstrating how trauma 
is embodied in everyday life and persists long into the “aftermath” of a war.  
In her work on reconciliation and remembering, Rigney (2012) provides a crucial 
link between memory and human rights work. She suggests “calls for remembrance in the 
cause of reconciliation are in effect paradoxically also calls for its containment” (Rigney, 
2012, p. 252). Linking remembering alongside forgetting demonstrates what is crucially 
important about studying personal narratives of people who have been through war—
there is no truth that is correct or more accurate. Or, rather, veracity is not the purpose of 
this project. There are multiplicities of truths that emerge through the complex interaction 
that is the sharing of traumatic memory. This dissertation merges theories from human 
rights rhetoric with cultural memory studies to demonstrate how rhetoricians can obtain a 
richer account of the human rights experience from on-the-ground resources. As I have 
tried to show throughout this chapter, and as will be shown in Chapter 3, an 
interdisciplinary theoretical approach to this topic reveals where human rights work can 
better account for lived experience. For this dissertation, I suggest that human rights as a 
living practice can be realized through analyzing language-in-action in the personal 









When memories about a particular cultural heritage are tied to trauma, such as in 
the case of civil war or genocide, memories and identities that were once presumed static 
become fractured by competing narratives of personal trauma, nationstate narratives, and 
international assumptions about war (Caruth, 1996; Edkins, 2003; Ritivoi, 2002; Smith & 
Watson, 2006). Thus, the questions that this project attempts to explore are as fluid and 
complex as memory itself. Conceptually and methodologically, this project unfolds 
through waves of inquiry. The first wave is broad and theoretical: 1) How do memory 
and identity inform one another through communication of traumatic experience? The 
second wave becomes more specific: 2) How and why do these 11 Bosnian Americans 
use stories to communicate trauma? And the third wave combines the first two: 3) How 
do the ways in which these Bosnian Americans tell stories about the war also tell stories 
about the roles of identity and memory in narratives?  
The data for this study come from embodied layers of memory and trauma as 
shared in personal narratives about life before, during, and after war. In these interviews, 
speakers share their experiences about leaving Bosnia, relocating to various countries in 
Europe, and finally relocating to Salt Lake City, Utah. I refer to the Bosnian Americans 
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in this study as “participants” or “storytellers,” using both terms interchangeably to 
represent the multifaceted, voluntary functions of each of the people I interviewed. 
“Storyteller” is a term I prefer since telling stories is often how people make meaning of 
their lives—processes of telling, sharing, listening, reflecting, and evaluating are all part 
of how identities are constructed through narratives and shared in interviews (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006; Bruner, 1991; Labov, 1972; Smith & Watson, 2010).  
This chapter outlines the methodologies used for this project—ethnographic 
interviews for data collection (Conquergood, 1991; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Fine, 1992; 
Horner, 2002; Rosaldo, 1989; Smith & Watson, 2001) along with narrative discourse 
analysis (Andrus, 2011; Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Bruner, 1972, 1991; Chase, 2003; Gee, 
1999; Gumperz, 1982; Huckin, 2002; Johnstone, 2008; Labov, 1972; Mills, 1997; Wodak 
& Meyer, 2009) for analysis of interview transcriptions. These two methods together—
ethnographic interviewing and narrative discourse analysis—provide a rich description of 
the interview setting and the narratives collected there, informing one another and linking 
together theoretical analysis and real-world functions of language (Huckin, Andrus, & 
Clary-Lemon, 2012). For example, ethnographic interviews enable researchers to pay 
attention to more than the language used, specifically “extra-discursive features” 
(Hawhee, 2006) such as gestures, talk, bodily movements, inflections, spaces, and places, 
as speakers “transmit traumatic memory” through bodily enactments of identity and 
memory (Chase, 2005; Smith & Watson, 2010; Taylor, 2003). And discourse analysis, as 
a method of analysis, accounts for language-in-action at the level of “talk,” working from 





“I feel, right now, like it's somebody else's life; it's not my life.”   
 (Interview with Tamara, 2014) 
“It's a … a true story. It's my life story! ... 250 men were killed!”  
(Interview with Edin, 2014)  
 
 When Tamara and Edin crossed the border into Slovenia, the bus they were on 
dropped them off in the middle of a minefield. This was not particularly uncommon since 
border crossings were (and still are in some places) riddled with mines to keep people 
from coming in—or to keep them from getting out. And bus drivers were often not 
allowed to drive across the border, or they didn’t dare. So Bosnians were regularly 
dropped off near a border and told to walk through the forest. Usually, this was in the 
middle of the night, each person carrying one suitcase, carefully placing one foot in front 
of the other in the dark, hoping to avoid a misstep. Edin told me when his family was 
dropped off, his 6-year-old son immediately froze with fear. So Edin picked him up. He 
carried his son and both of their suitcases through the forest. Across the border. Through 
a minefield. In 1992.  
In the case of traumatic narratives (such as the stories collected for this 
dissertation), realities of the stories are often unbelievable, meaning they are made 
strange in comparison to what is often made normal—everyday life (Laub, 1992; Weine 
et al., 1995). The awareness of strangeness can be seen in Edin’s insistence (earlier) that 
his “life story” is “true,” and in Tamara’s assertion that her life does not feel like her 
own. Both of the statements reflect an understanding on behalf of the narrators that the 
work of telling stories also does the work of constructing identity, which simultaneously 
defines differences and commonalities through authorial reflections of the stories by the 
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storytellers (“true” as opposed to fiction; “not her own” because of its relative absurdity) 
(Smith & Watson, 2010). Smith and Watson (2010) argue that autobiographical 
storytellers become, “in the act of narration, both the observing subject and the object of 
investigation, remembrance, and contemplation” (p. 1), constructing and producing 
identities through discourse.  
Storytellers share stories and are able to reflect upon them as an observer, but they 
are also being observed; this dual function contributes to the production of identity as 
discursively constructed (Hall, 1990, Hall & Du Gay, 1996; Smith & Watson, 2010). 
Identity, as a production, becomes always “implicated in the processes of social 
exchange” (Smith & Watson, 2010, p. 39), or in the processes of storytelling. Like 
memories, identities do not exist a priori to the communicative situation in play; rather, 
they are constructed anew as part of a narrative process wherein identity work is a 
negotiation between interlocutors, including the researcher (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; 
Campbell, 2008; Halbwachs, 1980; Nora, 1989; Thompson, 1988). And as Chase (2005) 
suggests, studying narratives in interview contexts necessitates a focus on embodiment in 
actual practices—connecting specific, actualized narrative instances to general narratives, 
linking a particular instance of “social action” to the social world.  This means that the 
way people tell stories about their lives literally says something about identity, memory, 
and trauma.  
 
List of Participants and Demographic Information 
Table 1 provides details to contextualize and personalize participants and their 
stories, yet, at the same time, does not give too many personal details that would identify 
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them when they wish to remain anonymous. These details provide only a small snapshot 
into one part of the histories that make each person who they were, are, and will become. 
I was unable to interview anyone older than 60 because of the language barrier. I did not 
interview anyone under the age of 25 because I wanted to focus on an age-group that 
would have lived in Bosnian for 5 or more years before the war.  
This section contains contextual histories for the people interviewed for this 
project. Contextualization comes from multiple conversations with participants as well as 
fragments pieced together from the material settings of those interviews when they 
occurred at someone’s home.  
 
Azra and Samira 
Azra was the first “official” contact I made as part of this research project. She 
founded the Bosnian American Professionals Association (BAPA) and works to connect 
members of the diaspora throughout Utah and nationally. I interviewed Azra in her home 
in Salt Lake City where we shared dinner and life stories. After about an hour talking 
with Azra alone, Samira was able to join us for the interview, and the remainder of the 
interview was 1 hour and 40 minutes with the three of us. Azra’s husband came into the 
living room to say “hello” but did not want to participate in the interview. Azra is 
connected to nearly everyone in the Bosnian American community in Salt Lake City. She 
organizes events for youth, for professionals, and for the cultural center. She is passionate 
about “connecting” with her Bosnian heritage. 
Azra spent most of her Ex-Yugoslavian time in Rijeka, Croatia, living only 2 
years in Bosnia-Herzegovina proper. Azra says her parents are a “mixed marriage,” 
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meaning her mother is Bosnian Croat and her father is Bosnian Muslim. She self-
identifies as Bosnian, but does not seem to care much about the Muslim designation. Her 
family left Croatia at the beginning of the war in 1991, and they arrived in Salt Lake City, 
Utah in 1999. In between those years, Azra and her family—her two parents and her 
brother—lived in Germany as refugees. After the war, Bosnian refugees in Germany (or 
in other places in Europe) had to either go back to Bosnia-Herzegovina or to a designated 
refugee relocation city, such as Salt Lake City, Utah. Azra is in her early 30s, is married, 
and is highly educated. Azra says she feels a compulsion to connect to Bosnia; she 
returns at least once a year to visit and spends much of her time connecting with other 
Bosnians who are part of the diaspora in the United States.  
Samira is highly educated, in her early 30s, and also has parents in a “mixed 
marriage”—Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb—and Samira spent the whole war in 
Banovici, the town where she grew up; she came directly to Utah from Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1997. Unlike Azra who is connected to nearly everyone in the 
community, Samira says she attempts to distance herself from the idea of Bosnia as well 
as other Bosnians living in Salt Lake City. She does not attend Bosnian cultural events 
put on by the Utah chapter of the ABHA (American Bosnian-Herzegovina Association) 
and she admittedly prefers not to think too much about what it means to be Bosnian now 
and in a different place. Recently, Samira and her mother returned to Bosnia to testify 
against the men who killed her grandfather in her hometown. Samira says she was 
terrified to go back and even more terrified to testify at the court in Sarajevo. Samira and 
Azra together shared stories they had not told one another before and both expressed 
frustration about the state of Bosnia now.  
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Edin and Tamara 
Tamara and Edin, a middle-aged married couple, came to Salt Lake City from 
Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina in May of 1998. Prijedor is in the northern part of Bosnia, 
near Croatia and is now part of the Serb-controlled territory known as Republika Srpska. 
After escaping across the border through the landmine-strewn forest with their two sons, 
they spent 6 years as refugees in Germany. Tamara and Edin both self-identity as 
Bosnian Muslim, but do so in a secular way. (Threads of this ambiguity with the term 
Muslim can be seen throughout each of the interviews.) Neither of them wants to move 
back to Prijedor, and they visit reluctantly when they have to. Edin says he does not feel 
safe there.  
I met Edin and Tamara through a colleague who is also their neighbor. He 
accompanied me to their home and stayed for the duration of the interview (1 hour and 10 
minutes). Their neighborly friendship was apparent throughout the interview, and it 
became clear that my colleague felt protective of Edin and Tamara and their stories, so 
much so that he regularly interrupted their stories to provide what he must have felt were 
necessary details for me. The interview took place in their living room with pictures of 
their hometown in Bosnia, their two boys, and their extended family members. They had 
the television set on, and it was playing a Bosnian news channel, which they explained 
they obtained through cable. Edin intermittently told stories about his life and referred to 
news stories in Bosnia, pointing out landmarks on the news and sharing tidbits of news he 
was hearing as we talked. Near the end of the interview, Tamara pulled out a family 
photo album and showed me pictures of their family in Prijedor. She also had a personal 
essay from her son, which he wrote in high school, about his experience crossing the 
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mine field. He had won an award for the essay, and she was proud of his work and 
insisted I take a copy of it.  
 
Tarik and Sarah 
Tarik is the youngest Bosnian American I interviewed and is in his late 20s. He 
left his hometown of Caplijna near the southern Bosnia border with Croatia. He came to 
Salt Lake City in 1994 via Croatia and then Turkey. His family was in one of the first 
waves of refugees to come to the United States in the mid-1990s. Tarik came with his 
parents and his older brother. Tarik self-identifies as Bosnian Muslim. He and his 
American-born wife, Sarah, were interviewed together. Sarah was raised as a Mormon in 
Utah but has converted to Islam. Tarik wanted to meet at a coffee shop near the 
university. Although he said at the outset of our meeting that he did not have much to say 
and would only talk for 30 minutes, the interview lasted for 1 hour and 30 minutes. Tarik 
was emotional as he shared stories about his brother losing his hand in a bomb accident at 
the beginning of the war and as he discussed his Bosnian identity now. I have met with 
Tarik and Sarah a few times since the interview, not to collect more stories but to talk 
about schooling, other life experiences, and to share coffee.  
 
Belma and Amir 
Belma and Amir met one another through friends in Banja Luka in 1987 where 
they were both attending the university there. Banja Luka is in the northern part of Bosnia 
and was a major battleground during the war; it is now the capital of Republika Srpska. 
Belma finished her studies at University of Zagreb after escaping out of Banja Luka on a 
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Red Cross convoy for students. Amir spent time with relatives in Croatia—a 
dehumanizing experience he reflects upon often. They were able to marry in Germany 
and came together to Salt Lake City, Utah in 1997 and now have one son. They are both 
in their mid- to late-40s. I met Belma and Amir at a public reading for Bosnian authors, 
and they invited me to their home to do the interview a few weeks later. We shared a 
dinner of pastry pie filled with spinach and feta cheese, called zeljanica (pronounced zel-
ya-neetza) and then talked for 2 hours and 40 minutes.  
 
Adnan 
Adnan identifies himself as Bosnian but not Muslim. He is emphatic about this 
point. He grew up in the town of Brcko, which is in northern Bosnian and is now a so-
called “district.” It is not part of Republika Srpska, or Bosnia, or the federation 
(Herzegovina). Adnan left Bosnian when he was 11 and spent several years in Germany 
before coming to Salt Lake City in 1997. He came with his younger brother and his 
parents. His parents are also a “mixed marriage”—his mother is Bosnian Croat and his 
father is Bosnian Muslim (ethnically, but not religiously). Adnan wanted to meet at a 
local bar. Out of all the people interviewed, Adnan spoke most confidently and 
passionately about Bosnian history and about the political/historical/socio-economical 
circumstances surrounding the war. He has helped me make sense of a complicated 
history. He is in his early 30s. Adnan was most comfortable meeting at a bar near his 
home where we spoke for almost 2 hours. He was also most comfortable philosophizing 




Nermin and Sabina 
Nermin and Sabina are Adnan’s parents. I interviewed them together in their 
home in Salt Lake City several weeks after interviewing Adnan. During the portion of the 
conversation Adnan was present for, he interjected his thoughts, often arguing or 
corroborating with his parents and their version of events. He also helped them find 
words for things they knew in Bosnian but could not immediately recall in English. 
Adnan stayed for half of the interview and then left for work. Nermin and Sabina met at 
the University of Sarajevo where they were both students. Sabina was able to leave Brcko 
with her two sons and make it to Croatia, but Nermin was detained in a concentration 
camp in the very apartment building where they lived. He did not want to talk specifically 
about his time in the camp, only referring to it as a time when he “wanted to die.” Sabina 
has spent much of her time in Salt Lake City working with children who are survivors or 
descendants of survivors of the Srebrenica massacre, where 8,000 Bosniak men and boys 
were murdered by Serbian military officials in 1995. They came to Utah in 1997. Sabina 
and Nermin told stories collaboratively, interrupting and clarifying one another’s 
narratives. We spoke for 1 hour and 30 minutes.  
 
Fatima 
Fatima grew up in a small village near Sanski Most in the northern part of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. She describes her town as a small Muslim community that was overtaken 
by the Yugoslav army and occupied for 4 years. Because her father was an influential 
community leader, he was one of the first men taken to a concentration camp in that part 
of Bosnia. Her brother was also taken. Her mother had passed away before the war, and 
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because her father knew he would be taken, he sent Fatima and her sister on a bus by 
themselves to Slovenia. Fatima was 15 years old. The four of them were reunited in 
Slovenia and then moved to Croatia together. They came to Salt Lake City in 1994, but 
her father and her brother both decided to move back to Bosnia. Her father has testified at 
The Hague against the men who detained and tortured him. Fatima is in her mid 30s and 
is married to another Bosnian American. I interviewed Fatima in her home in Salt Lake 
City where she lives with her children and her husband and her husband’s parents, and 
where we spoke for 1 hour and 30 minutes. 
 
Ethnonational Self-Identifications 
As memory scholars argue, memories are layered and threaded through past and 
present experiences and are constructed in the moment of their telling (Archibald, 2002; 
Campbell, 2008; Caruth, 1996; Cimet, 2002; Edkins, 2003; Hawlbachs, 1980; Nora, 
1989; Thompson, 1988; Zulaika, 2003). Thus, a notion of Bosnian identity is inextricably 
linked to memory, and memories about place and family co-construct a sense of identity, 
although both memories and identities will always be changing. For example, Bosnians 
who have lived in the United States for over 15 years now and who arrived during 
identity-forming teenage years may have vastly different memories and experiences than 
those who came to the United States at a different age, under different circumstances. 
Making a life in a new place and, yet, always remembering the old place necessitates 
place- and space-making activities along with a purposeful negotiation about how much 
of a particular cultural heritage to remember (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009). For instance, two 
interviewees, Belma and Amir, choose daily which traditions and cultural memories to 
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pass onto their 8-year-old son, who was born in America. They speak Bosnian with one 
another when they are home, but Belma said her son only speaks Bosnian when he wants 
to impress visitors. 
Each of the Bosnian Americans interviewed identify themselves as being either 
from Muslim, Serb, or Croat communities, but all of them self-identify as Bosnian. The 
designation given to Bosnian Muslims by Tito during the Ex-Yugoslavian period was a 
capital “M” Muslim, blending and blurring ethnicity and religion to create a new type of 
Yugoslavian citizen—a religious affiliation connected to territory and ancestry but not 
(necessarily) connected to “country.” Claiming identity as “Muslim” rather than, and not 
in addition to, “Croat” or “Serb” artificially collapses multiplicities of potential identities 
to an easily identifiable census designation (Cambell, 1998; Malcolm, 1994; Sen, 2006; 
Soh, 2008).  
However, the complexity and fluidity of identity in Ex-Yugoslavia belies any 
simple or single designations, which is why, in addition to referring to people how they 
identify themselves, as Muslim or Serb or Croat, where possible, I refer to the area where 
they are from and from where they fled the war. This more accurately represents the 
ethnonational complexity of identification in the region. In a collection of Balkan refugee 
stories, Mertus and Tesanovic (1997) employ similar language when referring to the 
authors included in their collection. As they note, “Many refugees identify themselves 
according to place and not to ethnic group, or at the very least according to group and 
place” (p. 1). Referring to place seems more representational of the ethnonational 
complexities of the region. Furthermore, “place” is an omnipresent invocation of Bosnian 
identity in my interviews; it is inextricably tied to self-identity, which will be explored 
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later in this project. The Bosnian Americans interviewed for this project did not identity 
themselves monolithically as one thing before the war began. Many Bosniaks come from 
“mixed marriages,” or mixed families, meaning ancestry and progeny are often made up 
of Serb/Croat/Bosnian heritages. Participants speak to this complexity in their narratives. 
For instance, in his explanation of what the term “Bosnian” philosophically and 
pragmatically means, Nermin (a 58-year-old Bosniak man) explains his thoughts this 
way:  
I was born a Muslim. And yes. But, ah, I’m not religious. I am not—but yes, I am 
Muslim. […] Bosnian, Bosnian is, Bosnian is, ah, Catholic, orthodox, Muslim, 
Jewish, ah whatever else lived in… Bosnian means, ah, ah—like American. You 
know and now you could be Jewish, you could be Catholic, you could be 
whatever […] Bosnian means that. […] And when you say Bosnian, that means, I, 
I am from Bosnia. (Interview with Nermin, 2014)  
 
But later in the interview, Nermin, Sabina (husband and wife), and Adnan (their son) 
have a discussion together wherein they complicate the notion of place linearly 
connecting to national identity: 
Extract 1: Identity Discussion 
Adnan:  […] In Croatia, if they come from Herzegovina they don’t call 
them Croatians, they call them Herze-, Herzegovinians. And the 
Bosnian Serbs who live in Bosnia, when they go to Serbia they call 
them Bosnians. They don’t call them Serbs.  
Interviewer: So I’m trying to understand the difference between nationality and 
religion. 
Sabina: It was different before. 
Cross-talk Discussion in Bosnian between the three of them. 
Sabina: --in former Yugoslavia it wasn’t different. Croat were, ah, mm, 
Catholic. All Catholic in Bosnia was Croat. Orthodox Serbs. 
Muslim….. [pause] 
Nermin: That was wrong. That what was wrong. Nationality and religion. 
Interviewer: Is mixing the two? 
Nermin: Yes. They mixed them. 
Interviewer: Who did? 
Nermin: It was mixed after, ah, I know after Second World War, but it was 
also before that. Before that, Y, you know. Because here then you’ll 
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say I am American. 
Interviewer: Mm hmm. 
Nermin: And I am Catholic. I am American. I am Jewish. I am American. I 
am that and that. It’s totally different. But you are always American. 
And this is right. Because you are American. You live in America. 
You are American citizen and you are American.  
Sabina: [To Nermin] You will never be American. 
Nermin: Huh? 
Sabina: [chuckling and gesturing to Nermin] You will never say, “I am 
American.” 
Nermin: Me? 
Sabina: You will always say I am Bosnian. 
Nermin: No, I am. I am American. And I am Bosnian. Of course, I have 
citizenship. I am American. 
Interviewer: You’re both. 
Nermin: I am both. I am both.  
 
While imposing singular ethnic identifications is difficult and problematic, the act 
of doing so is not meaningless, which is why it is necessary to explain those designations 
for this project. Postwar, Bosnian Muslims are often referred to as Bosniaks because to 
claim Bosnian in Bosnia is a complicated matter. That is, Croats can be Bosnian; Serbs 
can be Bosnian; and Muslims can be Bosnian. Tito’s designation gave the Muslims an 
ethnonational identity but also erased parts of identity that align with country (Malcolm, 
1994). This was evident during and after the war when residents of Bosnian-Herzegovina 
fled: Bosnian Croats were able to seek refuge in Croatia, and Bosnian Serbs were able to 
flee to Serbia. Where were the Bosnian Muslims to find safe refuge? In multiple ways the 
story of Bosnian refugees is the story of a displaced diaspora in exile. According to 
participants, claiming to be “Bosnian” to American-born Americans in the States is not 
received or perceived to be fraught because most Americans are unfamiliar with the 
identity tensions that exist in the Balkans. This does not mean that the act of self-
identification is not troubled still, however.   
The idea of ethnonational identification as it relates to personhood and refugee 
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status is extremely complex. As Hannah Arendt argued, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) positions people as subjects only within the nation-state; without 
a state, people do not exist as subjects whose rights can be violated. That is, unless a 
person’s rights are seen as being violated within the purview and context of a nation-state 
that makes them a citizen and not just a human, they do not exist as political persons with 
protected rights (Arendt, 1973). United Nations delegates have been, and are currently, 
working toward resolutions to negotiate how people can be protected under international 
law without a nation or in-between nations, such as refugees (Merry, 2009; UNHCR 
Report on Syrian Refugees, 2015). This conception of personhood within-a-nation poses 
obvious problems for groups of people living with blurred or multiple ethnonational 
designations that do not explicitly index country or nation. The undoing and collapsing of 
multiple identities to single identity works despite (and in spite of) the multiple, fluid 
self-identities Bosnians claim. That is, the work of the nation-state to singularize identity 
in order to designate “rights” is quintessential of the refugee experience through the rule 
of law, but not necessarily in the real-world reality of most Bosnian Americans.  
 
Interview Settings 
Each participant chose his or her interview location; 9 out of 12 people chose to 
speak with me in their homes. One interview took place at a local bar. Two others took 
place at a coffee shop near their home. The location of the interview setting played a 
significant role in how interviews progressed. Some participants were reluctant to say 
much about themselves outside of the “war story” context. Others shared many personal 
details. Others rapidly told story after story, out of order, without concrete details, and 
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then closed the interview without allowing any follow-up questions. And others shared 
personal details only to realize they felt uncomfortable doing so at a coffee shop.  
Each interview was over 1 hour long: the shortest interview was 1 hour and 10 
minutes; the longest was 2 hours and 40 minutes. Although I asked two or three of the 
same questions at each interview, they were not necessarily in the same order, and 
participants’ narratives guided the content, format, course, and duration of the interview. 
For example, the starting question about the circumstances that brought them to America 
was interpreted and answered differently by each speaker. Participants’ narratives guided 
the interview from that moment on. Even though I usually planned to ask participants 
about Bosnian identity (in a variety of ways), I rarely needed to; a discussion of Bosnian 
identity as it relates to nation, diaspora, and memory was a key topic of conversation that 
emerged in every interview. Alternatively, because I was curious about conceptions of 
justice, I also planned to ask about the war court at The Hague. Those topics did not 
come up naturally, and I usually had to link questions about justice to previous comments 
they made about war. Because this topic did not occur naturally in narratives about war I 
was compelled to recursively revise my theories and methods to think about “justice” 
differently and to place less emphasis on the legal work The Hague is doing for the 
former Yugoslavia and more emphasis on how people are coping with more conceptions 
of justice and peace in their lived experiences.  
 
Methods: Ethnographic Interviews for Data Collection 
An ethnographic interview takes place in the context of a relationship with 
participants with whom the researcher has established a respectful rapport (Spradley, 
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1979). But it is also much more than that. Similar to how Macgilchrist and Van Hout 
(2011) describe their methodologies, I use the adjectival form “ethnographic” rather than 
“ethnography” to “embed [my study] in the epistemology, attitude and research methods 
associated with ethnography but to bode caution in the type and scope of ‘findings’ the 
[study] will provide” (p. 3). In other words, an ethnographic interview employs the 
epistemology associated with ethnography but will not (cannot) account for all social 
activity in the Bosnian diasporic community nor in the interview setting.  
The Bosnian Americans interviewed were found using snowballing techniques—
one interviewee referred another, and so on.  I chose snowballing as a technique because 
of the potentially traumatic nature of content I was pursuing. I wanted participants to self-
select, to knowingly and willfully share their experiences with me because they wanted 
their stories to be heard. The first person I interviewed I met through the Bosnian 
American Professionals Association (BAPA). I found other willing participants at BAPA 
events I had been invited to by my first contact. I utilized a semistructured format, 
meaning questions were open-ended, and I attempted to interrupt or direct as little as 
possible during the telling of an account (Cresswell, 2013). Within the semistructured 
framework, I took care to ask two or three of the same questions at each interview: “1) 
Tell me about the circumstances that brought you to Utah; 2) Tell me about the day you 
left Bosnia; 3) Tell me about the day you arrived in Utah.”8 These questions prompted a 
variety of different stories, dependent upon if and when someone left Bosnia, how old 
they were during the war, and how willing they were to share personal details. Listening 
and participating in silence became easier with each interview, and I learned to embrace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A list of questions I used to guide me in the interviews is included in Appendix B. 
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the communicative value silence holds. The semistructured, open-ended format I 
employed focused on encouraging participants’ to share the stories that were most 
meaningful to their lives and identity now.  
Because I do not speak Bosnian fluently, my interviews were conducted in 
English. Participants often spoke Bosnian with one another when in a group setting; they 
also often helped one another find particular words they know in Bosnian but could not 
immediately recall in English. Despite these language barriers between participants and 
me as an interviewer, whether in English or in Bosnian, the stories told by my 
participants are pieces of larger discursive strands that resonate as diasporic life 
narratives told to outsiders. Whether someone is speaking in a language other than his or 
her home (first) language, or if they are speaking in the only language with which they 
are familiar, “each individual’s actual utterances are different” (Johnstone, 2008, p. 44). 
As Johnstone suggests 
[…] instead of asking how the grammar and vocabulary of a language affect, and 
are affected by, the ways speakers of that language conceive of the world, we 
could ask about how the things people do when they talk, sign, or write influence, 
and are influenced by, their knowledge about language and the world as they 
experience it. (Johnstone, 2008, p. 44).  
 
That is, my method of analyzing language, narrative discourse analysis (which will be 
explained further on in this chapter) explores how people talk about trauma with the 
means of representation available to them. I am not making universal claims about how 
people talk about trauma in general or even how Bosnian Americans talk about trauma. 
The particularities of this research situation, these participants, and this analysis are local. 
A method of analyzing discourse from the bottom-up, insists upon privileging instances 
of language-in-action, which is also an insistence upon particularity and locality 
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(Madison, 2005). I have attempted to maintain contact with the local Bosnian community 
through engagement with BAPA and through sustained collaboration with my 
interviewees. I communicate with most of them regularly, discussing Bosnian history and 
politics, and listening to their feedback about their interview once they had heard their 
audio and read the transcription.  
Because the interviews were semistructured and open-ended, I envisioned the 
interview setting as unfolding in waves also: The first wave included a general opening 
question about the circumstances that brought him or her to the United States. This first 
“wave” tended to elicit long narratives told in past-tense story form. During this “wave” I 
tried to talk as little as possible, prompting when necessary, but also trying to engage 
with silence as potentially generative—and silence, if left untouched, usually would turn 
into another story. The second wave included discussions to fill in gaps from the 
narratives of the first wave. I asked for more details about timing, age, chronology, and 
other details that needed to be fleshed out. During the third wave, I tried to prompt 
speakers to reflect upon what they had already shared.9 It took several interviews to more 
deliberately deploy this methodology; my first set of interviews were not as rich as my 
last set. And, of course, the “waves” were never so neatly realized, but thinking of 
interviews in terms of waves rather than as a set of questions supported a richer, 
participant-led method of eliciting and receiving information. Often participants meshed 
the anticipated “three waves” together, highlighting my role as what Sue Campbell 
(2008) calls a “second voice,” wherein the mutual construction of sharing memory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Transcripts of sample interviews are included in Appendix C and D and reflect the methodology 
of “waves” and questions employed.  
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through the act of listening to narratives came “under the influence not only of our own 
pasts as understood by others but of the pasts of others” (p. 41). The third wave—the 
reflection piece—often elicited emotions participants (and I) were not fully prepared to 
process in that interview setting. These moments often led to us crying together and 
sharing a space of vulnerability.  
De Leon and Cohen’s (2005) concept of “creative probes” or prompts to elicit 
memories is a useful paradigm for stimulating narratives. The main thrust of their concept 
ties nicely with scholarship on social memory, which posits that memories are provoked 
through sociality and are always interactionally constructed (Choi, 2011; Smith & 
Watson, 2001). To provoke memory in their interviews, De Leon and Cohen (2005) use 
“walking probes”—a method wherein they take a strategic walk with an interviewee, 
letting place and space prompt stories. Similarly, family pictures or other material objects 
in participants’ homes were helpful in starting conversations about home, family, or 
place, and usually led to narratives about war. When interviewing married couples, the 
interview often started with a story about how the two of them met, almost always 
leading to a complex narrative about war and family and invariably inspired nostalgic 
stories about the former Yugoslavia and “simpler” times. Aligned with the concept of 
“walking probes,” the third wave of questioning, the reflection piece, became much 
richer once participants could connect questions about reflection to previous stories they 
had shared earlier in the interview. Previous stories worked as anchor points (or probes) 
upon which narrators could attach specific feelings and reflection to better narrate their 




Analysis: Transcription Process and Analysis of Data 
Description of Audio and Transcription Data 
 As mentioned, data gathered from the interviews have been anonymized. Only 
three participants asked for their names to be changed; however, for consistency 
purposes, I changed all of the names of participants to names of their own choosing. I 
kept the names of towns, villages, and cities the same because one’s experience during 
the Bosnian conflict depends strongly on the area wherein one was raised. That is, to 
provide context for how someone is telling stories about the war, it is imperative that his 
or her geographical history, the confluence of their place and space identities, be included 
as part of the transcriptions, the analysis, and the write-up.  
Hard copy transcripts range in page length from 29 pages to 73 pages, although 
length does not correlate directly with depth/breadth of an interview. During 
transcription, I included all pauses, purposeful silences, filler words, such as “um,” 
“well,” “hmm,” etc. because silences and those words speak volumes about the situation 
in which one is sharing a story, about the content of the story, and about what is not 
communicated (Mishler, 2003; Ochs, 1979). I also marked places where participants were 
talking over one another, translating for one another, or speaking in Bosnian. All of these 
markers are central to the analysis of data, and to account for the ethnographic methods 






Transcription as Theory, Method, and Data Analysis 
I spent the majority of analysis time listening to the audio recordings of 
interviews before reading transcriptions of them.10 I listened to the audio recordings over 
and over again until I could visually imagine where in the interview a particular story 
occurred, and I could picture how we were interacting at that very moment.  Thus, my 
analysis came from the audio recordings of interviews and the transcriptions of 
interviews. As I was reading and marking transcripts, I returned to the audio again and 
throughout the analysis process, using my field notes to read into the transcripts and to 
overlay the audio with my own notes, the transcripts, and the feedback I got from 
participants on their own recordings.  
As is the case with any text, “What is on a transcript will influence and constrain 
what generalizations emerge” (Ochs, 1979, p. 167). As Ochs (1979) notes, transcription 
is theory, method, and data, which necessarily means that cultural biases are embedded 
into the ways in which audio recordings become transcribed. For instance, standard 
Western literacy practices rely on top-to-down, left-to-right page layout orientations, 
which work to emphasize important features in upper and left-hand regions. While these 
orientations may be conventional in standard Western orthographic processes, they are 
not without cultural assumptions that influence and are influenced by their spatiality. For 
example, as Ochs observes, “Utterances that appear below other utterances are treated as 
occurring later in time” (p. 168), meaning, linear, chronological meaning becomes 
attached to the text on a page in terms of its spatial organization. Because memories are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In qualitative, ethnographic research, the processes of data collection, analysis, and write-up are 
not discrete tasks; rather they fold onto one another, recursively adapting as they go. 
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not stored or shared linearly, nor is “trauma time” (Edkins, 2003) experienced or 
remembered chronologically, the stories of war experiences are also disordered. 
The messy nature of storytelling, alongside the ordered spatiality of transcription, 
lends itself to the theories used in the analyses (Chapters 3 and 4) about how components 
of narrative inform/influence and are informed/influenced by one another (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006; Bruner, 1991; Labov, 1991), which is also how transcription works in 
tandem with/as theoretical method. That is, the ethnographic interviews themselves 
influence and are influenced by audio recordings and transcripts of interviews, enabling 
me to conduct a rich description and analysis of “how discourse functions” (Oddo, 2013, 
p. 237) in a particular setting. For example, the silences and pauses in one of the 
interview settings first led me to think about how storytellers might be sharing traumatic 
memories in a variety of ways, leading me to revisit my theories and methods based on 
features of the interview that were also visible in their textual form (the transcript).  
 
Narrative Analysis and Discourse Analysis 
Analysis of the interview data unfolded in a two-part process: narrative analysis 
and discourse analysis. These two types of analysis were used simultaneously and were 
informed by one another throughout the process of analysis and writing. To more 
effectively explicate my analytical process, I will describe them here separately, as a two-
part process, and then show how they complement one another as a meshed, adaptive 
method—Narrative Discourse Analysis. 11  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Method, theory, and analysis fold over onto one another at all stages of research—as I have been 
writing and researching, my theories and methods have also recursively adapted along with my analysis. 
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Features of Narrative Analysis 
I use the term narrative to mean “a way of using language or another symbolic 
system to imbue life events with temporal and logical order, to demystify them and 
establish coherence across past, present, and as yet unrealized experience” (Ochs & 
Capps as cited in Johnstone, 2008, p. 155). Narrative Analysis is the analytical approach 
that allowed me to first identify how stories were emerging within the interviews. 
Because narrative analysis “combines macro- and micro levels of analysis” by 
positioning narrative tellings as the place wherein storytellers construct identities, “selves 
are made coherent and meaningful through the narrative or ‘biographical’ work” that 
occurs (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 42). That is, because “selves” are seen as constituted 
through talk, storytelling becomes a rich area of analysis for both macro- and micro 
constructions of identity through analysis of how stories are told, why particular 
narratives occur, what speakers choose to emphasize, and in what order stories are shared 
(Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Butler, 1997; Ehrlich, 2001). Chase (2003) argues, “If we take 
seriously the idea that people make sense of experience and communicate meaning 
through narration, then in-depth interviews should become occasions in which we ask for 
life stories. By life stories, I mean narratives about some life experience that is of deep 
and abiding interest to the interviewee” (Chase, 2003, p. 274). Lived, experiential 
narratives convey how trauma is embodied in everyday life. That is, despite/because of 
diasporic movement, familial loss, and displacement, speakers’ bodies endure as a 
layering of all the places of trauma. As Trinh T. Minh-ha (2011) explains, “Today, when 
I’m asked where home is for me, I am struck by how far away it is; and yet, home is 
nowhere else but right here, at the edge of this body of mine” (p. 12).  
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In his work on how narratives are used to share human experience, Bruner (1991) 
posits that narrative is a form of cultural negotiation wherein speakers construct a 
“verisimilitude of reality” through “happenings mainly in the form of narrative—stories, 
excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” (pp. 4-5). He argues that 
narratives are borne out of necessity and are “governed by convention” (p. 5). In this 
sense, Bosnian Americans can be seen as adding their prewar, midwar, and postwar 
narratives to a collection of already existing narrative discursive strands, constructing the 
meaning of diasporic war narratives as they are shared and heard. And, yet, each story is 
unique and told anew each time. Bruner identifies 10 features of narratives, which are 
briefly described in Table 2. 
Although each of these features manifest at various points in participants’ 
interviews, “canonicity and breach” and “hermeneutic composability” are most salient to 
how I am adapting Bruner and Labov to explore how participants share memories. Each 
feature mentioned, combined with macrodiscursive features of narrative (discussed next) 
will be discussed more specifically and thoroughly in the analysis chapters to place them 
within an analytical context.   
For instance, in Chapter 4, along with Bruner’s concepts “canonicity and breach” 
and “hermeneutic composability,” I use Labov’s (1972) five features of narrative to 
identify “structural properties” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006) of participants’ narratives. 
These five features are as follows: orientation, complicating action, evaluation, result, 
and coda. 
Orientation sets the scene with a “who, when, what, where.” The complicating 
action is the part that tells the audience “what happened.” The evaluation allows the 
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narrator to convey why the story is important, why it is told, and what the narrator’s point  
of view on events is. The result conveys the ending plot point, or the resolution to the 
complicating action. And the coda signals the narrative is over by bringing the story back 
to the present. These features do not exist chronologically nor do they present themselves 
linearly. In Chapter 5, I use a different set of macrodiscursive features to identify 
“structural properties” of narrative. These include “master narratives of belonging” 
(Schaffer & Smith, 2004b) such as 1) descriptions of new places, 2) “strangeness” 
balanced against “normal,” 3) nostalgia for old place, 4) imagined “nation,” and 5) 
“refugee-ness.” These master narratives, functioning as macrodiscursive features of 
narrative, are signaled by indexes to “place,” which are constructed alongside and 
with(in) indexes to the previously mentioned master narratives.  In both chapters, the 
analytical framework demonstrates how trauma emerges within language.  
Although there are similarities and commonalities across participants’ stories, 
there are also emergent particularities within each story shared, a feature described by 
Bruner as “referentiality,” meaning storytellers construct meaning and verisimilitude by 
sharing what is most referential to their life experience. Additionally, within narratives, 
the parts of a story are always dependent upon the whole story, and the whole is 
dependent upon the parts, thus reemphasizing the subjective and contingent nature of 
categorization and what Bruner calls “hermeneutic composability.” An interweaving of 
these rich features, their reliance on one another’s existence for a meaningful whole, 
speaks volumes about how narratives of history operate also as nostalgic memory in the 
former Yugoslavia and vice versa. Although these Bosnian Americans add their stories to 
already-existing narratives about displacement, refugee-ness, and human rights, their 
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stories are specifically localized and thus also work to disrupt these same canonical 
narratives about war. Yet, memories shared through storytelling are simultaneously 
individual and social, meaning the gaps and inconsistences speak even more about how 
storytellers construct themselves alongside and apart from collective memories about 
(the) war (Halbwachs, 1980). That is, despite institutional and nationstate insistence (like 
UN treaties or Yugoslavian history books), no “war story” is ever the same in content or 
in time and space—the ruptures, inconsistencies, gaps, and disparities show the fluidity 
of identities alongside shifting memories. It is within these gaps where disruption and 
moments of resistance can be found as people share traumatic memories through the use 
of humor, or through entreaties for empathy or simple understanding. The people I 
interviewed expressed passionate desires for the Salt Lake City community to care about 
their history.  
One way identities are produced is through language; because language is power 
and not merely a vehicle for power (Conley & O’Barr, 2005), the act of storytelling is a 
reality of life and not merely a reflection of it. Telling narratives invokes the past and the 
present simultaneously, constructing anew the narrative as a present, lived experience 
(Douglass & Vogler, 2003; Huyssen, 2003; Smith & Watson, 2010; Thompson, 2000).  
Thus, in order to explore how memory and identity inform one another through 
storytelling, it is important to look at the “language-in-action” (Ehrlich, 2001) used by 
storytellers to describe their experiences. Discourse Analysis enables a close reading of 





Features of Discourse Analysis 
Discourse Analysis is a cross-disciplinary method of analysis for studying 
language and its functions. However, what differentiates discourse analysis from other 
types of linguistic analysis is its focus on language-in-action, language in context, and 
language and power, which is also a focus on narrative (Johnstone, 2008).  As a mass 
noun, discourse refers to any strand of communication—“a historical monument, a lieu 
de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the 
term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se” (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009, p. 3).  
The following terms—discourse, language, and talk—are connected to one 
another and can also be described individually. Discourse refers to a(ny) strand(s) of 
communication and is not limited to language. Doing “discourse analysis” means analysis 
focuses not on language in isolation but on how people use language in connection with 
other means of representation, with material objects, with other people, with memories, 
with a larger contextual setting, and even with silence (Johnstone, 2008). Language refers 
to what people say, but language is not only limited to speech or writing. And, as the 
smallest unit of analysis, talk accounts for language’s situatedness within the world and 
displays how language functions in action—language-in-action—and interactionally 
(Ehrlich, 2001; Johnstone, 2008).  
Scholars who view discourse through a Foucauldian lens, position language and 
implementation of human rights policy as structured by cultural flows of power that 
produce institutions as they are enacted and embodied through discourse or as a “set of 
practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
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49). For instance, Judith Butler (1997, 2005) argues that subjects are constituted through 
language and through the scene of address, positioning language as always a bodily act, 
situated within the “social conditions of its emergence” (2005, p. 7). It is Butler’s focus 
on language and discourse as mutually constitutive of identity and the context wherein 
the act of speaking occurs which provides nuanced analysis to discourse. That is, paying 
attention to people who speak about their personal human rights through storytelling 
reveals language, as a bodily act, emergent in everyday trauma in discourse, as carried 
through memory, and as shared in personal narratives about war.  
Discourse analysis, as theorized by Johnstone (2008), is an “open-ended 
heuristic” that allows for a bottom-up analysis of language use in texts that mutually 
constitutes theory as it goes. Johnstone’s central tenet, that discourse constitutes the 
world and that the world is constituted by discourse, is also a central concept in my 
methodology, theory, and analysis. Rather than distinguish between “little d” and “Big 
D” discourse (Gee, 1999), “institutional” or “vernacular” (Ono & Sloop, 1995), or 
“archival” or “repertoire” (Taylor, 2003), Johnstone argues that all discourse is mutually 
structured by the social world. Similarly, while Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that 
“CDA distinguishes between the linguistic surface and some kind of deep structure” 
(2001, p. 22), I will argue it is unnecessary to separate “linguistic surface” from “deep 
structure” because discourse works on one discursive strand/plane. “Linguistic surface” 
refers to the actual text, words spoken, or the surface level analysis; “deep structure” 
refers to the larger social structures that typically are thought to constitute the surface 
level.  
To separate “talk” hierarchically diminishes the constitutive power of “linguistic 
89 
 
surface” features as relating to or indexing already-existing “deep structure” features. 
Rather, I argue, along with Andrus (2011), that both the linguistic surface features and 
deep structure features are constantly being contingently and fluidly constructed in 
moments of usage, thereby collapsing the distinction between surface and deep features. 
This means that surface features are the deep structures: They mutually constitute one 
another and cannot exist separately (Butler, 1997; Conley & O’Barr, 2005; Ehrlich, 2001; 
Matoesian, 2001). This is where Narrative Analysis and Discourse Analysis both inform 
one another and are informed by larger contexts of language-in-action. 
 
Narrative Discourse Analysis 
Narrative Discourse Analysis allows for the combination and possible collapsing 
of the distinctions between micro- and macrostructures. That is, it uses macrodiscursive 
features of narrative, combined with microlinguistic features of narrative as a 
simultaneously-informing heuristic that highlights how trauma emerges through 
discourse. For instance, I used discourse analysis as a method for analyzing how certain 
features of narrative (based on Labovian narrative theories) were able to achieve narrative 
cohesiveness or something else. As demonstrated in the analysis chapters, identifying 
“discourse markers” or “indexes to place” as emergent features within narrative segments 
allow me to recognize where trauma, in the form of “traumatic breach” and 
“(dis)placement trauma” also emerge through language. Usage of the term “language-in-
action,” as one hyphenated term embodies the theory/method described previously, as 
does the term “talk,” which is used by Ehrlich (2002) to describe the linguistic and 
discursive work that occurs in courtrooms. That is, language-in-action is both linguistic 
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surface and deep structure at the same time (Andrus, 2011; Ehrlich, 2002; Johnstone, 
2008). For instance, a notion of what it means to be Bosnian is constituted by the 
language-in-action used to describe the term. In the interviews, participants often 
described themselves using terms “Muslim” or “Bosnian” or “Croat,” but “Croat” means 
something different from “Croatian”; the selection of one term over another 
simultaneously references the symbolisms of nationhood, the pragmatism of 
ethnonational citizenship and paperwork, the realities of living in a “mixed” village; and 
the ways in which one identifies oneself linguistically, symbolically, and emotionally in 
an interview. 
As a method, Narrative Discourse Analysis provides an orientation from which I 
am able to view the interview settings, audio recordings, and transcripts from a variety of 
angles, zooming in at the level of “talk” to explore how discourse functions within/out 
particular narrative structures and zooming out to recontextualize “talk” with a larger 
cultural context. Macro and micro structures of language inform one another and are 
constitutive of one another, which is well suited for narrative discourse analysis, as 
utilized and put forth by Benwell and Stokoe (2006), Jerome Bruner (1992), and William 
Labov (1972). Narrative Discourse Analysis also accounts for power and identity as they 
emerge and are produced through language.  
 
Language, Power, and Identity 
Language is always situated in a cultural and social context; therefore, its usage is 
“political,” meaning words always do something both within their particular context of 
usage and within larger forces of institutional and cultural systems (Gee, 1999; Wodak & 
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Meyer, 2001). But as Andrus (2011) argues, context is as unstable as discourse, that is, a 
context cannot be seen as existing a priori to an utterance or to a discourse since they are 
both interactionally created as sites of negotiation. She writes, “The context can no longer 
be seen as backdrop and cause of the utterance, because context is itself affected by the 
(con)texts and situations that shape the utterance” (p. 132). That is, language is situated in 
a social context, but that context does not exist a priori to the language used, meaning, 
utterances, discourses, contexts, identities, and memories are unstable and fluid as they 
are interactionally negotiated. This view of discourse positions language as not merely 
the vehicle for power nor the representation of power, but as the power itself (Butler, 
1997; Conley & O’Barr, 2005). That is, institutions (such as “nation,” “government,” 
“the law”) exist as institutions because they are continually enacted and reenacted 
through discourse over and again, structuring the cultural flows of power as they 
construct how institutions function (Gee, 1999; Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
Language constructs and is constructed by social context; similarly, within an 
interview context, memory and identity also function interactionally. For example, as can 
be seen in the interviews, questions that are not about “identity,” per se, provoke answers 
that implicitly address notions of Bosnian identity. For example, during a conversation 
with Tarik, he expresses how he thinks his older brother would not be the same person he 
is today if he (the brother) had not lost his hand in Bosnia. (Tragically, part of his 
brother’s hand was blown off when the two of them were playing with bombs they found 
in a car outside of their apartment.) When I ask Tarik if he thinks he would also be 
different under different circumstances, he becomes emotional and is unable to talk: 
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Extract 2 Tarik and Identity 
Interviewer: Do you, um [4 second pause] do you think you would be 
different if you stayed in Bosnia? 
Tarik: Of course 
Interviewer: How so? Have you thought about it? 
Tarik: Um. Yeah. It’s just hard to even begin to say that. 
Interviewer: I mean, it’s an impossible question. 
Tarik: Yeah. 
 Overtalk with wife 
Tarik: One of the things that … [2 second pause] I feel like …the 
whole process of the war has [2 second pause]… stunted my 
kind of …growth and memory. Like this, like a [8 second pause] 
touchy subject…[3 second pause] I’m gonna take it slow….[9 
second pause] Nicole, help me out… [2 second pause] change 
the subject. 
 
 In this excerpt, the question about leaving Bosnia because of the war prompts an 
emotional response that he is unable to put to language. During this exchange, Tarik puts 
his head in his hands and does not look up at his wife or me. We are in a coffee shop, so 
there is background noise of people chatting, coffee grinding, and chairs scraping against 
the floor—all a jarring juxtaposition to the emotional turn the conversation has taken. A 
few moments after this exchange, Tarik expresses what it is that is such a “touchy 
subject” and uses the term “identity crisis” to explain his reaction to the question I asked. 
This moment stands as an important example of how all discursive components are 
mutually and interactionally constructed in-action—my presence in the conversation; the 
formal setting of “an interview;” the coffee shop and its background noise; the physical 
presence of Tarik’s wife; the language, in addition to extradiscursive elements of 
communication—all in construction with the language used to ask a question, prompted 
by his story about his brother’s hand, and answered in terms of identity as it relates to 
memory.  
None of these features exists separately or without mutual constitution from the 
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others. Put another way, “interview talk is the rhetoric of socially-situated speakers” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2010, p. 172). The question prompted Tarik to engage with identity, 
and his response was unexpectedly emotional, which compelled me (out of discomfort 
for his discomfort) to reroute the conversation. Again, all interwoven together, 
constituting the (whole) discursive moment (Andrus, 2011). This fluidity aligns with 
theories of memory that argue memories are co-constructed in the context of telling and 
are constructed anew each time as each storyteller finds the words to put memories into 
language (Campbell, 2006; Halbwachs, 1980; Nora, 1989). It is within these types of 
context and language-in-action that narrative discourse analysis is best employed as an 
adaptive method for discovering not just the “main reasons” for a narrative but as many 
reasons as are possible (Johnstone, 2008, p. 269), meaning, the goal of a discourse 
analysis is to explore all potential means of representation that are available for speakers 
and how those means function within context. Narrative discourse analysis does not 
presume to find power inequalities, or does not presume to find only power inequalities, 
but also looks at language as linguistic phenomena existing in local, interactional 
contexts, the emergence of which might include disparities of power, among other 
elements (Johnstone, 2008).  
 
Ethical and Empathetical Implications 
I now explore the implications of this research, focusing on embodiment, self-
reflexivity, empathy, and textual analysis as modes of inquiry for this type of work. The 
goal of my work, and what I hope to accomplish by interlacing the previously described 
methods together, is to provoke what Soyini Madison calls “response-ability”—a call for 
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advocacy or an ability to respond. A provocation for a “cycle of responses that will set 
loose a stream of response-abilities that will lead to something more, something of larger 
philosophical and material effects” (Madison, 2010, p. 11). The “larger effects” I am 
aiming for will be discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
Within the last 40 to 50 years (Rosaldo, 1989), ethnographers have embarked 
upon a “radical rethinking of the research enterprise,” which, in part, asks the researcher 
to become more aware of the people in the ethnographic process; this means encouraging 
a researcher to be aware of her presence as part of the research situation as well as being 
aware of the embodied, lived experiences of participants (Conquergood, 1991; Denzin, 
2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Fine, 1992; Horner, 2002; Madison, 2010, 2011; 
Rosaldo, 1989; Smith & Watson, 2001). In this sense, ethnographic research is always an 
embodied practice (Conquergood, 1991; Madison, 2011). As Conquergood suggests, 
these transformations have helped those doing ethnographic work engage in critical, self-
reflexive practices by recognizing the interactional, in situ context wherein participants in 
the interview context are interlocutors and practitioners of knowledge (Conquergood, 
1991; Fine, 1992). Recognizing the bodily nature of ethnographic work is also to 
recognize “the pleasure and burden of representation” that is inextricably and already tied 
to ethics (Madison, 2010, p. 11). Three particular qualities and goals guide my research 
methods and my desire to engage in critical advocacy and “response-ability” (Madison, 
2010) and are reflected in and by my theories, methods, and analysis: 1) reciprocity of 
effort and value, 2) transparency and co-production with the transcription and analysis of 
data, and 3) legitimization and privileging of community knowledge production 
(Conquergood, 1991; Fine, 1992; Madison, 2010, 2011; Rosaldo, 1989). First I will 
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describe what is meant by “self-reflexivity” and then I will discuss each of the qualities 
and goals that promote self-reflexivity and “response-ability.”  
 
Self-Reflexivity and Response-Ability 
Bearing in mind Madison’s term “response-ability,” which is a call for advocacy 
or an ability to respond (2010, p. 11), I have reflected continually on how the materialism 
of the “research site” structures and informs self-reflexivity and advocacy, and how these 
moments influence and are influenced by the researcher, the participants, and the 
research site (Horner, 2002). The act of bearing witness to narratives about traumatic 
memory is fraught with tension. For example, how and when is the interviewer 
simultaneously voyeur and witness? When is the act of speaking also an act of 
confession? How are “we” (researcher and co-participants) constituted as our work 
constructs identity and memory through language, and as it is constructed by enactments 
of identity and memory? These questions circulate always in my mind, highlighting the 
interactional aspects of fieldwork wherein we are all simultaneously constructing one 
another and ourselves throughout the process. As Conquergood (1991) writes, 
“Recognition of the bodily nature of fieldwork, privileges the processes of 
communication that constitute the “doing” of ethnography: speaking, doing, and acting 
together” (p. 181). The possibilities of gender essentialism and “racial/ethnic/class 
erasure” and essentialism exist in many attempts to “give voice” to particular 
communities, including my own. These possibilities reveal much about academic position 
and privilege, reminding me that while I cannot change the academic privilege I have as a 
researcher, I can recognize and account for it in my methodology, my analysis, my 
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writing, and in my collaboration with this Bosnian American community (Fine, 1992; 
McCorkel & Meyers, 2003).  
Ellen Cushman (2001) suggests researchers move “beyond self-reflexivity” 
toward a more “socially responsible, reflexive research” (2001, p. 45). She writes, “if 
self-reflexivity lays open the distinctions between researchers and participants, social 
reflexivity uses self-reflection and active nostalgia in order to establish, maintain, and 
develop relationships between participants and researchers” (p. 45). Cushman suggests 
that reflexivity should be less about an individual’s positionality and more about the 
interactional relationships between researchers and participants (2001). A reflexive 
project of determining how people make meaning out of their social practices should 
force us to ask ourselves why we feel we can speak for others as a form of analysis 
(Alcoff, 1991). I do not intend to speak for others; rather, I hope to provide places for 
people to speak for themselves, supporting their voices to provoke spaces for 
response(abilities). Throughout this project, I have tried to center the voices and 
experiences of my participants, positioning them as the authorities and “practitioners of 
knowledge” that they are (Chase, 2005; Conquergood, 1991; Fine, 1992). 
 
Qualities and Goals to Engender Self-Reflexivity  
and Response-ability 	  
Reciprocating Effort and Value 
Reciprocating effort and value means giving of oneself and finding ways to give 
back to the community that is part of this project. Members of the Bosnian American 
community have willingly given of their time to share intimate stories and welcome me 
into their homes, and I have thought of their work in terms of “ethics of labor” (Horner, 
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2002). In attempted reciprocation, I work with the Bosnian American Professional 
Association (BAPA), as much as they are willing to have me, to help fundraise for and 
coordinate events. I have made invaluable friendships that will endure long after this 
process has ended. Additionally, several participants have expressed interest in speaking 
to local groups about their version of the “Refugee Experience,” looking for ways to 
provoke “response-ability” (Madison, 2010) and empathy in the larger Salt Lake City, 
Utah area.  
 
Transparency and Co-Production with Transcription  
and Analysis of Data 	  
Transparency and co-production of the research project means interviewees only 
share what they wish to talk about (Powell & Takayoshi, 2003; Smith & Watson, 2001). I 
have been self-reflexive and upfront about admitting my awkwardness with soliciting 
particular topics and in not always understanding which topics will be sensitive; for the 
most part, participants have been forgiving toward me. Each of the interviewees has full 
access to their own audio recording and transcription and was able to review and 
contribute to my work throughout the entire process if they so desired (Alcoff et al., 
1991; Conquergood, 1991; Madison, 2011; Rosaldo, 1989). Additionally, building in 
time for them to reflect on their talk and to revise what they have said, or to eliminate 
portions of the transcript they no longer wish to share as part of the research project, 
enables a partial ownership over the research production. 	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Legitimization and Privileging of Community  
Knowledge Production 	  
Similar to the qualities identified above, the third quality, legitimization and 
privileging of community knowledge production, has come through group interview 
dynamics wherein interviewees collectively create knowledge and negotiate identity. 
During a group interview, participants construct knowledge together as part of a larger 
community (Fine, 1992; Smith & Watson, 2001). As an acknowledgement of the 
experiential knowledge each of the participants has, their voices are included as part of 
the history of the country and the war, alongside other histories that benefit from 
authorial publication and widespread dissemination. Several of the participants have also 
helped me translate and make sense of a complicated history. I have tried to center their 
voices throughout this project, relying on and utilizing their expertise. The Bosnian 
Americans I met are experts on how memory and identity influence and affect one 
another, especially in the context of war trauma; I am not telling them anything they do 
not already know from experience. Thus, many of them have been co-collaborators in the 
invention, analysis, coding, and drafting of this dissertation. 
 
Conclusions 
Rhetorical analysis, ethnography, and memory studies all tend to utilize large-
scale methods of analysis to make claims about social practice but rarely look at 
microlinguistic instances of language use in social contexts as a primary unit of analysis. 
Similarly, scholars in social memory studies often look at place-making activities and 
memory-making activities (Aguliar-San, 2009; Climo & Cattell, 2002; Huyssen, 2003; 
Soh, 2008), “in situ” analysis of museums (Dickinson et al., 2005; 2010), and personal 
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narratives (Smith & Watson, 2001; Thompson, 2000), but these studies often overlook 
language-in-action as part of rhetoric’s materiality. Furthermore, those scholars in social 
memory studies who carefully situate their analyses within “big D” Discourses, as 
defined by Gee (1999), rarely acknowledge the “little d” discourses or the language-in-
action instances that mutually constitute “big D” discourses. For example, although 
Edkins (2003) talks about the communication of trauma in relation to larger 
psychologized discourses about PTSD, she does not offer examples of language-in-action 
that might show how “big D” discourses are constituted by everyday language use or 
even language-in-action within psychology. Likewise, human rights scholars look at 
discourses of human rights through a rhetorical lens (Ashworth, 1999; Brown, 1999; 
Donnelly, 1999; Henley, 2005; Peach, 2005; Stacey, 2005), but do not claim to 
necessarily be analyzing the rhetoric of human rights discourse.  
At the same time, scholars who study language and the Bosnian War in specific, 
focus on the discourse of large-scale institutions. For instance, Hansen (2006) employs 
discourse analysis to study the foreign policy of the West in relation to the Balkans and 
the mid-1990s Bosnian war. One of her aims is to show how a discourse-centered 
approach to foreign policy-making can reveal how representations of identity and foreign 
policy are constitutive of one another. Similarly, Campbell (1998) takes a rhetorical 
approach to international politics, using deconstructionism to address intersections of 
violence and identity in Bosnia. He traces the extensive history of the region through 
discursive and visual representations of identity invoked by/imposed upon the region. 
Taking a sociolinguistics approach, Burgarski (2001) explores connections between 
language and nationalism in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Bugarski argues 
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that Serb-controlled media between 1992-1996 used language to replace communism 
with nationalism in attempts to incite Serb nationalist pride in territorializing the former 
Yugoslav republics. And Khosravinik (2009) explores how Balkan refugees are 
represented in British newspapers in the mid-1990s, utilizing rhetorical analysis to 
explore visual and discursive representations. 
Similarly, studies that engage in analyzing discursive practices but do not call 
themselves “ethnographic” regularly draw upon the methodological underpinnings and 
values of ethnographic research (Hauser, 1999; Kress, 2001), meaning, the researchers 
take into account the social context in which the discourse is produced and recognize 
discourse as socially situated. Again, this attention to context, community, and 
constitutive discursive production also occurs in studies that do call themselves 
“ethnographic” even if those studies do not claim to be analyzing discourse (Aguilar-San 
Juan, 2009; Stewart, 1996).  It is the merging of similar methodological commitments 
that marries ethnographic interviewing and narrative discourse analysis together 
(Oberheuber & Krzyzanowski, 2008).  
Narrative Discourse Analysis, as a method and a theory, focuses on how discourse 
functions in its context, how language-in-action affects and is affected by larger social 
structures, enabling investigation of how language does something and not only what it 
means. The remaining chapters in this dissertation will explore how participants share 
memories from the war and how “traumatic breach” and “(dis)placement trauma” present 
within narratives as emergent linguistic interactions. While each participant shares stories 
that convey these concepts, the rhetorical functions of traumatic breach and displacement 
trauma are most salient in particular participants’ stories; therefore, the remaining 
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chapters will explore specific narratives as significant examples of how trauma becomes 
manifest in narrative.  
I wish to (re)emphasize that these chapters provide merely one side of a dialogue 
about how these speakers share memory. It is difficult to avoid the common pitfalls of 
ethnographic work, one of which is to suspend participants in time through the act of 
writing, seemingly stopping their knowledge/identity/memory production and positioning 
them as closed, static subjects. While I am aware of this possibility, and the ethical 
imperatives that will always and already be intertwined with this work, it is my hope that 
this project operates “more like a hyphen than a period,” (Madison, 2012, p.11) as 









Table 1: Demographic Information of Participants 





Hometown in Bosnia 
Tarik Male 26 1994 7 Čapljina 
Sarah Female 22 Grew up in 
Utah 
n/a American spouse to 
Tarik 
Azra Female 31 1999 16 Lukavac 
Samira Female 31 1997 16 Banovići. 
Adnan Male 33 1998 17 Brčko 
Fatima Female 37 1994 17 Sanski Most 
Edin  Male 48-52 1998 32-35 Prijedor 
Tamara Female 48-52 1998 32-35 Prijedor 
Belma Female 45 1997 27 Bihać 
Amir Male 48 1997 30 Zenica 
Sabina Female 57 1997 39 Brčko 










Table 2: Bruner’s Features of Narrative 
Narrative 
diachronicity 
Events are understood the way they relate over time rather than by their 
moment-by-moment significance. 
Particularity Narratives tell particular happenings, but those stories are embedded into 
general types of narratives. 
Intentional state 
entailment 
Intentional states and subsequent action are loosely linked and therefore 
cannot provide causal explanations.  
Hermeneutic 
composability 




To be worth telling, a tale must be about how an implicit canonical script 
has been breached. 
Referentiality Narratives obtain meaning (and verisimilitude) by what they reference in 
one’s life. 
Genericness Genre is both a property of a text and a way of comprehending narratives. 




Context sensitivity makes narrative discourse in everyday life a viable 
instrument for cultural negotiation. 








OVERNIGHT, EVERYTHING CHANGES: 
“TRAUMATIC BREACH” 
 
 [….] it’s called Cryna, you know, that’s the region. That’s, uh, part of the 
Bosnian, um, that’s where I was born and raised and lived there and have a big 
family. […] And, um, all my family lived there for centuries. No one ever moved, 
no one ever left. You know, you go to school, and finish your education and then 
come back home. It’s a very, very close community. Um, small Muslim 
community. And, um, my family, as I said, lived there until the war […] when the 
war started […] It was very dramatic, it was such a different, um, we lived in a … 
such a nice, small, peaceful place […] and then over the night, everything just 
changed. People just, and it was amazing. […] People that, you know, just 
everything overnight turned into [……… pause] like we never knew each other. 
Like we were never, never a community. Like we were never friends, we never 
knew each other. 
 
(Interview with Fatima, 2012) 
Introduction 
Fatima’s story about her hometown at the beginning of the war exemplifies other 
narratives Bosnian Americans share about changing allegiances during wartime. As 
Fatima says, “everything overnight turned into…[ pause] like we never knew each other.” 
Other participants share similar stories about the seemingly overnight betrayal that turned 
neighbors into enemies, or, at best, passive observers of violence. Fatima’s father was 
taken away and interrogated at the local police station in her town. Men with whom he 
used to do business and drink coffee at local cafes turned into his abusers in the police 
station; they forced his hands into boiling water and beat him repeatedly. Fatima’s 
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narrative is not the only one that references the seemingly overnight changes in 
neighborhoods. Samira’s grandfather, who identified as Bosnian Serb, was beaten to 
death by his Bosnian Muslim neighbors. Another couple interviewed, Tamara and Edin, 
describe how neighbors anonymously killed Tamara’s brother; Edin was the one who 
found his body. Because of the closeness of the neighborhood, and because Edin knew 
who had murdered his brother-in-law, Tamara and Edin fled, fearing for the safety of 
their family.  
This quality of betrayal, combined with its consequential, inarticulatable disbelief, 
is what I call “traumatic breach.” To define traumatic breach, I employ several 
theorizations of trauma wherein it is characterized by a breach in the expected or 
presumed safety of an institutional authority (Edkins, 2003). Trauma is also described as 
persistent, enduring, and embodied in everyday life. (Caruth, 1996; Edkins, 2003; Smith 
& Watson, 2001). While these scholars (noted in literature on trauma and memory) have 
informed my thinking about trauma, none has talked about trauma as having a rhetorical 
function emergent through language. My notion of traumatic breach is linguistic, 
physical, and literal—each of these breaches can be seen as emergent through language. 
Traumatic breach does not reside linguistically in one feature or another; nor does it 
emerge as one distinctly identifiable thing. It always exists in the in-between and within 
narrative’s “composable” aggregations. That is, it is through the interplay and 
interdependence of each of narrative’s features and their reliance upon a constructed 
canonical script that traumatic memories emerge in linguistic interaction, normalizing 
and/or postponing instances of traumatic breach.  
As will be shown in this chapter’s analysis, traumatic breaches occur on multiple 
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levels: at the moment of the event in real time; discursively in narrative stories about war, 
as memory breaches and discursive breaks; and physically as regular ontological/physical 
interruptions in everyday life. In participants’ narratives, traumatic breach has a variety of 
rhetorical functions, but it does not manifest itself the same way across each narrative. 
Rather, each narrative is distinctive in how trauma emerges. What is common across each 
interview is that in each instance, regardless of disparity of linguistic emergence, a 
function of traumatic breach is to normalize and postpone talking about traumatic 
experiences. In the case of Adnan’s and Tarik’s stories, which this chapter analyzes, 
traumatic breach emerges in narrative through inference, through a talking-around, 
through the discursive work of co-participants, and through “discourse markers” 
(Schiffrin, 1986; Schourup, 1999).  
 
Framework for Analysis: Canonical Scripts and Traumatic Breach 
The framework for this analysis is an overlay and adaptation of two narrative 
theories (Bruner, 1991) and Labov (1972). Each interview can be segmented into features 
of a “fully formed narrative” (Labov, 1972), which then make up the “canonical script” 
(Bruner). It is the interdependence and interplay of components of narrative wherein 
linguistic features of traumatic breach emerge through language and erupt in narrative. 
Bruner’s concepts of “canonicity and breach” and “hermeneutic composability” as 
features of narrative work in tandem when mapped onto Labov’s five features. Table 3 
explains the features of a “fully formed narrative” (Labov, 1972). I argue that these five 
features comprise a “canonical script” because they work together to construct a 
seemingly cohesive narrative (Bruner, 1991). However, because of the interplay and 
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interdependency of these features, this canonical script presents the potential for 
“breach.” 
Therefore, Bruner’s concepts of “hermeneutic composability” and “canonicity 
and breach” are concepts that provide a framework for analyzing how breach occurs 
within a “fully formed narrative” (Labov, 1972). Figure 1 demonstrates how these 
concepts work together as a framework for narrative discourse analysis.   
As shown in Figure 1, hermeneutic composability and canonicity and breach are 
theoretical concepts that rely upon one another and map onto the features of a “fully 
formed narrative” (Labov, 1972). I will describe these features separately and then 
demonstrate how they work together as a framework for analyzing traumatic breach in 
language.  
 
“Hermeneutic Composability” and “Canonicity and Breach” 
“Hermeneutic composability” references how stories rely on the interdependence 
between their parts and the whole. As Bruner (1991) argues, “a story can only be realized 
when its parts and whole can be made to live together” (p. 8). Bruner suggests narratives 
have five distinct features: action, scene, actor, instrument and goal, and trouble. While 
these features may be distinct, they are hermeneutically composed together, meaning they 
reference and rely upon one another for the full narrative to be realized. Similarly, 
Labov’s (1972) concept of a “fully formed” narrative includes five features similar to 
Bruner’s five features: orientation, complicating action, evaluation, result, and coda. 
Positioning Labov’s five features as hermeneutically composed within a narrative 
demonstrates how features index and reference one another to emphasize, ameliorate, or 
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downplay instances of traumatic breach.  
The interdependence and interreferentiality of these features make up the “canon” 
of narrativity, referencing Bruner’s concept of “canonicity and breach,” describes how 
narrators tell their stories in a way to make the ordinary strange. As Bruner (1991) 
suggests, “Narratives require scripts as necessary background, but scripts do not 
constitute narrativity itself. For to be worth telling, a tale must be about how an implicit 
canonical script has been breached” (p. 8). Or, as Labov (1972) puts it—a story must be 
worth telling. In his interview-based study with patients with chronic illness, Crossley 
(2000) suggests that chronic illness constitutes an “ontological assault” or a breach in the 
normality of everyday life (p. 539) and “highlights the taken-for-grantedness of the 
‘normal’ and unseen experience of narrative coherence” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 
139). However, the canonical script or the perceived “narrative coherence” does not exist 
in isolation or a priori to breach or to the interview setting. Rather, the hermeneutic 
composability of narrative’s features constructs the canon as the script, and constructs the 
mundane in relation to the breach. A canonical script exists precisely because of the 
breach that makes the script seem normal in comparison to the abnormality of the breach.  
For example, one of the first nights after Samira’s family has been resettled in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, there is a burglary down the street. The police are called, and 
Samira and her parents, speaking only Bosnian, are scared and confused by the flashing 
lights and sirens. Samira shares the sentiments her father expressed: “Like, okay, this is 
as bad as it was.  Why don't I just go back?  At least I understand what's going on” 
(Interview with Samira, 2014). This sentiment expresses the breach of a presumed safety 
in American resettlement. For Samira and her family, the purpose of being evacuated 
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from the danger in Bosnia is a canonical script that references safeness and refuge in a 
stable America. This presumed canon is breached by an event that is unexpected and 
literally incomprehensible because of cultural and language barriers inherent in “refugee-
ness” (Ritivoi, 2002) or “being a stranger in a strange land” (Minh-ha, 2011). But the 
same canonical script that references safeness in a stable refuge is breached in other 
ways, indexing previous war trauma endured by Samira and her family in Bosnia. 
Samira’s story highlights presumptions and complexities of refugee experience—that life 
will be safer “far away,” and, yet, that danger persists (Minh-ha, 2011, p. 11).  
 
Discourse Markers 
One of the ways trauma emerges in narratives and is hermeneutically composed is 
through the use of “discourse markers.” Operating as an “organizing function” of the 
narrative, discourse markers are connective words or phrases that are “syntax-
dependent,” meaning they get their meaning from the clauses they are connecting, and 
they organize narratives into segments (Bolden, 2008, p. 981; Schiffrin, 1986; Schourup, 
1999). In narrative, discourse markers have a variety of rhetorical purposes. Often, 
participants’ use of discourse markers works to construct a canonical history with logical, 
linear movement when that story, taken apart into its component parts, has no rational 
explanation for its plot. Rather than only work to connect clauses together, I argue that 
discourse markers are also markers of traumatic breach’s rhetorical functions—
normalizing and/or postponing the sharing of trauma.  
For example, the primary discourse marker that emerges in Samira’s narrative is 
the word “yeah.” This word moves her stories along, both admitting and avoiding the 
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impossibility of talking about trauma. And it is often accompanied by nervous laughter: 
Um, we packed and I remember getting on the street and there was just a talk that 
we're, we can't leave.  I never asked what really happened.  I usually don't ask my 
parents what happened in war, what they've seen.  I just know in my silence.  
[Chuckles]  But, yeah, so.  (Interview with Samira, October 2015) 
 
After this last use of “yeah,” Samira’s narrative trails off. There is nothing more to be 
said about what she and her parents are unable and unwilling to talk about. The discourse 
marker “yeah” allows her to move the story along while simultaneously acknowledging 
and avoiding the traumatic breach.  
Discourse markers are crucial to this narrative discourse analysis because they 
demonstrate how component features of narrative are put together, and they signal how a 
speaker is attempting to organize a canonical script, but, they also mark instances of 
“breach” insofar as they signal what is not being said about a particular story. The silence 
that occurs as a result of the discourse marker is often the very feature that makes the 
story traumatic. Narratives rely upon their component parts and their hermeneutic 
composability as a complete whole. Discourse markers bring component parts into 
relation with other component parts and organize a narrative into a complete story, 
signaling instances of traumatic breach at the same time. Therefore, the framework for 
this analysis relies upon the overlap of several different theories that, when combined 
together, provide a heuristic that analyzes language in narratives holistically—in 
narrative form, in relation to its component parts and in relation to its whole, and in 





Analysis: Breaches in Language; Breaches in Memory 
This analysis focuses on two segments of two participants’ stories as emblematic 
of traumatic breach’s rhetorical functions and as places where features of narrative can be 
seen referencing and relying upon one another to normalize and postpone traumatic 
breach. I labeled these stories “Origin Stories,” a designation that imbues them with 
several qualities: 1) Origin Stories are prompted memories, meaning participants 
reference canonical scripts to tell a story about their lives that they have presumably told 
before; 2) Each storyteller (participant in this project) has an Origin Story making these 
narratives a salient place to consider how storytellers orient themselves within the 
interview situation; 3) Origin Stories, as narrative segments, employ each of Labov’s five 
features (orientation, complicating action, evaluation, result, and coda) thereby 
demonstrating how traumatic breach emerges in the interplay and hermeneutic 
composability of these features.  
Shared memories are always prompted (De Leon & Cohen, 2005; Halbwachs, 
1980; Nora, 1989). In the interview setting, participants share their Origin Stories as a 
scripted response to the question: “tell me about the circumstances that brought you to 
America.” This question, while vague and open in its inquiry, still puts narrative 
boundaries around what answer is expected. That is, it requires describing circumstances 
that have directed both of us to the interview setting; therefore, their story’s meaning is 
contingent within/upon the context of the interview setting. A participant’s Origin Story 
is one they have possibly told many times to an American audience—this is part of war 
diasporic experience (Auguilar-San Juan, 2009; Minh-ha, 2011; Ritivoi, 2002). However, 
even the script of Origin is constructed anew in the context of Bosnian-American 
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retrospection, new memory, new realizations, a new audience, a new setting, and a new 
purpose. Each of these features contributes to the bounding of the solicited narrative, 
constraining the type of story that will be shared (Chase, 2003).  
 
Interdependent Features of Narrative 
Participants’ Origin Stories are not linear, nor do they move through Labov’s five 
features chronologically. The work of orientation is done throughout the narrative, 
particularly as it references the complicating action and the complicating action indexes 
back onto the orientation work. Similarly, evaluation is threaded throughout and 
constitutively indexes both orientation and result; all component features of a fully 
formed narrative are dependent upon one another for meaning and purpose. 
 For example, as shown in Figure 2, Adnan says, “So, um, we never thought there 
would be actually a war in our country,” to foreshadow the complicating action (the start 
of the war). But the phrase “we never thought” indexes a nostalgic past that references 
unspoken pleasant memories of his childhood in Brcko, his family, and a safe/stable 
Yugoslavia steered by Josip Broz Tito.  Although traumatic breach emerges within each 
participant’s story as a way to normalize and/or postpone talking about traumatic events, 
two narratives best exemplify how this works in the narrative framework constructed 
earlier using theories from Labov and Bruner. It is within these two participants’ Origin 
Stories—Adnan’s and Tarik’s—that the emergence of traumatic breach, through the 




How Breach Postpones Trauma: Adnan’s Story 
Adnan wanted to meet at a bar near his house. He walks over after a day of 
working from home—he works mostly online and over the phone—and asks if we can sit 
outside so he can smoke. He lights one cigarette after another, smoking continuously 
through his stories, totaling almost 2 hours of talking. He was 6 when he left Bosnia with 
his parents and his brother, an escape he recounts as “traumatic” even as he 
simultaneously shrugs off its trauma by placing his story alongside other histories of 
Yugoslavia and the war. His stories weave back and forth between personal and 
generalized stories about that time, suspended occasionally in spaces between what he 
knows personally and what he knows institutionally of Yugoslavia’s war history, 
collapsing the dichotomies between those types of knowing into one strand of memory 
that is his story.  
Adnan’s Origin Story exemplifies features of narrative all simultaneously and 
interactionally enable traumatic breach to emerge in discourse. Although he is telling 
stories about “the past,” his recountings summon the past into the present (Stewart, 
1996), an invocation that is peculiar in the context of this interview setting. When 
listening to the audio of this interview, I can hear the clanging of mugs on the table, the 
click of a cigarette lighter, the laughter of sports fans inside cheering for the football 
game on the television, other patrons chatting and smoking, and the server’s intermittent 
query “do you guys need anything else?” This space, with its routine noise, epitomizes 
the embodied trauma of everyday life. Adnan carries layers of traumatic memories with 
him into a setting, and the bar reflects back to him its everyday-ness. 
While these extra (external) features provide a curious juxtaposition to the 
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oftentimes traumatic stories Adnan shares, they also amplify a discourse marker used 
most often in his storytelling: the word “so.” It is in the relistening to the audio recording 
of the interview where I first notice how “so” moves the story from one point to another. 
The casual ubiquity of this word is underscored by other voices using the same word but 
in different sentences. In the background, someone else in the bar makes this utterance: 
“[…] so I left […],” implying that leaving was a result of whatever event occurred before 
that so. Adnan’s so performs a different function in this context. As Bolden describes, 
“so” as a discourse marker has multiple functions, including as a conjunction used to 
indicate a causal relationship between events. As a conjunction, “so” joins two clauses 
together, establishing a causal relationship between the two propositions. In this sense, 
sometimes Adnan uses “so” to demonstrate a temporal relationship between 
chronological events within this Origin Story. Sometimes it is employed as a discourse 
marker that allows him to shift topics or to postpone telling a particular story. Bolden 
(2008) claims this usage of “so” marks a “course-of-action-internally,” to mark a 
continuation of a particular thread of the story after a perceived interruption (p. 978). 
Often in tandem with “so” as an organizing function to reorganize a particular story 
thread after an (internal) interruption, is the use of “so” as an inferential connection, 
meaning, “so” indicates some type of inference between two events, the nature of which 
is up to the listener (Bolden, 2008). These last two uses of “so” as a discourse marker are 
most salient to the concept of “breach” in this particular context. As the word emerges in 
Adnan’s narrative, “so” is not merely a discourse marker whose only feature is to 
organize stories; rather, it appears to function in the text as a coping mechanism for 
postponing talking about traumatic events.  
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Narrative Features Reveal “Traumatic Breach” 
Adnan’s Origin Story begins at the start of the war in 1992. In sum, he talks about 
fleeing Bosnia, becoming a refugee in Croatia and then Germany, and then eventually 
coming to America with the International Rescue Committee (IRC). What is segmented 
as his Origin Story, from orientation to coda is five pages. He returns to the present and 
to the interview setting in his coda: “but I’m assuming you will ask me those questions. 
So this is the story” (Interview with Adnan, Lines Q-20-21; R-22).12 Adnan’s narrative 
employs each of Labov’s features of a fully formed narrative at various points in the 
story. As mentioned above, these features do not present themselves linearly or 
chronologically, and they always index one another, relying on one another to convey the 
gravity of the breach. The breach and its meaning relies upon the constitutive interplay 
between orientation work and complicating action work. An initial orientation appears in 
Extract 4, Lines 4-10 wherein Adnan sets up the story of the war. The start of the war is 
the orientation and the breach simultaneously. He starts in 1992, which each of the 
participants identify as the year that marks the starting of the war in Croatia. Adnan 
explicitly characterizes the war as an act of “aggression” against an “internationally 
recognized country of Bosnia.” As part of his orientation, or setting of the scene, Adnan 
uses the words “attacked,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “genocide.”  He is clear about who 
attacked whom, the unprovoked nature of the attacks, and Bosnia’s status as an 
“internationally recognized” country at the time. Although he is emphatic about these 
statements, he is neither overly loud nor aggressive in saying them. To him, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Adnan’s Origin Story in its entirety is included in Appendix C. 
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assertions seem to be mere facts of the case, part of his history that is inseparable from 
his country’s history and a history of a war.  
Extract 3 
1.   Interviewer: Thanks.  So can you tell me about how you came to 
America? 
2.   Adnan:  Yes. [pause] 
3.   Interviewer: Like, what caused you to come to America and –  
4.   Adnan:  Well, um, … in 1992, war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started, 
or in 
5.   the former Yugoslavia.  Uh, they have been, um, an aggression against, uh, … 
6.   internationally recognized country of Bosnia, so it's o-, often confused like a 
7.   civil war, but it's not really a civil war because, uh, Serbian forces, um, 
8.   attacked Bosnia and started committing ethnic cleansing, genocide, and, um, 
9.   other ways of, uh – other means to, uh, spread Serbia, which was their 
10.  republic.   
 
As can be seen in the rest of Adnan’s interview, not just in his Origin Story, setting the 
scene in this way is crucial for making sense of the resentment, anger, and crisis of 
identity that is all related to this orientation that indexes trauma through the concept of 
“breach.”  
The first instance of complicating action occurs in Lines 1 and 4 of Extract 4 
wherein Adnan expresses disbelief about the start of the war based on the presumed 
stability of his country prior to the complicating action. In Line 1, Adnan uses “so” to 
indicate a shift to the complicating action of the story, which, as mentioned earlier, sets 
the stage for the complicating action because it also indexes a nostalgic orientation.  
Extract 4 
1.  So, um, we never thought there would be actually a war in our country, you 
2.  know we grew up in – under Tito and, um – my parents did.  I was born 
3.  afterwards, and, uh, his, um, system was – he called it "brotherhood and 
4.  unity."  So, um, we lived, and never thinking that it could ever be a war in our 
5.  country, so – however, politically, Serbia wanted to create, um – in 
6.  Yugoslavia, wanted to have a greater political power.  So, uh, the first thing 
7.   they did, they eliminated the provinces of, uh, the, the, uh, um, … political 
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8.  power of two provinces in Serbia:  uh, Kosovo and, uh, Vojvodina.  And then, 
9.  uh, Milosevic tried to spread his power, um, across other republics, and the 
10.  other republics said no.   
 
After “so,” Adnan pauses with an “um,” seemingly reflecting on the complicating action, 
which will be made meaningful by more orientation work after this foreshadowing 
phrase: “we never thought there would actually be a war in our country.” In B-2 through 
B-4, he reorients and reemphasizes the “breach” of nonbelief in the possibility of war 
with a reference to the safeness and stability that made the breach traumatic:  
you know, we grew up in—under Tito and, um—my parents did. I was born 
afterwards, and, uh, his, um, system was – he called it ‘brotherhood and unity.’ 
So, um, we lived, and never thinking that it could ever be a war in our country, 
so… 
 
To emphasize the breach, Adnan’s narrative moves back and forth between the 
work of orientation and complicating action. For example, in Extract 5, he gives a 
collective history of the war, meaning he tells a history that is not personal memory but is 
part of a historical script for the beginning of the war.  
Extract 5 
1.   So, um, once this – and they, um, proclaimed their independence.  So because 
2.   Serbs were living in Bosnia and Croatia, um, Milosevic didn't wanna let them 
3.   secede, so, uh, what he started doing is he sent, um, paramilitary forces and 
4.   Yugoslav Army to basically,…um…take parts of Bosnia.  Most of the towns in 
5.   Bosnia were, um – majority were Muslims in the towns.  In rural area it was 
6.   mostly the Croats.  But in all bigger cities, Muslims were the majority, so in 
7.   order to, uh, keep these certain areas under his control, uh, he started – he 
8.   used genocide and ethnic cleansing as a tool to, um, to reach his political 
9.   goals. 
 
He references Slobodan Milosevic and his desire to keep Yugoslavia together. He again 
uses the words “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” to emphasize the injustice of the war 
and to highlight how unprovoked and unwarranted the Serb aggression against the 
Muslim population was. Setting the scene this way is orientation groundwork that 
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becomes meaningful by its placement to the next section wherein he uses “so” to index 
back to his personal memory, his personal story about his hometown, Brčko.  
The following extract, Extract 6, works as complicating action precisely because 
it exists in a discursive space between, on one hand, the stability of home, friendship, and 
family; and, on the other hand, the instability of being separated from his parents and 
removed from his hometown. In this section, the breach occurs in the space between the 
orientation: 
Extract 6 
1.   So, um, I am from the city of Brčko, which is now a district, a s-, 'cause there's 
2.   the Republika Srpska entity and Federation entity, and my town is kinda like 
3.   a district.  In '92, there were tensions.   
 
and the complicating action: 
 
4.   So my parents sent me and my brother to my uncle in Croatia. 
 
The word “tensions” indexes the above section wherein Adnan describes Milosevic’s 
plan to turn Yugoslavia into Greater Serbia. And the complicating action indexes the 
unspoken breach, communicable in the form of retrospective evaluation, which is both 
happy and wistful: 
Extract 7 
5.    ------ And as a kid I always thought that this was just a 
6.   vacation, a temporary thing.  I was even, you know, kinda excited that I'm not 
7.   gonna go to school, not knowing that this'll be the last time to see all my 
8.   friends in Brčko, um, for a very long time to come.   
 
The meaningfulness of the trauma as “breach” simultaneously indexes the nostalgic 
orientation previously set in Section B, the complicating action previously set in Sections 
B and D, and the future result in Section Q wherein Adnan is able to “reconnect with 
everything” (Section Q, Lines 19-20).  
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Breach as Literal, Figurative, and Discursive 
 Throughout his sharing of this segment of narrative, Adnan hardly looks up from 
his drink. It is as if he knows it all so solidly by memory that he simply turns on “the 
story.”  His voice is deep, his cadence regular, each use of the word “so” is accompanied 
by a pause and a sigh. Often he shrugs his shoulders as “so” moves his narration from 
place to place or from scene to scene, signaling both the inevitability of its course and 
Adnan’s acknowledgement of that inevitability as a way to ameliorate the breach that has 
occurred. In Adnan’s story, the concept of breach emerges as literal, figurative, and 
discursive. The literal/physical breach occurs in a forced departure from his hometown 
and in multiple separations from his parents. This breach violates the presumed 
infallibility of multiple institutions: the safety of the family and the inviolable purity of a 
happy childhood—he was forcibly removed from both, and this literal breach emerges as 
trauma through discourse. Literal breach emerges most clearly in the coda at the end of 
this narrative segment wherein Adnan returns to Bosnia and to Germany to “reconnect” 
over the breach that had occurred.  
The figurative breach in this narrative occurs in a conceptual breach in stability of 
government, especially in relation to the safety of Tito’s socialist Yugoslavia—a 
nostalgia Adnan inherits through generational memory from his parents, whom I also 
interviewed (Nermin and Sabina). Adnan expresses heartfelt respect and pride for Josip 
Tito and the former Yugoslavia. Even though he was born after the fall of Yugoslavia, he 
shares his parents’ nostalgia for the way things were. In his narrative, he conflates his 
memories with what his parents have told him about Yugoslavia: “So, um, we never 
thought there would be actually a war in our country, you know, we grew up in—under 
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Tito and, um—my parents did.  I was born afterwards […].” He first says “we grew up” 
and then he corrects himself, saying, “my parents did”; but this correction is not 
necessarily for accuracy. It demonstrates the fluidity of generational memories and 
inherited identities as told through stories. Adnan’s parents’ experiences bleed into his 
own, layering over his memories like a palimpsest (Huyssen, 2003), invoking nostalgia’s 
dual functions as both acknowledgment and resistance to change (Ritivoi, 2002). The 
figurative breach that emerges through Adnan’s discourse is that belief in a nostalgic past 
that could (would) never be corrupted by war.  
The discursive breach occurs in the text of the narrative itself, in the way Adnan 
uses “so” to move his Origin Story along, insinuating linear and causal movement into a 
story that has no rational explanation for its plot. Discursively, the “so” allows Adnan to 
connect traumatic events in his Origin Story by inference and postponement, jumping 
over the breach until he is ready to do the work of evaluation, which then indexes back 
onto the interplay between orientation and complicating action. The use of “so” as an 
internal organizing discourse marker in this way constructs and is constructed by 
inferential “breaches” that allow Adnan to articulate his story as sensibly moving forward 
without discussing the particular breach that made the experience traumatic.   
 
Discourse Markers as Discursive Breach 
Now I will focus more on discursive breach since it is most salient in Adnan’s 
language. It is in Adnan’s retelling of the bus ride from Croatia to the Slovenian/Austrian 
border, which is part of his Origin Story (Sections J-L), that the use of “so” as a discourse 
marker of “breach” becomes most evident. And it is only in relation to his mother’s 
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retelling of the same event that the gravity and trauma of the situation are fully visible. In 
this story, Adnan, who is 11 at the time, is attempting to cross the border from the former 
Yugoslavia (in Croatia) with his mother and his 7-year-old brother, Enzo. But in Adnan’s 
story, the “so” jumps over what is traumatic about the bus ride, moving the story along to 
the next causal event. As Adnan shares this story, he appears resigned to its outcome. 
Because he knows the end from the beginning, he seems to downplay the trauma of it all. 
He says the event of crossing the boarder “illegally” was “a trauma in itself” and even 
asks, “how would you feel?” when I ask him if he was scared. And, yet, from his 
narrative alone, it is not entirely clear how dangerous and traumatic the situation was.  
Extract 8 
1.   Adnan:  So – [pause] – what would happen, people were … 
2.   who had passports would stay in a bus, 
3.   and the rest of the people, including us – it was night and it was cold.  Um, it 
4.   was December, like middle of December.  So we would go into the bathrooms 
5.   and wait until the bus driver, who was a real, real asshole and a prick, um – 
6.   once those people gave their passports and their passports were returned, 
7.   we would one by one come back into the bus.   
 
Here, the “so” in Line 1 indicates the beginning of the topic, or the story, by referencing 
the previous explanation about border crossing in Extract 9. The “so” in Line 4 
reorganizes the story after a (seemingly) incidental explanation about temperature. The 
use of “so” in Line 4 positions the information before it—“Um, it was December, like 
middle of December”—as orientation work, and positions the information following it—
“we would go into the bathrooms…”—as the main storyline and the complicating action.  
Extract 9 
1.   So in Austrian – Slovenian/Austrian border, my brother had to go to the 
2.   bathroom, and – at night.  It was like 2:00 in the morning, 'cause we were at 




The first “so” in Extract 9, Line 1, works again to reorganize the story temporally, 
moving it back to the main storyline, which is the “reason” for the story in the first place. 
The “so” in Line 3 also functions as a reorganizing marker after the internal interruption 
about the time of day the event occurred. But the “so” at the beginning of the next 
section, Extract 10, relies completely on inference for its traumatic meaning.  
Extract 10 
1.   So, uh, we were driving, and I was 11 years old, and I was so scared, I 
2.   remember, um.  So I went to this guy and said, you know, my mom stayed 
3.   behind.  And he started saying, like, the worst things ever, like, you know, uh, 
4.   "May she piss blood" and all of that kinda like verbal stuff. 
5.   Me:  Was he Bosnian? 
6.   Adnan:  He was Bosnian, I think, yeah, or Serbian or Croat, I 
7.   don't know.  But he said, like – and I was – I got really scared, so I went with 
8.   this other guy, who was nicer, and we went and we – like, across – well, here 
9.   were the fields, and we were going down the street, down the road at 2:30 in 
10.  the morning to kind of try to pick them up.  And, uh, we met them halfway, so 
11.  I was very happy to see the two – you know, to see them and that they were 
12.  able to, um, come with us, that they weren't caught and stuff.   
 
This “so” is the essence of the breach—being alone on a bus, at a dangerous border 
crossing, knowing your mother and younger brother have been left at a dangerous spot. In 
that same line, Section L, Line 1, Adnan evaluates his telling of the story with the 
admission “I was so scared.” Furthermore, the obfuscation of the breach is made evident 
by my question: “Was he Bosnian” and Adnan’s apathetic response about this question in 
Lines 5-7 of Section L. The ethnonational identity of the man who was mean to him was 
not the marker of the trauma, as I had assumed from previous discussions about Bosnian 
Serb/Muslim tensions. The “breach” occurs within the silence marked by “so”—the 
illegality of the situation, the danger of being alone as a child on a bus, the fear he felt for 
his mother and brother, and the “breach” of a presumed safety existing in the stability of 
his mother as a protector. Thus, this analysis of breach as discursive is based on 
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constitutive features of the text as it constructs and is constructed by context. Similar to 
the above analysis, the “so” in Line 10 allows Adnan to move the account of the story 
immediately to evaluation: “I was very happy to see the two—” Again, this “so” relies on 
inferential connection on the part of the listener to infer the information between finding 
his mother and being happy. The “so” obscures the possibilities of what might have 
happened in that story, indicating the potentiality of trauma at any moment.  
In Sabina’s (Adnan’s mother) telling of the story, she and her husband (Nermin), 
set the orientation of the story by stating how they were illegally crossing the border, 
thereby heightening the danger involved in the crossing: 
Extract 11 
1.   Nermin: And everything was illegal.  We, we weren't legal.   
2.   Sabina: Across border.  And then I traveled with children without a, a 
3.   papers, without documents.  Illegal.  And half of, of people in a bus was illegal 
4.   without documents.  Half had the documents.  And on, on the border, ah, I 
5.   think, ah, driver had a somebody on the border.  And, um, and half of people 
6.   who didn't have documents – went to restroom and waiting.  Till, ah, bor, 
7.   border officer, ah, go to the bus and check the documents from people who 
8.   had the documents.   
 
The first three lines of Adnan’s parents’ extract provide orientation toward the illegality 
of the situation, an orientation Adnan only mentions once in his Origin Story (Extract 7, 
Line 4), and it is unclear what about the situation is illegal. Is it illegal to cross borders? 
Are the people themselves illegal? In Adnan’s extract of this story (Extract 8, Line 4), 
Adnan’s “so” enables him to skip over the reason why they (he, his mother and brother) 
went into the bathroom, and allows him to causally connect the two events without 
explicitly describing the event that would linearly connect the plot points of this narrative 
chunk. That is, the “so” in Extract 8, Line 4, of Adnan’s story, connects two crucial 
points of the story: People who had passports stayed on the bus, and the rest of people, 
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including his mother, his brother, and himself, would “go into the bathrooms and wait 
until […] those people gave their passports and their passports were returned,” to return 
to the bus. In this segment of the story, “so” connects the actions of getting off the bus 
and getting back on the bus by skipping over the breach that occurred, which is the 
illegality of their status, made meaningful within the breach of presumed safety in 
government and governmental documents. This breach, combined with the separation of 
Adnan from his mother and brother, is skipped over in the telling of the story until 
Adnan’s evaluation in Extract 10, Line 1, where he says, “I was so scared.” 
In contrast, Sabina and Nermin’s orientation works to establish and stress the 
trauma of the situation by emphasizing how dangerous it was to cross borders without 
“legal” documents, which were nearly impossible to get during the war.  
Extract 12 
9.   And then when, ah, officer, ah, border officer went out we came 
10.  in the bus.  And, ah, ah, hid, ah we, we had to hide.  So, ah, through the 
11.  window border officer cannot see so many people.  Only people who had the 
12.  documents.  So but it was, ah, very experience, bad experience.  Um, ah, when 
13.  we were between, ah, German and Austria border, ah, Enzo was six.  Adnan 
14.  was, ah, ten years old.  [pause] Seven, Enzo was seven.  Adnan was 11 years 
15.  old.  And Enzo wanted to go to restroom.  Real restroom.  And then I went 
16.  with him and then, ah, the driver, ah, bus driver called other people to go in 
17.  the bus and bus had to leave immediately.  And, ah, Enzo and I, we were in 
18.  the bathroom when bus left.   
19.  And, ah, but Adnan was in the bus.  Did you tell the story?   
20.  Adnan: I told the story.  Yeah.   
21.  Sabina: Ah huh.  So, um, I, ah, I, when I went out I s-, didn't see the bus.  
22.  And it was December.  Cold.  Without, we didn't have coat.  And I forgot to tell 
23.  you we didn't have heat in the bus. So I-, ah, Adnan and Enzo were close to 
24.  me.  Ah, we have a coat.  And I hug them and cover with the coat.  And, ah, I 
25.  continue now my story.  And then when we –  
26.  Ah, when I saw there is no, not the bus, I looked at the people, ah, because it 
27.  was two in the morning.  They, ah, went back in their little house, on, office.  
28.  And then I ran across the border.  And then I ran and ran and ran –  
29.  Nermin: To the forest.   
30.  Sabina: Ah, through the forest.   
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31.  Interviewer: With Enzo?  
32.  Nermin: Yep.   
33.  Sabina: With Enzo.   
34.  Nermin: They could kill her.  They could, you know.   
35.  Sabina: And, ah, and, ah, after 15 minutes I saw the man, ah, going 
36.  toward me.  It was bus driver.  And he started to yell at me.  But I was happy 
37.  that I saw them because bus couldn’t, ah, stop because of, ah, border police.  
38.  Couldn’t stop by the border.  He, they had to go, ah, further.   
39.  Nermin: Further.  Yeah.   
40.  Sabina: Few kilometers.   
41.  Nermin: - people, they would find another 20, 30 people –  
42.  Sabina: Without.   
43.  Nermin: - without documents then because they couldn't wait.   
44.  Sabina: But Adnan, ah, was crying in the bus.  
 
Adnan’s skipping of the breaches with the conjunction “so” is made visible 
through the telling of the same story by his parents, and in combination with other 
information about border crossings and checkpoints told in other interviewees’ stories, in 
published memoirs, in court documents from the war court at The Hague, and in my 
informal conversations with other Bosnian Americans. During the war, border 
checkpoints were typically controlled by paramilitary troops, often referred to as 
Chetniks, Arkan’s Tigers, or the Serbian Volunteer Guard (Malcolm, 1996; Trebinčević, 
2014), and who were known for their brutality, although there is variation and complexity 
among these labels. 13 (Interview Nermin and Sabina, 2014; Interview with Adnan, 
2014). Each of the interviewees and the sources mentioned discuss being fearful of 
paramilitary troops, thereby referencing another “breach” in the presumed stability of the 
nationstate and its homeland military. Often, the crossing of borders guarded by Arkan’s 
Tigers or other paramilitary troops literally meant risking death, as emphasized by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The decentralized nature of militarism in the years following the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia, i.e., the existence of paramilitary troops who were not commanded explicitly by Yugoslav 
generals, but who nonetheless took orders from an ideological agenda, is part of what has made 
international prosecution of war crimes so complicated.  
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Nermin in Line 34.  
Another mark of “breach” in Sabina’s extract is her acknowledgement of the 
secrecy and illegality involved in crossing the border with the phrase “real restroom.” She 
explains how she and Enzo became separated from Adnan because Enzo needed to use 
the restroom for its “real” purpose; not to use it as a hiding place for people who did not 
possess legitimate documents:  
And Enzo wanted to go to restroom—real restroom (Extract 12, Line 15). 
The adjective “real” modifies the noun “restroom” and indexes the “restroom” in Line 6, 
which is the same physical restroom but is not the “real” restroom because it is not being 
used for its “real” purpose. That is, the restroom mentioned in Line 6 is different from the 
restroom mentioned in Line 15 in terms of “breach.” The “real” restroom in Sabina’s 
extract (Line 15) indexes the same “bathroom” Adnan uses in Section K, Line 2—the 
bathroom/restroom where people are using it for its intended purpose whether they have 
legal, border-crossing documents or not. Although Enzo and Sabina left the bus again, 
this time it was for legitimate reasons instead of needing to hide from border guards with 
machine guns. This time the need was legitimate and physical; therefore, the “breach” 
occurs in the event of the bus leaving despite the legitimate “real” nature of their 
restroom use.  
Extract 13 
1.   So in Austrian – Slovenian/Austrian border, my brother had to go to the 
2.   bathroom, and – at night.  It was like 2:00 in the morning, 'cause we were at 
3.   the border, so he went with my mom out there, and the bus left.   
 
Here, Adnan’s “so” in Line 3 skips over the “breach” by skipping over the secret, hiding-
place bathroom and moves directly to the legitimate use of the bathroom, which Enzo 
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needed to use at a dangerous border crossing. In this extract, the breach is the 
bathroom/restroom, which, despite being used for its stable, legitimate, intended purpose, 
ended up not being a safe place for Sabina and Enzo. A breach also occurs, and is 
obscured by the discourse marker “so” acting as a conjunction, in the leaving of the bus. 
The breach is manifest discursively in Adnan’s plea to the bus driver to stop: “my mom 
stayed behind” (Extract 10, Line 2).  
 
Narrative Potentialities in Traumatic Memory 
 As both Adnan and his parents explain in their narratives, they ended up together 
as a family in Germany, but the trauma of this border crossing still persists in their 
discourse, and this particular story is one Adnan shared separately from his parents and 
one his parents shared independent of my conversation with their son; it is clearly a 
significant marker of traumatic memory during a time of war and demonstrates how 
narratives accrue across generations, within families, and how they fluidly layer over 
other memories of wartime trauma to illustrate trauma’s ability to persist in the past and 
the present simultaneously (Caruth, 1996; Edkins, 2003). However, this story about 
crossing the border, while clearly a traumatic memory, also functions as a unifying 
narrative, as shown in Sabina’s face and heard in her voice when she describes the 
remainder of her bus ride to Germany alone with her two sons. That is, this story has 
become a family tale of triumph and good luck. It is clear from the remainder of Nermin 
and Sabina’s stories that they see this incident as an example of their ability to survive. 
Thus, this narrative opens up potentialities: While traumatic memory persists, so does the 
potential for triumph. 
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How Breach Normalizes Trauma: Tarik’s Story 
 Another salient example of how traumatic breach emerges in discourse comes in 
Tarik’s narrative about the start of the war in his hometown of Caplina. Tarik and his 
wife, Sarah, were interviewed together in a coffee shop. While Tarik was born in Bosnia 
and lived there until he was 6, Sarah was born and raised in Salt Lake City, Utah. They 
have been married for 2 years, and Sarah has converted to Islam. Tarik and Sarah are the 
youngest participants interviewed for this project. I initially met Tarik at a reading for a 
Bosnian author, and he agreed to speak with me, though he said it would be for only 30 
minutes. The interview ended up lasting 1 hour and 30 minutes, and the transcription of 
the interview is 43 pages long. Tarik is finishing a master’s degree at the local university, 
and Sarah is working on her bachelor’s degree. Tarik is at first reluctant to talk about 
himself, but Sarah encourages him to share his story, and he becomes more comfortable 
as he talks. But when he starts talking about how his identity would be different had he 
not left Bosnia, about halfway through the interview, Tarik breaks down and is unable to 
continue. I mentioned this in the Methodology chapter; however I bring up this 
occurrence again here because it feels important to reiterate the persistence of trauma as 
related to memories and identities. As I will discuss in the analysis below, and elsewhere 
in this project, it is impossible to talk about what it means to be a Bosnian American 
without indexing war trauma. The very concept of traumatic memory is embedded within 
and layered upon the palimpsest that is refugee identity, an identity that exists “between a 




Discursive Interactions Reveal “Traumatic Breach” 
Tarik’s Origin Story is a significant example of how Labov’s features of a “fully 
formed narrative” interact to cope with traumatic breach, and, how traumatic breach is 
emphasized because of his wife’s presence, which markedly influences the way features 
come into being throughout the interview. That is, the interplay between orientation and 
complicating action functions through the mutual constitution of Tarik’s primary 
discourse marker, “you know,” and Sarah’s interjections and clarifications. Tarik’s 
discourse marker, “you know,” works to hypernormalize the traumatic breaches within 
his stories while also appealing for understanding from an audience. At the same time, 
Sarah’s gentle interjections work to emphasize the traumatic breaches Tarik is 
normalizing. Thus, Tarik’s Origin Story demonstrates how parts of a narrative perform 
“heremenutic composability” through the interaction and construction of various 
narrative features with co-participants in an interview setting. Additionally, the setting for 
this interview, much like Adnan’s interview, occurred at a noisy, public place. We met on 
a Saturday, and there were dozens of people in the coffee shop. Intermittent sounds of 
espresso machines, cash registers, and customer conversations are heard throughout the 
audio recording, once again emphasizing and de-emphasizing the impact of the traumatic 
memories being shared; embodiment of trauma in everyday life erupts through dialectics 
of past and present, mundane and strange, normal and abnormal. 
As with Adnan’s story, Tarik’s Origin Story begins with an orientation based on 
my question: What brought you to America?, and ends with a coda that brings us back to 
the present tense: “But anyhow, that's kind of going all over the place there.  So I don't 
know” (Interview with Tarik, 2014). In the text between these two Labovian features are 
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interactionally constructed and intertextually indexed features of orientation and 
complicating action that work to obscure and normalize traumatic breach.  
Extract 14 
1.   Interviewer: Can you tell me about what, when you came to America 
and sort of the….. circumstances that got you here?   
2.   Tarik:  So as I remember, and from what some of the things 
3.   that my parents say and my brother that's three years, well, 2 ½ years older 
4.   than me, [pause] um, it all started in Croatia where my dad – we, we met my 
5.   dad after he was in a concentration camp.  And he had a choice to either go to 
6.   America, Sweden, a couple other countries.  But it sounds like he forged some 
7.   papers – he didn't have a place to live.  So he did something that maybe 
8.   wasn't right but at the time, you know, what would a father do with two 
9.   young kids to get them to a place where they can – Be safe.  So somehow we 
10.  were able to come to Utah specifically.   
 
Tarik’s first orientation occurs in Extract 14, Line 2, wherein Tarik sets the scene for 
what he remembers. He says, “it all started in Croatia.” The pronoun “it” here is 
ambiguous; unclear is whether Tarik is referring to the war or to the literal, personal 
“circumstances”—a word I use—that brought him to America. “It” is also ambiguous 
because, as Tarik explains, his knowledge of “it” comes from stories told to him or near 
him by his parents and his older brother, which is evident through hedging phrases, such 
as “as I remember” (Line 2), and “from some of the things my parents say” (Line 2-3), 
and “it sounds like” (Line 6). The pronoun “it” in Line 2 also indexes forward to Line 10 
in the same section wherein Tarik references his arrival to Utah, thus indexing the “it” in 
Line 4 again to discursively construct a result, which ties up the abstract of his Origin 
Story from “it” to his arrival in Utah.  
Extract 14 can be read as metonymy or an “abstract” of his full Origin Story 
(Labov, 1991); he skips over anything specifically traumatic, starting his justification for 
coming to Utah with the aftermath of his dad’s detainment in a concentration camp. He 
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skips over the illegality of his journey to Utah (as Adnan also does in his story about 
crossing borders) by first explaining how his dad was homeless and was concerned about 
his family in Extract 15: 
Extract 15 
1.   He had a choice to either go to America, Sweden, a couple other countries. 
2.   But it sounds like he forged some papers—he didn’t have a place to live. 
3.   So he did something that maybe wasn’t right but at the time, you know, 
4.   what would a father do with two young kids to get them to a place where 
5.   they can—be safe.  
 
Extract 14 is simultaneously both orientation and also a full narrative setting the scene 
for details that will be fleshed out later. Two of the complicating actions are hinted at in 
Lines 4-5 (concentration camp) and Lines 6-7 (forging papers to get out of Croatia).   
 Throughout the orientation and complicating action work happening in Tarik’s 
narrative, Sarah’s discourse functions to emphasize the breach that would make a 
particular event traumatic. For instance, when Tarik explains how his family went as 
refugees from Bosnia to Croatia to Turkey and then to Utah, he attempts to explain the 
official reasons for why they went to a refugee camp in Turkey. As shown in Extract 16, 
Sarah interrupts and gives the implicature (emerging as traumatic breach) behind the 
policy: 
Extract 16 
Tarik:   So I think you have to be in three different countries to be able to 
get refugee status or something----  
Sarah:   (interjects quietly) passed around as a refugee. [overtalk] 
 
Sarah takes Tarik’s explanation and reexplains it as a breach in a system that treats 
refugees like unwanted cargo, referencing what Ritivoi (2002) says about host cultures 
often seeing foreigners as “pariahs.” Again, in Extract 17, Sarah reorients the scene for 
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Tarik’s story about stealing bread from trucks while in the refugee camp in Turkey: 
Extract 17 
Tarik:   And I remember the older the parents, which was mostly mother, 
you know, a lot of the—there was also f-, fathers that were able to escape… 
Sarah:   (interrupts) They were in the camp at this time while his dad was 
in a concentration camp. 
 
Here Sarah emphasizes the breach, which is the trauma of not having his father with his 
family and, which is unimaginably worse, knowing his father had been taken to a brutal 
concentration camp but not knowing if he was still alive. She emphasizes his absence, 
providing a link between orientation and complicating action that emphasizes the 
traumatic breach Tarik neglects to discuss. 
 Sarah embodies this role throughout the interview, and not only in Tarik’s Origin 
Story. She emphasizes the information that would mark trauma by emphasizing the 
breach that exists in the present story. For instance, when Tarik shares a story about a 
relative whose husband was killed when a bomb struck his apartment, Sarah provides the 
missing information that marks the story as traumatic, emphasizing how the woman still 
lives in the apartment where her husband was killed and how young he was when he 
died: 
“She still lives in the apartment complex where the grenade went off and he was 




“And he had two young kids still….” 
Although it is unclear how Tarik feels about Sarah’s discursive role as embodied 
highlighter of breach, and that is not within the purview of this project, when it comes to 
the state of Bosnia as a country and as an identity, Sarah’s interjections do not necessarily 
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function the same way as they do for other topics. The constitutive role of nation and 
identity will be discussed more in depth in the next chapter, but for now, noting the 
interactional differences that occur when Tarik discusses his country of origin is 
important in understanding how Sarah’s role functions in the interview context as 
emphasizer of traumatic breach. For example, in Extract 18, Tarik explains why his 
cousin wants to move out of Bosnia to France for his engineering profession: 
Extract 18 
1.   Sarah:  Yeah, he wants to be in America.  Get out of Bosnia.  And 
2.   all of its political problems and things.    
3.   Tarik:  Yeah.  Just the fact that he can't really advance 
4.   anywhere and how he gets really mad when he talks about how things are. 
5.   Just, you know, the corruption –  
6.   Sarah:  [interrupts Tarik] I mean you know you've been to 
7.   Bosnia.  Time stands still.  Literally for the past 20 years.  Every building is 
8.   still affected by the bombs and the –  
9.   Tarik:  [Interrupts Sarah] I mean but they've been fixed.  Every 
10.  building was kind of destroyed.  But this kind of economy just is not really 
11.  going anywhere.  It's slow progress.  [pause…] But, yeah, it was interesting 
12.  because … to have a cousin from there visit us is unique, you know.  Usually 
13.  we go back there almost every year.   
  
In Lines 1-2, Sarah attempts to emphasize how devastated Bosnia currently is as a 
country—highlighting this would also highlight the trauma of war—that war destroys 
countries. But Tarik is reluctant to let Bosnia, as a country, be made into a dreadful place 
even if it makes his story more interesting. While Sarah asserts in Lines 6-8 that “time 
stands still” in Bosnia and that “every building is still affected by the bombs,” Tarik 
immediately interrupts, contradicting her orientation work as inaccurate: “but they’ve 
been fixed…” and “It’s slow progress…..” He is quick to defend and deflect her scene 
setting. And, as I will analyze in the next chapter, many Bosnian American’s allegiance 
with Bosnia is inextricably linked to self-identity, which might provide context for why 
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Tarik discursively refutes Sarah’s particular orientation work on that topic. Sarah’s 
interjections are loving and supportive. Her words are in a softer tone, often barely 
audible on the recording, and in the interview, she often interjects with one hand on 
Tarik’s arm. 
 
Discourse Markers as Discursive Breach 
In tandem with Sarah’s discursive role as emphasizer of traumatic breach, Tarik’s 
discourse marker, “you know,” works to admit and normalize aberrant events that 
occurred during and because of the war and to discursively remove himself from guilt he 
feels over his role (or lack of a role) in events. For example, using the phrase, “it sounds 
like he forged some papers…” to explain how he arrived in America, deflects the 
responsibility for this action from Tarik—he hardly even knows about it, and what he 
does know is second-hand knowledge gleaned, it appears, through inference.  
As previously mentioned, the strategies speakers use to cope with traumatic 
breach indicate how traumatic breach functions rhetorically in narrative. Tarik’s 
emphasis on his indirectly acquired, second-hand knowledge, along with Sarah’s 
discursive role, becomes important when viewed as interactionally constructed with his 
most common discourse marker, “you know.” Analyzing discourse markers provides 
valuable insights into how a speaker constructs and makes meaning through narrative. As 
discussed earlier in the analysis of Adnan’s Origin Story, and by scholars in 
sociolinguistics (Bolden, 2008; Schourup, 1998), speakers often use discourse markers as 
organizational linguistic utterances to organize their stories or to reorient a main storyline 
when they have veered into what seems like a tangential story.  Of course, as newer 
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research on discourse markers has shown, discourse markers are not void of meaning, nor 
do they merely organize a story.14 Furthermore, the marker “you know” does not have an 
inherent meaning or function it carries with it into all conversational settings; its meaning 
and function are contingent upon the interactionally constructed context of a particular 
narrative and interview setting.  
In an interview setting, discourse markers takes on additional weight as they are 
interactionally constructed and called into being/meaning through the sharing of a story 
and through the listening that occurs with a “second voice” (Campbell, 2008). In “you 
know,” the “you” simultaneously indexes the proximate listener(s) and a collective 
“you,” (the collective, historical imaginary into which a conversation insinuates itself) 
while also situating the speaker into that same historical collective. In this sense, Tarik’s 
use of “you know” also functions as an entreaty for empathy to both proximate and 
collective listeners. It pleads for common understanding even as it assumes (hopes?) one 
already exists. Tarik’s “you know” might be seen as Madison’s (2010) provocation for 
“response-ability.” It compels a listener to ask: “do I know?” or “why do I not know?” or 
“how could I know?” This discourse marker does more than organize discourse; it opens 
up potential ethical responses to a story, calling on the listener(s) to respond.  
Additionally, as Bruner (1990) notes, narratives contain and construct underlying 
values that become “incorporated in one’s self-identity and, at the same time, they locate 
one in a culture” (p. 63). In the case of Tarik’s narrative, the collective “you” constructs 
and is constructed by the “canonicity” of war stories (Bruner, 1972; 1991). In specific 
contexts, Tarik’s “you know” works to qualify what would, in retrospect, be perceived as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a history of scholarship on discourse markers in sociolinguistics, see Schourup (1998).  
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aberrant behavior, but, in the present telling, is trauma normalized by the fog of war. 
Thus, Tarik discursively acknowledges the trauma of war even as he attempts to 
normalize and recognize the trauma it creates by indexing both a personal and a 
collective “you.” For instance, in Extract 19, Tarik explains how his father forged some 
papers to get them to America.  
Extract 19 
1.   But it sounds like he forged some 
2.   papers – he didn't have a place to live.  So he did something that maybe 
3.   wasn't right but at the time, you know, what would a father do with two 
4.   young kids to get them to a place where they can – Be safe.   
 
The use of “you know” in Line 3 comes after the phrase “something that maybe 
wasn’t right at the time,” and “what would a father do?” and works to link the two phrase 
together causally and to smooth over possible moral ambiguity about the illegality of the 
situation. The “you” references a listener directly, as in, what would you do in that 
situation? And it also references a collective you—a collective imaginary wherein fathers 
do what is best for their children regardless of morality and illegality. Similarly, the 
instances of “you know” in Extract 20 likewise do the same type of acknowledgment and 
normalizing work:  
Extract 20 
1.   But I remember lots and lots of kids being there.  And it was, it was a lot of 
2.   fun.  There's certain things that I remember that kids, you know, being six 
3.   and seven shouldn't have been doing.  We'd latch on to like trucks, bread 
4.   trucks that would take us from place to place.   
5.   Interviewer:  Like hop onto the back of them?  [Sarah giggles] 
6.   Tarik:   Yeah.  It was just, you know, take bread that wasn't 
7.   Ours and stuff like that.  And I remember the older the parents, which was 
8.   Mostly mothers, you know, a lot of the – there was also f-, fathers that were 
9.   able to escape.   
 
In Line 2, Tarik’s “you know,” admits that 6- and 7-year-olds should not be jumping onto 
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the backs of bread trucks, nor should they be stealing bread (Section D, Line 2), nor 
should they be without fathers (Section D, Line 4). Each of these discourse markers 
indexes past instances of aberrant childhood behavior Tarik has already mentioned, future 
ones he mentions throughout his interview, and collective instances of children 
everywhere exhibiting behavior that is aberrant in relation to a script of appropriate 
childhood-ness. The discourse maker, “you know,” works to hypernormalize these 
situations, attempting to make sense of a story that has no rational explanation except for 
the trauma that is wartime existence. In these instances, Tarik’s “you know” references a 
canonical script about childhood nostalgia that dictates child safety and security above all 
else, while it simultaneously references and constitutes the traumatic breach (war) that 
makes the story “worth telling” (Labov, 1991). These two references cannot exist without 
each other; and their mutual existence emphasizes the trauma of war even as it also 
normalizes those breaches.  
 And, yet, Tarik’s “you know” also works as a call for understanding, as 
mentioned previously. The canonical script about childhood referenced by the breaches in 
Tarik’s narrative become emphasized even more by what Tarik calls his “identity crisis,” 
a state he relates directly to his forced departure from Bosnia during his childhood, and 
which indexes all the previous and collective “you know”s that normalize breach while 
also pleading for empathy. He calls “this side of the story” an “emotional thing” for him 
to talk about because he says his growth and memory are “stunted” from having to leave 
Bosnia at a young age. Tarik is convinced he is not Bosnian enough: he says, “I feel like I 
am stuck. I am not here or there” (Interview with Tarik, 2014). He says this with his head 
in his hand, with his wife rubbing his back, and with embarrassment. The breach, then 
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occurs in this inbetween-ness, of living elsewhere when it appears as if everyone else 
around is solidly here or there (Minh-ha, 2011).  
 
Continual and Persistent Traumatic Breaches: Living With  
Trauma and Narrative (Im)possibilities 
 It is often trauma’s inassimilatable qualities, along with its tendency to persist 
despite (or perhaps because of) its inability to be articulated, that mark breach as 
traumatic (Caruth, 1995). Each of my participants expressed the prolonged effects of 
trauma as a persistent phenomenon they negotiate daily. This persistent trauma is related 
to traumatic breaches referenced earlier in the interview—breaches that occurred almost 
20 years ago for some people; yet, the effects of these traumatic events still present 
themselves as breaches in the presumed normalcy of everyday, postwar, postrefugee, 
American life. In the extracts below, participants share how traumatic breaches have 
insinuated themselves into daily aspects of life and have become layered into their 
bodies, even in their dreams. In Extract 21, Amir and Belma discuss the nightmares they 
had upon first leaving Ex-Yugoslavia as refugees: 
Extract 21 
Amir: They don’t want you there but you can’t leave.  They don’t want to 
let you go… but… so what are you supposed to do?  I mean you’re 
stuck.  You’re nowhere.  And I remember for 10 years after the 
war, always dreaming I’m back in Banja Luka and I can’t leave but 
people. I’m an American citizen now.  You can’t keep me here 
anymore and you can’t kill me.  I’m not one of you anymore.  I’m 
an American citizen.  I want to go back.  I have my job.  I want to 
go back.  Many times that dream, that recurring dream coming 
back until maybe five, six years ago.  It doesn’t happen anymore 
but.   
   
Belma: I had few of those when we were in Zagreb just right after leaving 
Bosnia.  You know I would have these dreams that we are stuck 
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there and we can’t leave but they pretty much stopped in Germany 
and then when we came here I didn’t have any nightmares. 
 
Amir: It was happening for me, for me for some while.  Yeah.   
 
Amir and Belma express what is traumatic for them in the aftermath of war and in present 
time: the possibility of being uprooted again, separated from family, friends, and country. 
They carry this trauma with them, “living in wait” (Minh-ha, 2011, p. 12) for traumatic 
breaches to present themselves again.  
In Extract 22, Samira expresses the persistent trauma she felt after the war and 
explains how she experienced panic attacks in enclosed spaces. She talks about these 
experiences in present tense, as in, “I know how to manage now.”  
Extract 22 
Samira: Uh, I think war affected all of us, like, panic attacks, and all of that 
which I do have.  Yeah.  Oh, I used to have, I don't.  I know how to 
manage now.  [Chuckles]   
 
Interviewer: Did you have panic attacks after, like, once you were here in the 
U.S.?   
 
Samira: It started at age 25.  And to this day, um, if I'm in elevator and if 
it's, if I know that it's not gonna open, I can get, I can get full panic 
attack and if I'm in Trax [transit light rail] that's stopped and it's 
not moving –  
 
 You know, when the Trax, um, let's say something happens in the 
street and they, they don't come to a stop, they won't open your 
doors and I know that.  And if that happens which kinda happened 
twice, once.  Yeah, it happened once but, uh, I was near the 
conductor so he opened the door.  I got out. I know I can have full 
panic attack.  So just in closed space to this day freaks me out.   
 
Minh-ha describes the embodiment of trauma and traumatic memory this way: 
The whole body was an ear, and my ear, trained to the sounds of war, was always 
on the alert for that split second of silence before the blast of rockets, which 
would be followed by the crackle of small-arm fire or the wail of sirens and 
shouts and cries of afflicted witnesses. (2011, p. 12) 
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Trauma persists in memory, in the body, and in language. It erupts within dreams and in 
all types of spaces where everyday life is being lived. Tarik demonstrates how the effects 
of war, the effects of traumatic breach, affect his daily life, his self-identity, and his 
parents’ dreams: 
Extract 23 
Tarik: I feel like the war, what it did, it stunted my memory.  To the point 
that I know that I have post traumatic s-, stress s-, whatever.  S-, 
syndrome.  With, you know excuse me peeing in a bucket in, in 
Turkey in a camp because I was too afraid to go to the bathroom in 
the middle of, of night.  So I had this, it affected my urinary tract.  
Ah, posttraumatic stress or whatever else.   
 
Sarah: Well, and his dad suffers from that a lot.  From concentration camp 
stuff.   
 
Tarik: My dad screams.   
 
Sarah: I mean night terrors to the point –  
 
Tarik: Sarah hears them –  
 
Sarah: - they can't, him and his wife don't sleep in the same bed cause 
they're so extreme sometimes.  Just loud and almost just violent 
night terrors, you know.  But he, you know has very legitimate 
reason that that's affected him a lot.   
 
Stories of trauma do not emerge with easily identifiable features or categories; 
trauma, as a discrete linguistic phenomenon, does not exist. That is, there is not a specific 
feature in a text that could be pointed too as being specifically about or referencing 
“trauma.” Rather, trauma exists as a narrative (im)possibility—a referent to other 
narratives about families, or hometowns, or plane rides. It is unassimilatable and 
undefinable for most participants. In a sense, speakers are always coping with the 
(im)possibility of talking about trauma. But, at the same time, speakers are also coping 
with the impossibility of not talking about trauma. When a speaker’s story is inextricably 
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tied to traumatic breach in the form of refugee-ness (Ritivoi, 2002), fractured families, 
and rogue militias, his or her story must necessarily also be a narrative about trauma. 
After all, it is through the convention of narrative that we organize our thoughts, 
experiences, and memories (Bruner, 1991; Denzin, 2000; Rosaldo, 1989)—“narrative is a 
cultural form, transmitted culturally and constrained by each individual’s level of 
mastery” (Bruner, 1991).  
Because language is always “about itself, no matter what else it is also about,” as 
participants share and listen to stories about thoughts, experiences, and memories from 
the war, they are also sharing and constructing the history of a trauma (Campbell, 2009; 
Caruth, 1996; Johnstone, 2010, p. 32). In stories about war, traumatic breaches emerge 
through the interaction of narrative’s features and work to normalize and postpone 
trauma. Breaches in narrative also reference traumatic breaches in experiences as 
language reflexively indexes itself and the context it has constructed and is constructed 
by. As shown by participants’ stories, traumatic breaches occur at multiple points: at the 
moment of the event in real time; discursively in narrative stories about war, as memory 
breaches and discursive breaks; and physically as regular ontological/physical 
interruptions in everyday life. But, also, as Minh-ha (2011) writes, “A story is told to 
invite talk around it” (p. 15), meaning, while these participants’ share traumatic memory 
and the embodied persistence of trauma, their stories are also simultaneously about 
potentialities and possibilities. They open up spaces for empathy, understanding, and 
ultimately, action, “a profound gift traveling from teller to teller, handed down from 
generation to generation, repeatedly evoked in its moral truth and yet never depleted in its 
ability to instruct, to delight, and to move” (Minh-ha, 2011, p. 15).  
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The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated how trauma emerges through 
language and how features of narrative, along with discourse markers, can point to 
trauma and highlight what is not explicitly shared. In stories about war, traumatic 
breaches emerge through the interaction of narrative’s features and work to normalize 
and postpone trauma. Breaches in narrative also reference traumatic breaches in 
experiences as language reflexively indexes itself and the context it has constructed and 
is constructed by. As shown by participants’ stories, traumatic breaches occur at multiple 
points: at the moment of the event in real time; discursively in narrative stories about war, 
as memory breaches and discursive breaks; and physically as regular ontological/physical 
interruptions in everyday life. 
The next chapter will explore how trauma emerges in stories about physical place 













Table 3: Five Features of Fully Formed Narrative 
Orientation Sets the scene with a “who,” “what,” “when,” “why” 
Complicating Action Provides the plot twist or “what happened” 
Result  Allows narrator to assess what happened or give 
viewpoint 
Evaluation Ending plot point; resolution to the complicating action 
















Figure 1. Hermeneutic Composability; Canonicity and Breach 	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CONNECTIONS TO PLACE: (DIS)PLACEMENT TRAUMA 
 
 
My mom does go [back to Bosnia] because of her mother, because of my 
grandma. Um, but, when my grandma dies, she won't go. Maybe just some year, 
maybe, like, every second year to see her sister, that's about it. My dad is, uh, still 
in, uh, limbo. He wants to go there. When he goes there, he wants to come back. 
When he's here, he wants to go there. When he goes there, he doesn't like it.  He 
wants to come back. Because I guess him, like, his generation, they're still in the, 
in the prewar, you know, era. You know, the life was good and that's all they can 
think about. Why it's not like that anymore. So, like, I can ask him how it was 
before and, yeah, he, he's happy to talk about it. But, I'm working on asking him 
what happened or what he seen. But, yeah, I think he's still in that mindset how it 
was during Yugoslavia time. But it ended and I don't think it will ever be the 
same.   
(Interview with Samira, 2015) 
 
Introduction 
War trauma manifests in multiplicities. It doesn’t look like any one thing; it 
threads through and emerges within each participant’s narratives about Bosnia. Within 
these narratives, a major marker of trauma emerges in narratives about displacement. For 
example, Samira’s statement above about her father exemplifies similar narratives told by 
other participants who left Bosnia during or after the war: “When he goes there, he wants 
to come back.  When he's here, he wants to go there.  When he goes there, he doesn't like 
it.  He wants to come back.”  These narratives about “elsewhere” (Minh-ha, 2011) are co-
constructed alongside associations with trauma, identity, and nation and emerge as what I 
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call “(dis)placement trauma.” This term, “(dis)placement trauma,” indexes the doubly 
traumatic nature of the displacement itself, the quintessential “refugee-ness” that is a 
“kind of separation […] often perceived in more dramatic terms as loss—of one’s first 
home, one’s first language, one’s familiar environment” and invokes “homesickness” 
(Ritivoi, 2002, kindle location 98). But it is also, at the same time, the state of being 
“placed” elsewhere—a forced “scattering of people” to the “edges” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 
198). Hence, the term’s parenthetical form—(dis)placed—references the state of being 
out-of-place, in-place, replaced: the status of being the passive object of war’s effects and 
human rights’ best of intentions rather than an active participant with agency to choose 
where one will live. 
This “double-wound” (Caruth, 1995), the double nature of (dis)placement trauma, 
can be seen in Samira’s previous statement about her father: She claims he is still in a 
“prewar era” where “life was good” and all he can think about is “why it isn’t like that 
anymore” (Interview with Samira, 2014). It is both simultaneous displacement and 
placement of a person elsewhere that constitutes the complicated identities and memories 
shared by participants in this study. Displacement trauma refers to an “elsewhere,” the 
place where “memory and language are places both of sameness and otherness, dwelling 
and traveling” (Minh-ha, 2011, p. 28)—the place of loss and, yet, nostalgia at the same 
time. Sabina’s husband, Nermin, exemplifies what Ritivoi (2002) means when she 
describes nostalgia as “homesickness” associated with loss. In his narrative, Nermin 
explained his current philosophy of not becoming “attached” to any place because he is 
used to being out of place: I asked if he felt attached to Salt Lake City.  
Ah, I don't feel so attached anymore anywhere. I feel this house. I will say I feel 
this house like a home. I have some feeling. I, I like here in Salt Lake City. For 
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these sixteen years I don't have any, any complaint. And I cannot say I am not 
satisfied.  But I am not happy. And I cannot be happy ever. Because I didn't come 
here because I wanted to come. I was pushed. I ___. I couldn't go back to my 
country. I couldn't go back to my apartment. What means I could go – they didn't 
want to keep me a, any, any, any more in Germany. They said you have to go. 
[…] And then I choose to come here. It doesn't matter where I try. I went to 
Sarajevo. I check everything, you know that can we go back. And but there wasn't 
any, any chance to go back. And then you cannot be happy if you come 
somewhere that you didn't choose to come.   
 
In this example, Nermin emphasizes part of what constitutes (dis)placement trauma—
being forced to leave a place, or, as he puts it, coming somewhere when “you didn’t 
choose to come.” He explains how he was forced to leave Bosnia, and then forced to 
leave Germany. Therefore, he is unhappy in Salt Lake City and does not feel “attached” 
even though he has been there for 16 years and says he feels his house “like a home.” But 
because he didn’t choose to leave, and he associates his current place with loss of a 
previous place, he is unsettled. His idea of home, it seems, has “shrunken into a metaphor 
for belonging” (Aguilar San-Juan, 2009, p. xi). Similarly, Tarik, a Bosnian American in 
his late 20s, explains this ambiguity in his own terms: “I feel like I'm stuck.  I'm not here 
or there” (Interview with Tarik, 2014).   
 
Framework for Analysis: Place and Identity 
This chapter focuses on how participants construct place through indexing both 
local place and ideological structures associated with “master narratives of national 
belonging and identity” (Schaffer & Smith, 2004b, p. 6). I investigate how place becomes 
constructed in narrative by language indexes to what I call macrodiscursive features of 
narrative: 1) descriptions of new places; 2) “strangeness” balanced against “normal;” 3) 
nostalgia for old place; 4) imagined “nation;” and 5) “refugee-ness.” Similar to the 
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analytical framework of Chapter 4, this chapter uses macrodiscursive features of 
narrative, combined with microlinguistic features of narrative as a simultaneously-
informing heuristic that highlights how (dis)placement trauma emerges through 
discourse. These five master narratives were identified based on how participants referred 
to Yugoslavia, to Bosnia, to their refugee homes in Europe, and to their homes in Salt 
Lake City now. These five references emerged most often in my interviews and represent 
how speakers orient themselves in relation to place.  
Building upon the concept of “hermeneutic composability” in Chapter 4, which 
suggests that component parts of narrative rely upon one another for their meaning and 
for the cohesiveness of the whole, in this chapter I suggest that participants index various 
“master narratives” (such as, (1) descriptions of new places; 2) “strangeness” balanced 
against “normal;” 3) nostalgia for old place; 4) imagined “nation”; and 5) “refugee-ness”) 
which are component pieces of a narrative that also rely on one another for meaning and 
cohesiveness as a whole story (Bruner, 1991). In Chapter 4, I positioned Labov’s five 
features of narrative (orientation, complicating action, result, evaluation, and coda) as the 
hermenutically composed parts of narrative. In this chapter, however, I argue that 
references to place function as macrodiscursive features of narrative that are 
hermeneutically composed. These macrodiscursive features are signaled by 
microlinguistic instances of language—indexes. As speakers index these master 
narratives that are also component features of narrative, they establish links between 
places and identities. It is within these “semiotic links” wherein (dis)placement trauma 
emerges in narrative.  
 That is, (dis)placement trauma emerges through participants’ “indexicality,” 
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which is a “linguistic form that depends on the interactional context for its meaning 
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 21; Silverstein, 1993, 2003). Linguistic forms do identity 
work through indexicality (Silverstein, 2003). It is within the “semiotic links” between 
“linguistic forms and social meanings” wherein (dis)placement trauma emerges as 
speakers construct identities in relation to features of narrative that reference and 
construct “place” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 21; Johnstone, Andrus, & Danielson, 2006). 
This means indexicality, as an analytical, discursive concept, is heavily reliant upon 
ideological structures. As will be shown in this chapter’s analysis, (dis)placement trauma 
emerges through discursive indexes to places, which are constructed, in participants’ 
narratives, in relation to “master narratives of national belonging and identity,” such as 
the five macrodiscursive features of narrative identified previously (Schaffer & Smith, 
2004b, p. 6). Neither microlinguistic features nor macrodiscursive features is constructed 
before the other. They both mutually construct each other as they index and link 
linguistic forms to identity, constructing identity through the linkage, and giving the 
linguistic form meaning through identity work done continuously.  
 
How Place Is Constructed in Narrative 
In narrative, component parts of a narrative work together to construct meaning 
and function (Bruner, 1991). Features can be taken apart for analysis and then put back 
together to see how features rely upon the whole and the whole relies upon its component 
features (Bruner, 1991; Labov, 1972). Thus, the analytical theory I have constructed 
based on the findings from this research insists upon this kind of self-referentiality. That 
is, it is only through the links between component features of narrative, the indexical 
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links between language and ideological structures, and the links between participants’ 
construction of place alongside constructions of identity, wherein we can conceptualize 
how different types of trauma occur during and after war and how those traumas emerge 
through language. 
As previously mentioned, I have identified five specific “master narratives” that 
are indexed through participant’s narratives in relation to place: (1) descriptions of new 
places; 2) “strangeness” balanced against “normal”; 3) nostalgia for old place; 4) 
imagined “nation”; and 5) “refugee-ness.” These master narratives are not “master” in the 
sense that they exist a priori to the narratives shared or to the war; rather, I call them 
“master narratives” to reference their commonality across interviews and stories. Most 
importantly, these master narratives relate to and rely upon one another from interview to 
interview and in relation to institutional narratives about war. Although each participant’s 
narrative is unique in how a speaker indexes place, it is clear that associations with place 
are crucially important in constructions of identity. Thus, being displaced is crucially 
important in how a sense of identity is constructed as well (Ritivoi, 2009). Figure 3 
demonstrates how these macro- and microfeatures work together as a framework for 
identifying (dis)placement trauma. 
 
Master Narratives of Belonging and Place 
Each of the master narratives I have identified relates to one another—it is 
impossible to talk about feeling strange in a new place without also describing the new 
place, reflecting nostalgically on the old place, referencing a “Bosnia” that indexes an 
imagined nation, or reflecting on what it is like to be a refugee. These master narratives 
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are connected discursively, conceptually, and ideologically through memory. For 
instance, feeling displaced relies on memory of a particular kind of “place,” which 
emphasizes the linguistic emergence of “making strange” in relation to and alongside 
“making normal.” That is, in order to tell stories about displacement, speakers must also 
“make normal” the place from where they were displaced in order to “make strange” the 
interruption that disrupts the normal. This involves nostalgic memory and narrative 
constructions about places, displacements, replacements, and placements—here, there, 
and elsewhere (Minh-ha, 2011). What I focus on in this chapter is how speakers construct 
their identities in relation to different places, constructing their sense of identity as 
relational according to physical and emotional places, particularly when “placement” is 
out of their control due to war.  
In war, displacement itself is traumatic, “inextricably bound up with the notion of 
departure” alongside a history of Bosnian culture and its relation to an identity as it exists 
in contrast to nostalgic memories about place (Caruth, 1996, p. 13). In addition to the 
trauma that caused the displacement (separated families, bombed homes, violent 
militias), the act of displacement itself, co-functioning with “traumatic breach” (as 
discussed in Chapter 4) is trauma in the moment and in its perpetual aftermath. Because 
the Bosnian Americans interviewed exist in a diasporic space, a “double exile” (Minh-ha, 






Imagined Nation and Connections to Place 
 (Dis)placement trauma functions in tandem with breaches in identity formation 
that occur as identity is constructed alongside, and in relation to, nation (Aguilar-San 
Juan, 2009; Climo & Cattell, 2002; Edkins, 2003; Huyssen, 2003; Nora, 1989). As a 
master narrative, the concept of “nation” is a symbolic interaction where “space and time 
cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and 
outside, inclusion and exclusion” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 2). Nation, as a discursive construct, 
produces collective histories, but it also reveals gaps where local particularities diverge 
from national ones. Nation exists ideologically as well as physically. When identity is 
constructed in relation to nation, displacement forces a rearticulation of new identities, or, 
sometimes, a recognition of identity as not solid and static, but as fluid and 
transformative, in relation to place. Similarly, Taylor (1997) writes,  
Nation-ness captures the idea of nation that links disparate phenomenon such as 
nation, nationalism, and nationality. But it is not just about politics and borders, 
it’s about our way of imagining community, of creating and performing civil 
bonds […] identification is predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy 
along the lines of gender, class, and race. (p. 257)  
 
Imagining community is also how “new or newly identified citizen-subjects reimagine 
the grounds of their communal identities, test the individualist ethos of the UDHR 
[Universal Declaration of Human Rights], and contest master narratives of national 
belonging and identity” (Schaffer & Smith, 2004b, p. 6). Master narratives of national 
belonging and identity come from entities emerging from nations: governmental 
narratives (such as Bosnian politicians), international bodies (such as the United 
Nations), and international legal bodies (such as The Hague and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)). Therefore, they are also intertwined with memories of national 
154 
 
war trauma. In reference to concepts of nation or national belonging, “nation” is less of a 
physical place and more of a  “moral consciousness” and a “spiritual principle, the 
outcome of the profound complications of history; a spiritual family […]” (Renan, 1990, 
pp. 18-19). Viewing the concept of nation as a “spiritual family” explains why 
displacement could make one feel Bosnian but not too Bosnian in conversation 
with/to/for/against master narratives about a nation’s “moral consciousness.” That is, 
“Bosnia” as a spiritual/ideological/familial construct is as important to Bosnian 
Americans as is Bosnia proper. The disconnect between Bosnia and “Bosnia,” and the 
nostalgia for both through memories of prewar Bosnia, is what provokes tensions in 
ethnonational, diasporic identifications and is often where (dis)placement trauma is most 
emergent.  
The convergence of nation as a symbol and nation as physical place allows for 
conflation between the two. Notions of place are bound up with memory practices and 
even become reified through storytelling, as are concepts of nation. In some cases, 
survivors of traumatic memory articulate their memories and identities through references 
to place (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009). However, for diasporic communities in “double 
exile,” memories of prewar Bosnia are inextricably bound up with nostalgia, ideologies 
of nation, and place, all conflated together discursively (Minh-ha, 2011). For instance, 
Azra talks about her ethnonational identity in relation to the physical places in the former 
Yugoslavia where her parents come from. Despite the area being all one country at the 
time, Azra says she comes from a “mixed marriage” because her mother was born in 
Herzegovina (the Croatian territory in Bosnia), and her father was born in Bosnia 
(Interview with Azra, 2014). Although she admits that living in Croatia, and then 
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Germany, and then Utah has shaped who she is now, in her narrative she constructs an 
identity in relation to a physical and ideological place that existed for her parents before 
the war, and she self-identifies as Bosnian because of her paternal lineage. 
Azra and Samira both talk about celebrating certain Muslim holidays that were 
practiced during the Yugoslavian era—a type of place-making and memory-making 
practice that strengthens links to a cultural past and constructs and is constructed by how 
they see themselves now in relation to Bosnia, to family, and to memories. Likewise, 
when Azra reflects on why she founded the Bosnian American Professional Association 
(BAPA), she indexes a sense (a loss) of national belonging: 
I think, uh, maybe because I don't feel, like, Bosnian enough.  [Laughing]  No, 
because, like, uh, you know, I don't feel like I belong anywhere really, right?  So 
I'm, like, a part this, part that, part this.  I'm, like, part so many different things.   
 
Azra claims she does not feel Bosnian enough because her family moved to Croatia when 
the war broke out. She says she only spent 2 years in Bosnia, but her father is Bosnian, 
and his family is still there. Her mother is Herzegovinian, which means her heritage is 
Croatian-Bosnian, but not necessarily Croat. Azra’s friend Samira, who was interviewed 
with Azra, positioned herself in contrast to Azra’s desire to “run toward” her Bosnian 
heritage. In the interview, Azra asked Samira why she never comes to any BAPA events. 
Samira sheepishly admits she purposely “runs from” her Bosnian heritage even though 
her mother is always trying to get her to participate in community cultural events.  
Extract 24 
Samira: So I just, I shouldn't be but I don't know why.  It's just, yeah, I run 
away from it.  [Laughs] 
Interviewer: Why do you feel like you shouldn't?   
Samira: Because that's who I am.  It's part of me.  Bosnia is part of me.  But 
being in Bosnia, last year when I was there, I felt so disconnected.   
Interviewer: What do you mean when you say you felt disconnected?  What did 
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that, what did that mean?   
Samira: Um, like, being with my family was just different.  I, I couldn't 
understand them, in a way, not the language thing.  But I just 
couldn't understand. […] 
 
In this extract, and in conversation with Azra and her desire to be “more Bosnian,” 
Samira says she “shouldn’t” be avoiding Bosnian American cultural events because it is 
who she is, it is part of her— “Bosnia is part of me.” This connection to Bosnia as a 
physical place and as an ideological construct is often in play when participants talk 
about their identity as it relates to place and memory. Samira says she feels 
“disconnected” because she can’t understand her family members who still live there. In 
other words, she cannot relate to them as they are in Bosnia, the physical place.  
As might be expected, ethnic ambiguity as it relates to physical place is a 
common discussion topic in the former Yugoslavia, but those discussions rarely resolve 
their complexity or ambiguity. For instance, similar to Azra’s multi-identity unease, 
Sabina (a Bosnian American in her late 50s) expresses similar tensions in locating ethnic 
identity with physical place. Sabina’s parents live, and she grew up in, what is now 
considered Serbia. However, when the former Yugoslavia was all one country, and, even 
before that, when the region was part of a larger Austro-Hungarian Empire, the arbitrary 
border between Bosnia and Serbia was exactly that—arbitrary and somewhat irrelevant 
(Campbell, 1998; Malcolm, 1996). The extract below demonstrates the complexity of 
describing where one grew up when physical borders have been redefined over and again, 
especially to someone who is less familiar with these changes. When I asked Sabina 
where she grew up, her answer constructed a stable ethnonational identity that has 




Interviewer: So your family's Croatian? 
Sabina: Mmmm.  My family.  And my brother lives in Zagreb.   
Interviewer: But then they moved to Serbia? 
Sabina: Sorry?   
Interviewer: But then your family moved to Serbia?   
Sabina: Um.  My mom, my parents…. 
Adnan [Interrupts Sabina] They lived –they didn't move.   
Sabina: They – yes.   
Adnan: They lived forever.   
Sabina: Forever.   
Adnan: Before there were even Serbs there.   
Sabina: Mm hmm.   
Interviewer: Oh.   
Sabina: Forever, forever.   
Adnan: Yeah.  So that's, it was part, it became part of, ah – 
Sabina: It was Austro-Hungarian – 
Adnan: [helps translate] Empire.   
Sabina: Empire.  This part.   
Interviewer: And then became Yugoslavia.   
Sabina: Mm hmm.   
Interviewer: Okay.   
Sabina: Mm hmm.  After Second World War it became Yugoslavia. 
 
 In this extract, Sabina and Adnan (her son) both emphasize the length of time her 
family lived in Serbia—“forever.” Along with co-participatory construction of a 
Yugoslavian settlement that predates the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
they also explain how this was “before there were even Serbs there.” They work to 
establish a timeline that places Sabina’s family as living in this territory before the 
Serbs,15 and before the establishment of Yugoslavia proper. They “didn’t move” there; 
they lived there always, complicating connections between ethnic identity and place 
because Sabina does not self-identity as Serb. She does self-identity as Bosnian Croat, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Remember that “Serb” refers to an ethnonational identity of someone who is of Serb descent 
but who lives in Bosnia. A Bosnian Serb is not “Serbian,” per se, because someone who claims to be 
Serbian is from Serbia. Self-identifying as Bosnian Serb means one speaks Serbian, using the Cyrillic 
alphabet, and identifies religiously and/or ethnically as Serbian Orthodox (Malcolm, 1996).  
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but the genealogical logic for this is unclear without the explicit connection to place. In 
this extract, Sabina works to construct an identity as tied to the land in terms of 
ownership and “first rights” but as separate from how it is now and who lives there 
now—Serbs in Serbia.  
When Fatima explains why her father moved back to Bosnia after the war, she 
constructs her own identity as related to the country in terms of an ethnonational 
identification but also as separate from it as part of her acquired American-ness. Her 
father spent the war in a concentration camp after Fatima and her sister were sent on a 
bus to Slovenia. Fatima explains his desire to go back as related to (and because of) the 
trauma he suffered: 
And he didn't care. He wanted it. He wanted, he, you know, he felt that after I 
spend all this time in concentration camp, after I've seen all these people die, 
after, I want to be part of this. […. And] we didn't want to. We, we didn't care. It 
was just, the fear of going back, the unknown. And after, after I left Bosnia, when 
I left the, the day when he put us on a bus, me and my sister, and said goodbye to 
us. Um, when the war started and we left, I, that moment I just felt that I'm never 
going to come back. And it's never going to be a place that, because it was so 
changed. And I never, after that, I never lived in Bosnia. Again, we go for visits, 
but I never lived there. I would fear to live there, even that there's a big desire of 
me that's Bosnian, that's always going to be Bosnian. It's this thing, that I, I don't 
know how to be a real Bosnian to live there. (Interview with Fatima, 2012) 
 
Fatima positions herself as having a stable, enduring Bosnian identity that is “always 
going to be Bosnian.” But, simultaneously, she positions her identity as separate from a 
“real Bosnian” because she wouldn’t know how to live as an adjusted Bosnian American 
citizen in a perceived-authentic Bosnian state. Thus, Fatima constructs her own identity 
in a space that is in between and in relation to an ideological linguistic form—“real 
Bosnian.” In this case, this term related to physical Bosnia indexes the high 
unemployment rate (40% in 2009), along with the economic instability, the unstable 
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borders defined by the Dayton Accords wherein Republika Srpska controls the land it 
conquered through ethnic cleansing, and all of the ideological underpinnings that make 
“American-ness” desirable in relation to Bosnia’s current state of affairs, which is 
unstable, yet also somewhat desirable. This tension between wanting to be Bosnian but 
not wanting to be in Bosnia emerges throughout many of the narratives I heard about the 
region. Speakers desire to visit, to “reconnect” as Azra and Adnan both put it, but 
simultaneously express apprehension about their ability (and desire) to live in Bosnia. 
This also references the double-ness of “Bosnia”/Bosnia as nation.  
 
How (Dis)placement Trauma Emerges 
 For a closer reading of how speakers discursively index place, I will analyze one 
interview setting that most strongly exemplifies how this identity work occurs in 
narrative (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). As described earlier, speakers construct identities by 
indexing ideological forms as they also talk about being displaced. This indexing works 
to emphasize the connection (and thus, the (dis)placement trauma) between identity and 
physical place.  
 
Amir’s and Belma’s Stories 
 As an example of heightened (dis)placement trauma, Amir’s story discloses how 
war trauma is more than the trauma that happens in the physical place and duration of 
war. His story is one of (dis)placement trauma in relation to refugee-ness, loss, perceived 
instability, and confusion manifesting as anger towards the family who were supposed to 
help him. As will be explored below, Amir’s trauma comes from being displaced from 
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the familiar past and being displaced from a presumed future. Amir and Belma, husband 
and wife, were interviewed together in their home. They were both college students in 
Banja Luka when the war started in 1991. They went through multiple separations from 
one another because of the war, eventually ending up reuniting and marrying in Germany 
before being relocated to Salt Lake City, Utah. Amir and Belma invited me to their home 
for a dinner of zeljanica (Bosnian pita with spinach) and salad, and we officially began 
the interview (recording) after dinner. The recorded interview itself lasted 2 hours and 40 
minutes, but we also spoke about their experiences during dinner. Their son, who was 
present during dinner and spoke Bosnian to his parents, opted to spend the “interview” 
portion in his room. During dinner I learned about Belma’s decision to go to law school 
and where she would be working after taking the bar. Amir talked about his work 
experiences as an engineer, and they both talked about what it is like for them to return to 
Bosnia in the summer.  
 
(Dis)placement: Always Outside 
As is the case with all the participants’ narratives, Amir’s story is told in his 
current context of living in America, reflecting back onto his memories from prewar 
Yugoslavia, midwar Bosnia and Croatia, and postwar life in Germany and America. As 
memories map onto identities and around place and vice versa, Amir’s displacement 
trauma is indexed through master narratives about nation, ethnicity, home, and identity. 
That is, Amir constructs a sense of place through indexes of master narratives, which in 
turn exemplify the trauma that occurs between constructions of identity as related to 
place. Amir’s narrative references past, present, and future simultaneously and at 
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different times, always and already constructing his diasporic identity now in relation to 
his (dis)placement trauma from the war. Because of his treatment from his family in 
Croatia, Amir constructs himself as separate from the region in almost every exchange. 
The anger and trauma he feels over his displacement can be seen in Extract 26:  
Extract 26 
Amir: So I often ask people, “What do you think?   How many friends do 
you have?” So what would you think, how many friends do you 
have?   
Interviewer: Now?   
Amir: Yes.  How many real friends do you have?   
Interviewer: I feel like I could say 20?   
Amir: It’s a trick question.  I would say you have one but most likely none.   
Belma: Yeah.  I would say.   
Amir: I don’t know if you and your husband fell and your kid, god forbid.  
If you 
for whatever reason, earthquake your house goes down, fire, 
anything, how 
many places would you have to go and spend some time until you 
recover.  
How many people would really take you in.  Your parents probably.  
But other people?   
 
This exchange occurred near the end of our interview after Amir shared his story 
of being displaced from Bosnia and existing in a traumatic, dehumanizing situation in 
Croatia. As Belma, his wife, says: “As you can tell, Amir’s trauma is from his relatives.  
Not really from the war.  You know, because you get hurt more from people whom you 
expect to help you out.  Actually he talks mostly about that experience more than any 
other.” Although Belma claims Amir’s trauma is “not really from the war,” the story of 
Amir’s displacement trauma does not occur without the war. Thus, it is technically “war 
trauma” even though it does not look or narrate how war traumas expectedly unfold. But 
the story of Amir’s displacement is a story of war trauma, and it is also a story of identity.  
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Amir’s discourse in Extract 25 illustrates how relationships to “home” and 
“place” emerge in his story: 
Extract 27 
1.   Yeah.  Is it cold?  Is it raining ? It doesn’t matter.  They wouldn’t leave a 
2.   refugee. Even though they knew me for twenty-three years, but they 
3.   wouldn’t leave a dirty refugee in their house even though that’s my 
4.   mom’s brother and his wife. They were afraid that I was going to steal 
5.   from them.  Who knows what I was going to do? Well, of course, it’s a 
6.   filthy refugee.  So they leave, I have to leave. So they say we’ll be back at 
7.   5:00 in the afternoon so that means do not show up before 5:00 because 
8.   the doors will be locked you can’t get in.  So I come back around, let’s say 
9.   7:00 or 8:00.  All this time I’m walking around Zagreb trying to find 
10.  someone to take me to Germany, to Austria.  To anywhere just out of 
11.  Croatia.  So this time I showed up and they had a dog in the backyard, and 
12.  I show up the lady says, “are you hungry?” Yes.  “I thought I was waiting 
13.  for you till 6:00 with dinner, so you didn’t show up, so I gave it to the 
14.  dog.” And I go to bed and I’m hungry and you know hungry.  And so one 
15.  night I go to the bathroom and as I go to the bathroom I flushed and I 
16.  came out, and the lady that just had a baby a few months earlier, and I 
17.  woke up the baby and it started crying and cried all night long and the 
18.  next day again. And of course I got to hear all about it, and I wasn’t 
19.  allowed to go to the restroom at night anymore.  So I woke and I didn’t 
20.  know what to do. Anyway there was a window and a piece of grass 
21.  outside.   
22.  Interviewer: So you had to climb outside to use the bathroom?   
23.  Amir: Through the window.   
24.  Belma: Oh, wow, you didn’t tell me that. 
25.  Amir: Yeah.  Through the window.   
 
In this extract, Amir’s indices to place revolve around an inability to access it. Most of 
his story about living as a refugee in Croatia involves moving about and around a 
designated place that he is unable to access as a home. For instance, he had to be out of 
the house if his aunt and uncle were also out of the house because they did not trust him 
to be there alone. And the woman who owned the house, Amir’s aunt, did not want him 
to be there while she was there alone; therefore, Amir was always outside.  
Amir’s (dis)placement trauma revolves around experiences of being unable to 
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access the place that seemingly implied shelter, safety, relative stability, food, and family. 
For instance, he says he spends most of his day “walking around Zagreb, trying to find 
someone to take [him] to Germany, to Austria. To anywhere just out of Croatia.” The 
terms “anywhere” and “out” both refer to place. He is continually wandering around and 
outside the home. Similarly, he must use the restroom outside of the house, and he is 
unsure of when it is “ok” to come back to the house, which often leaves him without 
dinner. Amir’s time as a refugee in Croatia is in continual flux. The displacement trauma 
is enacted over and again each day as he is continually (re)placed outside and around the 
house. The trauma of this outside (dis)placement is compounded with stories told by 
other interview participants, and by Amir and Belma later in their interview, who 
describe the volatile reality of Bosnian men being picked up in Croatia to be exchanged 
as prisoners with other militias. In a very real sense, Amir was not safe inside or outside 
the house in Croatia.  
 
Embodied (Dis)placement Trauma: Animals and  
Refugees as Outsiders 
In his narrative, Amir becomes discursively aligned with the family’s dog, 
signaling his relationship to the place as an unwelcome body—an outsider. Like the 
dog’s, Amir says his food was often placed on the porch; the dog also lives “in the 
backyard” (Extract 28, Line 11). And in Lines 12-14, Amir describes how his food is fed 
to the dog when he is late for dinner, suggesting that he and the dog are equals in terms of 
proximity and in access to the home.  
Extract 28 
1.   Yeah.  Is it cold?  Is it raining ? It doesn’t matter.  They wouldn’t leave a 
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2.   refugee. Even though they knew me for twenty-three years, but they 
3.   wouldn’t leave a dirty refugee in their house even though that’s my 
4.   mom’s brother and his wife. They were afraid that I was going to steal 
5.   from them.  Who knows what I was going to do? Well, of course, it’s a 
6.   filthy refugee.  So they leave, I have to leave. So they say we’ll be back at 
7.   5:00 in the afternoon so that means do not show up before 5:00 because 
8.   the doors will be locked you can’t get in.  So I come back around, let’s say 
9.   7:00 or 8:00.  All this time I’m walking around Zagreb trying to find 
10.  someone to take me to Germany, to Austria.  To anywhere just out of 
11.  Croatia.  So this time I showed up and they had a dog in the backyard, and 
12.  I show up the lady says, “are you hungry?” Yes.  “I thought I was waiting 
13.  for you till 6:00 with dinner, so you didn’t show up, so I gave it to the 
14.  dog.” And I go to bed and I’m hungry and you know hungry.  And so one 
15.  night I go to the bathroom and as I go to the bathroom I flushed and I 
16.  came out, and the lady that just had a baby a few months earlier, and I 
17.  woke up the baby and it started crying and cried all night long and the 
18.  next day again. And of course I got to hear all about it, and I wasn’t 
19.  allowed to go to the restroom at night anymore.  So I woke and I didn’t 
20.  know what to do. Anyway there was a window and a piece of grass 
21.  outside.   
22.  Interviewer:So you had to climb outside to use the bathroom?   
23.  Amir: Through the window.   
24.  Belma: Oh, wow, you didn’t tell me that. 
25.  Amir: Yeah.  Through the window.   
 
This (dis)placement trauma maps onto his body when he must crawl through the window 
to relieve himself outside, like the dog (Lines 19-25). Along with this continual 
(dis)placement outside, and the discourse that links refuge-ness to animal-ness through 
bodily references to place, Amir references, through adjectival indexes, the implied 
uncleanliness of his body, moving the displacement trauma to his body as well as to 
being continually outside of a place—a move that reinforces his discursive likeness to the 
family’s dog and indexes master narratives about “refugee-ness” and imagined nation.  
For example, in Lines 3 and 6 of Extract 29 he refers to himself, through the 
presumed mind of his aunt, as a “filthy” refugee.  
Extract 29 
1.   There were many things, but the phone was right in front of that little room 
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2.   where they kept me like a monkey.  The phone was so – and she would get on 
3.   the phone and talk to some of her friends.  And the stuff she was talking.  You 
4.   know, every piece of hair was standing up.  “These filthy refugees, they’re 
5.   stinking up our buses, our city. You know what because of them, refugees 
6.   who are not paying the tickets, that’s why our kids have to pay more for their 
7.   monthly passes.  Those refugees, and this and that.” And I’m inside and I pray 
8.   to god that I am never seen you in your city in my life.  I didn’t come here to 
9.   live off of your food or money or anything.  I wish I’d never seen you in my 
10.  life. 
 
These adjectives index what it means to be an unwelcome outsider—to be 
physically and ideologically unwanted “inside.” The uncleanliness of Amir’s state is 
constructed by literal and ideological concepts of “homelessness,” which, in this case 
manifests itself as a recurrent near-proximity to place with inability to access it wholly. 
This placement-in-flux constructs a sense of (dis)placement trauma Amir references 
throughout his narrative. The discursive relationship between Amir’s body and animality 
is intertextually indexed again in the same extract. He indexes the animal-like quality of 
his living conditions, but this time it is explicit. In Line 2, he says they kept him in a 
small room “like a monkey.” And he hears his aunt describing the Bosnian refugees, 
describing him, as “filthy” and “stinking” (Lines 4-5).  
The telephone conversation Amir overhears shapes and is shaped by how he 
views himself as a refugee through his current subject position as a diasporic Bosnian. In 
other words, in the interview setting, Amir first indexes his perceived filthiness and 
dirtiness before he mentions overhearing his aunt use those same words to describe him 
and “his kind.” This indicates that Amir’s sense of identity constructs and is constructed 
by these indexes to “refugee-ness.” Because memories are constructed anew each time 
(Campbell, 2008), Amir’s memories of his displacement in Croatia are shaded by the 
paintbrush used now to (re)sketch his refugee experiences as a Bosnian American, 
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demonstrating how (dis)placement trauma persists.  For instance, in his narrative, Amir 
references his American citizenship when he describes a recurring dream he used to have 
wherein he shouts out, “I’m an American citizen now!” when soldiers try to take him 
away (Interview with Amir and Belma, 2014). The meshing of past and present together 
in a dream about wartime within a present-day telling, exemplifies the way memories and 
identities simultaneously construct one another and illustrates how trauma becomes 
embodied and carried. Refugee-ness exists as “a dialectics of change and sameness, with 
the afferent scrupulous balancing of allegiances and loyalties, and most importantly, a 
newly discovered perspective on one’s self-identity” (Ritivoi, 2002, kindle location 815). 
That is, the (dis)placement trauma, as ongoing flux in relation to place, requires a 
rearticulation of identity through past, present, and future memories. 
 
Presently Reflecting on Past Places and Identifications 
Amir and Belma say they have discussed Amir’s situation in Croatia many times, 
trying to figure out why he was treated the way he was, why his aunt acted the way she 
did. Belma is convinced the aunt had other factors making her act so horribly toward 
Amir; Amir says she was just an awful person.  
Extract 30 
1.   Finally she threw me out of the house.  I don’t know. We talked about that a 
2.   lot, about her.  What was making her do all those things, and my uncle was 
3.   behaving like she owned him.  I don’t know did she, she was a mad, a 
4.   possessed lady.     
5.   Belma: She probably suffered some postpartum depression.  I would 
6.   attribute part to it.  I mean that’s partially maybe a problem because she 
7.   literally went mad at that time.  I know some instances that you just wouldn’t 
8.   believe but it’s her personality also.  And I think she was also scared.   




These retrospective evaluations are intersected through past and present stereotypes of 
gendered expectations about how woman and men should behave in a home, along with 
historical, systemic treatment of refugees as Other.16  In Line 5, Belma suggests the aunt 
might have been suffering from postpartum depression, which Amir then suggests merely 
“augmented her ugly personality” (Line 9). Both of their retrospective evaluations are 
also influenced by other experiences they had as displaced refugees during the war. For 
example, Belma was evacuated with her sister. She was separated from her parents, but 
she was with her sister once they escaped to Croatia, and that gave her a sense of 
stability. Amir was on his own (Interview with Belma and Amir, 2014). 
Furthermore, Belma says she had positive experiences with people helping her 
during the war. Friends of her parents gave her money when they saw her at a Mosque in 
Croatia. After her Red Cross convoy was turned back at the Bosnia/Croatia border, a 
Bosnian Serb soldier gave her a cigarette and a ride back to her apartment telling her to 
remember, “not all Serbs are the same” (Interview with Belma and Amir, 2014). A 
wealthy Croatian man who knew and respected their father bought a house for her sister 
and her to stay in for a year, along with coats, food, and bedding, enabling both of them 
to finish their university schooling in Zagreb, Croatia. These experiences are shaped by 
Belma’s current telling of them through the lens she wears now—that of an aspiring 
attorney, a Bosnian America living the “American Dream,” and it is clear she attempts to 
see her experiences in Bosnia and as a refugee through a lens of tolerance and fluidity. 
She describes herself as always trying to “see things from the other side,” which is why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




she works to persuade Amir, shown in Extract 31, that he was indirectly helped by 
people, just not in the way he expected or wanted: 
Extract 31 
1.   Amir: The only people that helped me, one of them sits right here 
[gesturing to Belma].   
2.   Belma: But see other people helped me, I helped you.  So it’s indirectly. 
3.   Amir: That’s fine, but that’s why I’m saying that’s why I went back  
4.   only once in 2004.  Why would I want to go back […] I would  
5.   never spend thousands of dollars to go back to Bosnia.  Why? I can take  
6.   thousands of dollars and go to Bahamas.  You know, to a nice place.   
7.   Belma: Yeah.  See we have different perspectives. It’s just…. And I 
8.   understand your bitterness.  That’s justifiable completely.   
9.   Amir: Like I said.  […]  I’ll admit it.  I hold grudge. 
 
Amir’s displacement trauma still persists in his relationship to Bosnia and to 
Croatia as places. In Lines 3-6, Amir asks Belma (and me) why he would ever go back to 
Bosnia when he could spend the same amount of money and go to a “nice place.” The 
discursive “place” in Line 6 indexes all prior negative associations with the region Amir 
has already shared while it also most closely, structurally speaking, within the sentence, 
references The Bahamas. Meaning, Amir’s construction of a “nice place” exists in 
relation to the displacement trauma he carries and still thinks about from his time as a 
refugee. Even when Belma suggests he was helped “indirectly” through her, Amir 
concedes, but still associates the “place” as not nice and traumatic regardless of how and 
if he was helped.   
 
Persistent (Dis)Placement Trauma 
 Bosnian Americans’ relationships to places in the former Yugoslavia are fraught 
with tension in different ways, as is evidenced by Belma and Amir’s disparate 
experiences and associations with “Bosnia.” Many of them express their loyalty and love 
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of being Bosnian while simultaneously admitting their reluctance to ever live there again. 
Several of them visit each summer to “reconnect” and to see family and friends. But 
others never want to go back. Among my participants, the desire to reconnect with 
Bosnia as a place is much more prevalent in Bosnian Americans in their early or mid-30s. 
Oftentimes, it seems they want to connect with whatever Bosnia is now because they do 
not have solid memories of Bosnia as a place before the war. Bosnian Americans who left 
the region in their early or mid-20s express less desire to “reconnect,” presumably 
because they know the region has changed so much that it is no longer the place for 
which they feel nostalgia. For instance, Edin and Tamara say being “Bosnian” is “the best 
thing to be.” But the few times they have been back, Edin will not stay in physical Bosnia 
overnight. He will drive in for the day to visit family or friends, and then he will drive to 
Slovenia or Croatia to sleep. Another participant, Tarik, says sometimes he thinks he will 
want to be buried in Bosnia—to physically put his body in that ground—but even though 
he visits almost every summer with his wife, he does not want to move back there.  
When nostalgia is balanced against displacement, trauma associated with place 
might be too much to reconcile. For some people, “the past with its quiet routine had 
been replaced in the present with the turmoil of the war,” creating an association with 
place that is also traumatic (Ritivoi, 2002, kindle location 653).  For Amir, and other 
participants, the physical place of Bosnia acts as a memory and identity anchor, indexing 
master narratives about national belonging yoked to conceptions of ethnicity, religion, 
and heritage. Oftentimes, it seems the nostalgic memory anchor might be better left 
where it is: buried, uninterrupted, and stable. This provides a sense of Bosnian identity in 
relation to how participants fondly remember it—as a “powerful self-reinforcing tool. We 
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derive from our nostalgic remembrance the comfort of identifying with ourselves. 
Nostalgia, then, is a type of autobiographical memory, crucial in the formation and 
maintenance of personal identity” (Ritivoi, 2002, kindle location 652). Memory and 
identity anchored as place in the former Yugoslavia resemble a palimpsest, a solid form 
upon which new memories and identities can be layered without disrupting the requisite 
nostalgia against which moments of traumatic breach and (dis)placement trauma are 
balanced (Hyussen, 2003). That is, in some ways, the past might be better left in the past 
as prewar nostalgia.  
 
Before, After (The Space Between the Comma) 
(Dis)placement trauma functions as the “comma between,” the marker of 
“elsewhere,” the space between before and after, between there and here (Minh-ha, 
2011). That is, the war exists as a breach in a stable timeline, which in most 
circumstances appears to splice participants’ lives into a “before” and an “after.” In 
Extract 32, Amir draws a distinction between prewar and postwar, directly relating his 
happiness and prosperity along a timeline with place: 
Extract 32 
1.   And actually my life was going down and down and down and finally in 
2.   Croatia I hit the rock bottom and that was my long story short about my 
3.   family in Croatia.  When you were down on the ground everybody likes to 
4.   kick you when you can’t defend yourself.  And finally I leave Croatia and I go 
5.   to Germany and my life starts looking up finally.  I go to Germany it’s better, I 
6.   come here it’s yet even better and, you know, it just keeps going up.   
 
His time in Croatia was “rock bottom” (Line 2) because of his displacement from 
stability and safety and because of the volatility inherent in being without a home. 
Germany is “better” and in Salt Lake City, “it just keeps going up.” In his narrative, 
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Croatia in specific (and the former Yugoslavian region in general) is forever a place 
associated with displacement trauma, with “dirty” refugee-ness. He says, “I think I don’t 
think like them anymore,” “them” being the Bosnians who are still in Bosnia, referencing 
both “Bosnia” and Bosnia. Much like doubtful sentiments Fatima expressed about being 
“real Bosnian,” Amir draws a distinction between himself and other Bosnians based 
entirely on physical place. Despite presumably going through similar traumatic breaches 
and displacement traumas, and sharing an ethnonational heritage, Amir, Belma, and 
Fatima (among others) suggest that “place” is the distinguishing factor between the 
Bosnians who live in Bosnia still and those who have left and made new lives elsewhere.  
Perhaps this attention to physical place is called forth by this breach that is the 
comma between there and here, between pre- and postwar. The “elsewhere” is associated 
and discursively represented with narratives about a continual undoing of ethnonational 
identity that occurred during the war, via a forced separation of place from ownership. 
The decoupling of place, ownership, and belonging that occurred during the war 
complicates how trauma becomes embodied within the storyteller and not (only) as a 
referent to physical place. For example, Tarik (whose brother lost his hand from a car 
bomb) describes going back to his house after taking his brother to the hospital and 
finding that the locks on their door had been changed (Interview with Tarik, 2014). This 
was a common occurrence during the war, neighbors or militia members changing the 
locks on their neighbors’ door, effectively forcing relocation and displacement. This had 
the physical and metaphorical function of undoing identity through the literal taking of 
place—displacement. Belma suggests a similar undoing of identity through place when 
she describes her evacuation from Bosnia with the Red Cross: 
172 
 
Once we crossed Croatia we went straight to the railway station so we sat on the 
train and we went to Zagreb.  But in between we stopped in these ruined houses.  
You know they stopped the busses and they let us go to the bathroom.  So we 
went to one house that was like, you know, in ruins.  It was so sad to see it’s like 
somebody’s living room but we had to go there. (Interview with Belma, 2014) 
 
Physical homes were destroyed by bombs, but they were also evacuated, existing as 
gaping reminders of the violence of war, empty of their occupants who were now 
displaced somewhere else in the region. In this sense, the ruined homes Belma describes 
symbolically index the identities and memories constructed by Bosnians now. On one 
hand, with pieces of identity anchored in the past, preserved in nostalgia to maintain a 
sense of Bosnian identity that persists despite traumatic breaches and (dis)placement 
traumas in reference to physical Bosnia. And, at the same time, but perhaps on the other 
hand, diasporic memories and identities that shape and are shaped by who they are now 
and how they remember the past.  
 The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated how (dis)placement trauma emerges 
through language and how features of narrative, such as indexical associations with 
master narratives such as 1) descriptions of new places, 2) “strangeness” balanced against 
“normal,” 3) nostalgia for old place, 4) imagined “nation,” and 5) “refugee-ness” can 
point to how identifications with place emerge as traumatic. As with the analysis in 
Chapter 4, it is within the balancing of component narrative parts wherein trauma 
emerges, demonstrating how crucial identity work is in relation to place. These findings 
suggest new ways of viewing human rights for displaced refugees—as lived practice in 
everyday lives rather than only in relation to static, transportable “rights” earned or given 
during times of war. That is, these findings show that (dis)placement trauma exists within 
fluid movements that make up refugee and war diasporic life, and that trauma persists 
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long after the initial even wherein rights were initially violated. These findings indicate 
that trauma occurs in displacement and in diasporic movements, not only in relation to 
physical harm that occurred during wartime. These findings also show that 
(dis)placement trauma, like the nostalgia against which it is often balanced, resists simple 
dichotomies of loss and gain. In other words, (dis)placement trauma is traumatic because 
it forces people to live often in a space that is not easily definable to one meaning—
“elsewhere” (Minh-ha, 2012). Its simultaneous existence as valuing stability and resisting 
adjustment is part of its trauma but is also part of a continual rearticulation that allows for 























COMMUNICATING TRAUMA THROUGH LIVED NARRATIVES 
 
“This is, this is ridiculous. What they're doing. Hague is nothing.”  
(Interview with Nermin, 2014) 
 
“What has to be heard in court is precisely what cannot be articulated in legal 




Abuses of humans’ rights have occurred as long as humans have existed. In 
international law, however, “human rights” as definably capable of being protected or 
being violated, have only existed since the United Nation’s adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.  And it has only been within the last 30 
years that international justice mechanisms have been used to prosecute human rights 
abuses with the legal designation of “war crimes” (Felman, 2002; Hagen, 2003; Hayner, 
2009). From its very inception, the legal linguistic deployments of human rights and its 
accompanying policy implementations and adjudications have imbued a concept of 
“human rights” with discursive definitions that constrain how trauma can be understood 
within human rights work. But it is within these justice mechanisms, such as at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), that perpetrators are 
prosecuted, found guilty or innocent, and then punished accordingly. The Bosnian War 
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ended with the Dayton Accords in 1995; 20 years later, the ICTY is still prosecuting war 
criminals and attempting to establish international legal precedents. Yet, the Bosnian 
Americans I interviewed still feel everyday trauma from their experiences during the war, 
despite the ICTY’s efforts at justice or reconciliation. Their war trauma is persistent, 
enduring, and embodied in everyday life and is unaffected by the ICTY’s efforts.  
 When I started this dissertation project, I wanted to understand how Bosnian 
Americans who are part of the war diaspora feel about the ICTY’s efforts on their behalf. 
The ICTY claims it is “bringing war criminals to justice; [and] bringing justice to 
victims” (www.icty.org). But what I found was an apathetic stance toward international 
legal attempts at justice in the region. Studies that ask Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats how 
they feel about the ICTY reflect similar findings—not much value is placed in the legal 
process itself and communities are largely skeptical about the punishments given: 
Bosniaks often think the sentences are not harsh enough (as shown in my interviews), and 
Serbs often think the proceedings are unfairly biased against them (Hagan & Ivković, 
2006). In effect, the resulting function of the ICTY seems to be a performative 
demonstration of what justice would look like if the only players were lawyers, judges, 
and international policy makers. For these reasons, this project evolved into an effort to 
understand how Bosnians are experiencing war trauma and why they are unaffected by 
the ICTY’s work. I found that what is neglected from international attempts at justice is a 
focus on survivors’ lived experiences with war trauma.  
Accordingly, this dissertation project focuses specifically on the lived narratives 
of Bosnian Americans who lived through the war and are now part of the larger war 
diaspora. I focus on “what cannot be articulated in legal language,” exploring how 
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memory, identity, and trauma intersect within participants’ lived narratives (Felman, p. 4, 
2002). The findings of this dissertation—that trauma emerges through language—
contribute to global discussions about human rights and war diasporas in two significant 
ways: 1) by extending theories of human rights to reconceptualize human rights as a 
living practice rather than as a static collection of rights that are taken, granted, or given; 
and, 2) by offering an adapted methodology that enables research into how trauma 
emerges through language, thereby asserting the collection and study of lived narratives 
as part of human rights work.  
 
What Cannot Be Articulated in Legal Language 
In order to prosecute war crimes, certain legal narratives must be heard in court—
these prosecutions depend upon eyewitness testimonies; accounts of systematic, 
ethnically-motivated violence; and references to nationalism. However, “what has to be 
heard in court is precisely what cannot be articulated in legal language” (Felman, 2002, p. 
4). What cannot be articulated are the lived instances of trauma that participants shared in 
their narratives for this dissertation. For example, Adnan’s experience on the bus crossing 
the border into Slovenia wherein his mother was left at the restroom, and he was left 
alone on the bus, was deeply traumatic for him. This trauma occurred as a result of the 
war and it endures today, emerging throughout his narrative and the narratives of his 
parents. Yet, this memory, and memories of fathers being taken away in the night (shared 
by Fatima, Tarik, and Adnan), memories of close family members being physically 
harmed, tortured, or murdered (shared by Tarik, Nermin, Sabina, Samira, Tamara, and 
Edin), or memories of neighbors and relatives turning on you overnight (shared by every 
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single participant) are not the types of traumas that can be articulated in legal language to 
resonate within a court of law.  
These traumas occurred during the war and continually persist, and, in many 
instances, surface as new traumas that reflect back onto memories from the war but also 
are newly emergent as they occur. That is, the term, “aftermath” in relation to war, is 
interminable. There is no end to aftermath of war—only a circular series of openings and 
closings wherein people feel reprieve and closure only to feel sad and violated again. And 
the cycle continues. For instance, as I am writing, another mass grave has been unearthed 
near the Bosnian town of Prijedor—the town from where Tamara and Edin fled after her 
brother was killed. Now, Prijedor joins Foca, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Sanski Most, 
Vlasenica, and Srebrenica as locations with mass graves amounting to genocide as legally 
defined by The Hague tribunal (www.iwpr.net). The discovery of this most recent 
atrocity has allowed the tribunal to reopen its case against Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian 
Serb commander of the Yugoslav army who stands accused of genocide. In their 
interview, Tamara and Edin talked about the amount of bodies that were buried at the 
Tomasica iron mine, near their town. They said it was rumored that many bodies were 
buried there from other prison camps, namely Omarska and Keraterm, both of which are 
near Prijedor. And now forensic sources have confirmed that this iron mine is, in fact, a 
burial site for many different prison camps. They know this because the bodies are in 
pieces—they have been moved from other sites with heavy machinery and dumped into 
the mine (www.iwpr.net). It has been at least 20 years since these murders, and, yet, these 
traumas persist. The interminable aftermath is composed of traumatic memories 
unfolding in cycles and reemerging in everyday life.  
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Perhaps because these stories are inarticulatable (and unrecognizable) in legal 
language, lived narratives have typically been neglected in studies of human rights. 
Scholars who study issues of human rights tend to focus on artifacts (including text from 
war courts, policy documents and implementation, or discourse produced in court), or 
they focus on theoretical questions about human rights in abstract (Campbell, 1998, 1999, 
2002; Doxtader, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Dunne & Wheeler, 1999; Dwyer, 
1997; Felman, 2002; Hesford, 2011; Lyon, 2013; Slaughter, 2009). And scholars who 
study social memory often examine theories of memory or artifacts of memory, such as 
memorials, monuments, or court testimonies, but do not include language-in-action as 
part of analysis (Douglas and Vogler, 2012; Edkins, 2003; Felman, 2002; Felman & 
Laub, 1992). Because of these gaps, no theories have emerged that tie together memory, 
language, trauma, and identity to examine how participants talk about traumatic memory 
years after war’s effects.  
This dissertation attempts to fill that gap. It extends current theories on human 
rights by weaving together scholarship from human rights rhetoric, memory studies, and 
discourse analysis as a multidimensional approach to examine how on-the-ground 
communities talk about trauma, memory, and identity and how everyday trauma emerges 
as language-in-action. If the purpose of human rights actions is to bring some type of 
healing, then this project provides one fruitful way to embark on that process. I put forth 
a new way of approaching the study of human rights, positioning storytelling as a living 
practice of human rights outside the realms of international law and localized within 




Based on this research, I argue, like other scholars of memory and trauma, that 
trauma is embodied and persistent (Caruth, 1996; Douglas & Vogler, 2012; Edkins, 
2003). But, unlike these scholars, I assert that trauma emerges through language-in-
action. Specifically, I posit two significant ways in which trauma emerges through 
language-in-action. I call these emergences “traumatic breach” and “(dis)placement 
trauma.” Traumatic breach, as shown in Adnan’s and Tarik’s interviews, is manifest 
through linguistic breaches, breaches in narrative, and physical breaches. Traumatic 
breach is marked by “discourse markers” that work to create cohesion amongst 
component features of narrative, but, most significantly, they also work to highlight, 
ameliorate, normalize, or postpone instances of trauma. (Dis)placement trauma, as shown 
in Amir’s and Belma’s interviews, is marked by participants’ indexes to master narratives 
of belonging that reflect and are reflected by constructions of “place.”  
A significant contribution this dissertation makes to the fields of human rights and 
rhetoric is a dynamic method that enables researchers to study on-the-ground discourses 
of war diasporic communities. This adapted method combines ethnographic interviews 
and narrative discourse analysis—two methods that are not historically used in tandem on 
the same data set. I used ethnographic interviews to collect narratives from Bosnian 
Americans living in Salt Lake City, Utah. The semistructured, open-ended format I 
employed in the interviews facilitated participants’ sharing of lengthy narratives about 
their lives before, during, and after the war. I then performed narrative discourse analysis 
on transcripts and audio of the interviews, listening and reading alternatively and 




The merging of these methods allowed for a richer analysis into the lived 
narratives of Bosnian Americans as I was able to account for lived expressions of 
narrative such as bodily movements, silences, facial expressions, laughter, etc., and also 
account for language-in-action as analyzed within transcripts of each interview. Both 
these methods continually inform one another and depend upon one another for analytical 
richness. This adapted methodology, along with a theoretical framework that pulls from 
fields of rhetoric and memory studies, enabled me to examine intersections of trauma, 
memory, and identity, and to posit several theories about how trauma emerges through 
language, thus constructing a new approach to human rights that expands theories about 
“war trauma” and a sensitivity to how people share those memories. 
Additionally, the findings that emerged from this methodology extend current 
human rights theories by positing new ways of thinking about memory, trauma, and 
identity. The two emergences identified, “traumatic breach” and”(dis)placement trauma” 
both point to human rights as a living practice, embodied in everyday life alongside 
traumatic memories. For instance, in addition to the individual contributions of traumatic 
breach and (dis)placement trauma as theoretical concepts that posit new ways of thinking 
about trauma in times of war, both emergences also collectively demonstrate the 
significance of memory work in relation to identity, a constitutive relationship that is 
often neglected in human rights institutions, such as the ICTY. For example, as is shown 
in Chapter 5, identity work occurs in participants’ narratives through linguistic references 
to “place”—indexes that layer upon one another like Huyssen’s (2003) notion of 
palimpsest. As Huyssen explains, a palimpsest is a manuscript that has been written on 
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more than once so that traces of the original are always part of the new. As 
(dis)placement trauma and traumatic breach emerge, identities also become like a 
palimpsest—made over and reconstructed as part of indexes to place. However, unlike a 
manuscript that exists solidly before it begins to get made over, an identity palimpsest 
works horizontally in addition to vertically, wherein identities do not collect on top of 
one another but are simultaneously constructed as they also construct the palimpsest 
itself. This occurs as participants connect memories to identities and construct identities 
through the act of remembering.  
Likewise, bodies carry trauma and traumatic memories along with them from 
place to place, layering and constructing new identities with new memories, always and 
already reconstructing identity through embodied memory and trauma as related to (and 
separate from) place. Minh-ha (2012) writes: “Today, when I am asked where home is for 
me, I am struck by how far away it is; and yet, home is nowhere else but right here, at the 
edge of this body of mine” (p. 12). Thus, the act of sharing traumatic memory is also an 
embodied, bodily act where one’s body is also one’s home, layered with memories and 
identity constructions, as it moves inside, outside, around, and beneath place(s). 
Traumatic breach and (dis)placement trauma emerge as concepts inextricably tangled 
with bodies. It is bodies that are “placed,” and bodies that experience breach; the very 
telling of stories about trauma is a bodily act.  
These findings provide valuable, empathetic insight into the types of trauma 
diasporic populations dispersed by war feel long into an aftermath, and thus suggest a 
new way of approaching human rights theory, policy, and implementation. That is, these 
assertions about types of traumas and their persistence into everyday lives, underscore the 
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inability of international legal justice mechanisms to adequately heal or reconcile a nation 
after large-scale violence and war. Intersections of memory, identity, and trauma are at 
the heart of human rights issues; yet, the main adjudicating body of human rights 
violations, the ICTY, is locked into a system of law that privileges physical 
manifestations of trauma and eyewitness accounts. However, the participants in this 
research project profess different types of traumas that are inarticulatable in court.  
 
Conclusions and Potentialities 
This research project has its limitations, one of which is the small data set of 11 
Bosnian Americans. Also limiting in the scope of this project are factors of class and 
language facility—I was limited to participants who spoke English, which narrowed my 
pool of potential participants by socio-economic status, education level, and comfort with 
spoken English. However, I assert that it would be inaccurate to suggest that any findings 
emergent in lived narratives are universally shared across various demographics and 
experiences, regardless of interview participant size. That is, the uniqueness of these 
findings are particular to each storyteller; however, these unique findings also speak 
volumes about how to reenvision human rights work through lenses of memory, rhetoric, 
narrative, and discourse.  
This area of research is large. Regrettably, instances of human rights violations 
and the need to view human rights as living practice are only increasing. The UN 
Security Council continually reviews current International Criminal Court (ICC) tribunals 
and decides whether or not to set up new ones to address continuing crimes. Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) are continuing to be set up around the world, and 
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human rights are always and already being threatened. More research remains to be done 
in this area, including several of the following potential questions: How does the ICTY’s 
discourse circulate within other non-UN human rights adjudications in the former 
Yugoslavia? What does it mean to actively pursue human rights as living practice? What 
would this look like? How are local Bosnian Americans’ discourses informing (and being 
informed by) larger human rights discourse? How are these discourses (specifically in 
regard to international law) gendered, raced, classed, etc.? More work needs to be done 
with war diasporic communities and with war communities that are still in their home 
nations, in order to more fully understand how memory, trauma, and identity intersect in 
various iterations of human rights theory and work.  
This dissertation posits a theory of human rights as a living practice outside of 
international law and within localized communities, which are more attuned to address 
the traumas expressed through lived narratives. These narratives are examples of “lived 
memory,” which is “ active, alive, embodied in the social […] in individuals, families, 
groups, nations, and regions” (Huyssen, 2002, p. 28). The sharing of lived narratives by 
the people whose rights and traumas are being discussed is one helpful way of embarking 
on a process of healing and possibly a path of understanding and empathy towards the 









































































Broad, starting questions for soliciting life narratives: 
1.   Tell me about the circumstances that led you to coming to Salt Lake City. 
2.   Can you describe the town where you grew up? 
3.   Tell me about the day before you left your town. 
4.   Tell me about the day you arrived in Utah. 
5.   Tell me about your family. 
6.   Tell me about an object that is important to you. 
 
Questions about experiences leaving Bosnia and coming to the US: 
 
1.   What was it like when you came to the US?  
2.   What was it like when you came to Utah? 
3.   Have you been back to Bosnia? Why or why not? 
4.   Do you commemorate any events from the war? 
 
Questions about culture and identity: 
 
1.   What are some things you do to keep your heritage? For your children? 
2.   What would you want to tell younger Bosnians about your life? 
3.   How would you compare your life to your children’s (parents’)? 
4.   What does it mean to be Bosnian? How Bosnian do you feel? 
 
Questions about justice: 
 
1.   What would make you feel like someone cares about the Bosnian people?  
2.   What would make you feel like someone is being held accountable? 







TRANSCRIPT OF ADNAN’S ORIGIN STORY 
 
A: 
11.  Me:  Thanks.  So can you tell me about how you came to America? 
12.  Adnan: Yes. [pause] 
13.  Me:  Like, what caused you to come to America and –  
14.  Adnan: Well, um, … in 1992, war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started, or in 
15.  the former Yugoslavia.  Uh, they have been, um, an aggression against, uh, …. 
16.  internationally recognized country of Bosnia, so it's o-, often confused like a 
17.  civil war, but it's not really a civil war because, uh, nn forces, um, 
18.  attacked Bosnia and started committing ethnic cleansing, genocide, and, um, 
19.  other ways of, uh – other means to, uh, spread Serbia, which was their 
20.  republic.   
 
B: 
11.  So, um, we never thought there would be actually a war in our country, you 
12.  know we grew up in – under Tito and, um – my parents did.  I was born 
13.  afterwards, and, uh, his, um, system was – he called it "brotherhood and 
14.  unity."  So, um, we lived, and never thinking that it could ever be a war in our 
15.  country, so – however, politically, Serbia wanted to create, um – in 
16.  Yugoslavia, wanted to have a greater political power.  So, uh, the first thing 
17.  they did, they eliminated the provinces of, uh, the, the, uh, um, … political 
18.  power of two provinces in Serbia:  uh, Kosovo and, uh, Vojvodina.  And then, 
19.  uh, Milosevic tried to spread his power, um, across other republics, and the 
20.  other republics said no.   
 
C. 
1.   So, um, once this – and they, um, proclaimed their independence.  So because 
2.   Serbs were living in Bosnia and Croatia, um, Milosevic didn't wanna let them 
3.   secede, so, uh, what he started doing is he sent, um, paramilitary forces and 
4.   Yugoslav Army to basically, …um… take parts of Bosnia.  Most of the towns in 
5.   Bosnia were, um – majority were Muslims in the towns.  In rural area it was 
6.   mostly the Croats.  But in all bigger cities, Muslims were the majority, so in 
7.   order to, uh, keep these certain areas under his control, uh, he started – he 
8.   used genocide and ethnic cleansing as a tool to, um, to reach his political 
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9.   goals. 
 
D. 
1.   So, um, I am from the city of Brčko, which is now a district, a s-, 'cause there's 
2.   the Republika Srpska entity and Federation entity, and my town is kinda like 
3.   a district.  In '92, there were tensions.  So my parents sent me and my brother 
4.   to my uncle in Croatia.  And as a kid I always thought that this was just a 
5.   vacation, a temporary thing.  I was even, you know, kinda excited that I'm not 
6.   gonna go to school, not knowing that this'll be the last time to see all my 
7.   friends in Brčko, um, for a very long time to come.   
 
E. 
1.   So, um, my brother and I went to Croatia to my uncle; my parents stayed 
2.   behind.  Somehow my mom, after two months or so, was able to escape.  Uh, 
3.   my dad stayed, and he was, uh, physically and psychologically, uh, maltreated 
4.   there.  And, um, after three, four months – 'cause Serbian nationalist Chetniks 
5.   had their headquarters in our building, so he always had to have his doors 
6.   open and he was constantly exposed to, um, their violence, be it physical or 
7.   psychological. After one other, uh, Serb helped him out, so he was able to 
8.   come to Croatia after three, four months, and, um, then, um, we lived in an 
9.   apartment with my uncle that had, like, one room, so I don't even know how 
10.  much square feet that was, but there were 11 of us living there, and it was a 
11.  one-bedroom apartment.   
 
F. 
1.   So, um, it was very tough.  For me as a child it was, um, very traumatic in 
2.   sense.  Even though I was a kid, I was kinda, um, safe from all the war 
3.   traumas.  Um, I used to miss Brčko, and as a kid I would always have the 
4.   same dream, uh, every night during that time, and – that I would tr-, you 
5.   know, travel, uh, by car, by train, and every night I would be coming, uh – 
6.   like, towards the end of the dream, somehow would reach Brčko, and in my 
7.   dream I would tell myself, "Now, finally this is done.  It's not a dream.  I'm 
8.   finally here."  And then I would wake up and realize that it was a dream.  So I 
9.   miss Brčko.  I miss my friends, because my childhood was very, very happy 
10.  And it's kinda like an island of beasts for me.  I like to – every time I don't feel 
11.  well, I like to drift back into those times because, um, in my memory it's very 
12.  bright and happy. 
 
G. 
1.   So we couldn't stay there, and obviously, war escalated.  It didn't, um, get 
2.   better, what I was hoping for.  So we – my dad moved to Germany, uh, with 
3.   his friend, illegally, which many Bosnians at those times were doing because 
4.   – and, uh, Europe was closing one eye.  That's, uh, in fact because the new 
5.   people were coming, but they just didn't wanna make it, uh, public, you 
6.   know, official.  So he went there, and he didn't have anybody.  He went with 
7.   one of his friends from Brčko, basically just illegally going over the border 
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8.   and not having anybody there.  Uh, so basically as a homeless. My dad, in 
9.   Brčko, he was a – he was teaching, uh, philosophy – philosophy 
10.  and sociology, and my mom was a, uh, kinda like an advisor.  She studied 
11.  pedagogy and, uh, worked with kids in high schools.   
 
H. 
1.   So he went there, uh, with his friend, and, uh, at first they arrived in Munich, 
2.   and they had to stay in the street.  Then, uh, his friend found out that he has 
3.   one of the cousins in Munich, so they went, visited him.  And then they were 
4.   lucky that in Mannheim, one other friend from Brčko invited them to come 
5.   over there, because there was potentially a room in, um, in a motel room that 
6.   they could inhabit.  So they used the money they had left and went to 
7.   Mannheim, and they lived in one small room, like, with that couple who were 
8.   older.  So the room was, like, from here till maybe, uh, all the way at the end 
9.   of the, uh, like, the – by the fence. 
 
I. 
1.   So he lived there, and then my dad said – told us that, uh, we have to come 
2.   over.  My mom was waiting for the passport, but he said, "No, you have to 
3.   come over, because we will lose the room."  So – which meant that we would 
4.   also have to cross the border illegally, which was a trauma in itself, um. 
5.   Which basically, um – I don't have to go into details how we did it, but, um, it 
6.   was traumatic.  Uh, I don't know if I should say how I did – how I crossed the 
7.   border to you – 
8.   Me:  If you want to.  I'd like to hear about it, but – 
 
J. 
1.   Adnan: Yeah.  So – [pause] – what would happen, people were 
2.   who had passports would stay in a bus, 
3.   and the rest of the people, including us – it was night and it was cold.  Um, it 
4.   was December, like middle of December.  So we would go into the bathrooms 
5.   and wait until the bus driver, who was a real, real asshole and a prick, um – 
6.   once those people gave their passports and their passports were returned, 
7.   we would one by one come back into the bus.   
 
K. 
1.   So in Austrian – Slovenian/Austrian border, my brother had to go to the 
2.   bathroom, and – at night.  It was like 2:00 in the morning, 'cause we were at the 
border, so he went with my mom out there, and the bus left.   
 
L. 
1.   So, uh, we were driving, and I was 11 years old, and I was so scared, I 
2.   remember, um.  So went to this guy and said, you know, my mom stayed 
3.   behind.  And he started saying, like, the worst things ever, like, you know, uh, 
4.   "May she piss blood" and all of that kinda like verbal stuff. 
5.   Me:  Was he Bosnian? 
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6.   Adnan:  He was Bosnian, I think, yeah, or Serbian or Croat, I 
7.   don't know.  But he said, like – and I was – I got really scared, so I went with 
8.   this other guy, who was nicer, and we went and we – like, across – well, here 
9.   were the fields, and we were going down the street, down the road at 2:30 in 
10.  the morning to kind of try to pick them up.  And, uh, we met them halfway, so 
11.  I was very happy to see the two – you know, to see them and that they were 
12.  able to, um, come with us, that they weren't caught and stuff.   
 
M. 
1.   So, uh, we came to Munich, and we took a train.  And in the bus these people 
2.   were basically stealing money from other people.  Every once in a while they 
3.   said, "Give me money or, you know, we'll kick you out," and all of that stuff.  
4.   So, uh, one lady, old lady, she came directly from work from Sarajevo and 
5.   spent 10,000 German Deutschmarks, which, uh, would be equivalent now to 
6.   maybe $15,000.00, something like that, just to get – and then she didn't have 
7.   enough money for the train when she, uh, reached Munich, so my, uh, mom 
8.   helped her. And then we came to Mannheim and, uh, lived in a motel for a 
9.   while, so to make the long story short, then we got an apartment.  I went to 
10.  school there, tried to adjust.  There were a lot of Bosnians from my city there, 
11.  and, uh, it was nice, um, to be with my fellow Bosnians, especially from – uh, 
12.  with people who are from my town.   
 
N. 
1.   So in – and, uh, when the war ended, Germans said that all Bosnians had to 
2.   leave.  So, uh, we – basically, since my parents are a mixed marriage – my dad 
3.   is, uh, a Bosnian Muslim; my mom is a Croat – um, we had an opportunity to 
4.   go to, um, either New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, or back to 
5.   Bosnia, through different refugee programs.  Um, IR-, uh, what's it called, um?  
6.   Me:  IRC? 
7.   Adnan: IRC and, uh, Catholic organization.  So we didn't wanna go back 
8.   to Bosnia, because the war just ended, and, uh, the hatred and, um, and 
9.   nationalism was still present very strongly.  So we decided to go to the States 
10.  with – because my friends had some friends here.  And then – um, our first 
11.  choice was Boston, actually; and the second choice was Tampa, Florida; and 
12.  the third choice was Salt Lake City.  So we ended up in Salt Lake City because 
13.  my parents had some friends here.  And, um, I can say, when I first – that was 
14.  a trauma in itself, when I was moving here, because I knew I wouldn't, uh, see 
15.  any of my friends again because they were displaced all over the world.  
16.  Some went to Australia, Canada, some back to Bosnia, and, uh, it was very 
17.  depressing.  So when I first came here, I was very depressed.  And, um, I was 
18.  17, almost 18. 
 
O. 
1.   So I started going to school, to Olympus High School, and it was kinda – uh, I 
2.   felt displaced.  Uh, I felt like I couldn't identify with those people's lives and 
3.   them in general, with – uh, so I would generally be by myself.  So I met my 
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4.   friend, uh, Adam, who – it was a funny story, because I came to the German 
5.   class.  That was my first class.  And, um, I spoke German perfectly, so when I 
6.   was brought in, the professor started speaking German, then I started 
7.   speaking back, and everybody's like, "Who is this guy?"   
 
P. 
1.   So, um, I sat down, and after that we had lunch, and I sat by myself, of course, 
2.   and he came over and he said, "Yeah, you know, I was in Austria, I was in 
3.   Croatia" and all of that, and the principal just came over to see – to ask how 
4.   I'm doing and how am I getting to school.  And I said, "I'm using the bus," and 
5.   out of nowhere this guy said – like, I just met him ten minutes ago – he'll 
6.   come and pick me up.  So he would drive all the way from 23rd East to 5th 
7.   East to pick me up and then go all the way to Olympus, which is in 2030s.  
8.   And he, you know, uh, invited me to come along with him to parties and all of 
9.   that, so I hung out with him, and that kinda like, uh, took my mind off of a 
10.  little bit of all those things and helped me. And then I, um – my parents told 
11.  me basically that, uh, if I passed ACT, uh, and I'm enrolled in – at university, 
12.  they'll pay for my trip to go back to Mannheim, so I was kinda proud of it.  I  
13.  spoke English when I first came here. I didn't go to ESL class, and in like 
14.  seven months I took ESL and I passed it, so, uh, I was admitted at the U after 
15.  seven, eight months of being in United States. 
 
Q. 
16.  So I, um, I went to, um, to Europe, to Mannheim again.  It was nice to see all 
17.  my friends.  That was the last time where I still was able to see some of my 
18.  friends that still haven't left Germany.  So after that, like, I went to school.  
19.  Every summer I went to Europe and, um – to kinda try to reconnect with 
20.  everything, uh, and with the whole idea of identity and what home is, but I'm 
21.  assuming you will ask me those questions. 
 
R. 






TRANSCRIPT OF TARIK’S ORIGIN STORY 
 
A. 
1.   Me:  Um.  Can you tell me about what, when you came to America and 
sort of the….. circumstances that got you here?   
2.   Tarik:   So as I remember, and from what some of the things 
3.   that my parents say and my brother that's three years, well, 2 ½ years older 
4.   than me, [pause] um, it all started in Croatia where my dad – we, we met my 
5.   dad after he was in a concentration camp.  And he a choice to either go to 
6.   America, Sweden, a couple other countries.  But it sounds like he forged some 
7.   papers – he didn't have a place to live.  So he did something that maybe 
8.   wasn't right but at the time, you know what would a father do with two 
9.   young kids to get them to a place where they can – Be safe.  So somehow we 
10.  were able to come to Utah specifically.   
 
B. 
1.   Sarah:   Catholic.  
2.   Tarik:   Through the Catholic, ah, agency that a lot of the 
3.   refugees here actually come through them.  There's other organizations in 
4.   other states that, you know allow the refugees to come.  And … we came to 
5.   Utah in December 90-, 1994.  I remember there was snow.  And the part of 
6.   Bosnia, actually southern Bosnia, Herzegovina, south of Mostar, that we came 
7.   from, there was only two other times that I remember snow actually falling.  
8.   So it was unique for me.  Um, I remember that specifically.  But yeah, so it 
9.   was '95 basically, you know December 90-, 1994.  We were one of the first 
10.  groups to actually come.  Um, there was lots of other Bosnians that came 
11.  later on.  They were the ones that stayed in Germany.  And then they were 
12.  basically kicked out of Germany unless they had something to kind of offer 
13.  for – whether, maybe they were in school at the time or they had jobs that 
14.  were beneficial to the economy.  They ended up staying as, as I hear it.  But a 
15.  lot of them actually came back.  C-, came to Utah, including my only cousin 







1.   Me:  So you came straight from Croatia to Utah.   
2.   Tarik:  Yes.   
3.   Me:  You didn't go anywhere else in Europe.   
4.   Tarik:  No.   
5.   Me:  Ah.  
6.   Tarik:  So I think you have to be in three different countries to 
7.   be able to get refugee status or something –  
8.   Sarah:  Passed around as a refugee.  [overtalk] 
9.   Tarik:  So we were actually in Croatia – sorry, in Turkey.  The 
10.  European side of Turkey for ten months.  Ah, the city was called Kirikkale.  
11.  And I remember that [pause] as a child a great place just because there was 
12.  so many other kids.  We lived in an army camp that was basically, ah, it was 
13.  like … one big camp.  And it wasn't like a tent.  It was an actual wood kind of 
14.  camp thing that was split in half.  So there was a family in one side and a 
15.  family in this side.  And I remember these metal beds, like army, you know 
16.  beds that – it was one of those beds that you can just keep stacking, you 
17.  know.  So I think there was two stacked in our room and then my mom's 
18.  where me and my brother slept.  But I remember lots and lots of kids being 
19.  there.  And it was, it was a lot of fun.  There's certain things that I remember 
20.  that kids, you know, being six and seven shouldn't have been doing.  We'd 
21.  latch on to like trucks, bread trucks that would take us from place to place.   
 
D. 
1.   Interviewer: Like hop onto the back of them?  [Sarah giggles] 
2.   Tarik:  Yeah.  It was just, you know take bread that wasn't ours 
3.   and stuff like that.  And I remember the older the parents, which was mostly 
4.   mothers, you know a lot of the – there was also f-, fathers that were able to 
5.   escape.   
6.   Sarah:  They were in the camp at this time while his dad was in 
7.   a concentration camp.   
8.   Tarik:  Yeah.   
9.   Sarah:  So it's him and his brother and his mom.   
10.  Tarik:  Yeah.  So we actually didn't know where my dad was 
11.  nor did he know where we were.  And I keep hearing the story that what 
12.  happened was – nor did my mom's twin sister know where we were.  Some 
13.  guy apparently knew that his wife was with us in that city.  And she knew – 
14.  he knew that we were there, but he didn't want to tell any of my family until 
15.  my mom got in contact with his wife.  And so it was just one of those things 
16.  that through them we were able to – they were able to figure out that we 
17.  were actually over there. They, they didn't know where we were.  Um.  And 
18.  later on I actually f-, I was told that they even divorced, that couple.  That he 







1.   So after that we went back to the city was called, um, what was it called?  
2.   [pause] Something with a P.  It was a coast city in Croatia.  We actually, my 
3.   dad stayed in a hotel there.  He, I don't know how many days or weeks he 
4.   was out of the concentration camp.  But I remember actually being, we were 
5.   pulling over in the bus and coming out and my dad was in a wife beater and 
6.   was just an awesome time, you know to see your dad again after –  
7.   Sarah:  Skinny.   
8.   Tarik:  Yeah.  At least 10, 11, 12, I don't know how many 
9.   months.  But, you know it was a big deal.  And I remember kinda going back 
10.  to – I remember we were in Cro-, in, in the camp in Kikareli, after the time 
11.  that we h-, later on when they actually discovered that we were there, my 
12.  mom was talking to her sister.  And I remember like a minute was some 
13.  ridiculous amount of money at the time.  But she found out that her husband 
14.  actually got killed from, um, a grenade that to this day, Sarah, you remember 
15.  the entrance to their, ah apartment.   
 
F. 
1.   Sarah:  [overtalk] She still lives in the apartment complex 
2.   where the grenade went off and he was killed in that very, you know 
3.   entryway.   
4.   Tarik:  Yeah.  It was him and my dad.  Another guy that my dad 
5.   was actually his best man at the wedding.  Um.  But they lived in the same 
6.   housing project. You know how it is in Bosnia.  A lot of people live in 
7.   apartments that –  
8.   Me: Yeah.   
9.   Tarik:  Or condos.  They're, you own them, you do whatever 
10.  you want with them.  But he was basically killed in the entrance of their – I 
11.  remember my mom just crying.  And I started to cry because she was crying.  
12.  I was still young.  And just I remember that.  She was on the bed and I didn't 
13.  know what was going on at the time but.  
 
G. 
1.   Sarah:  And he had two young kids still.   
2.   Tarik:  Yeah.   
3.   Interviewer: He had two young kids.   
4.   Tarik:  My mom has a sister, Cena.   
5.   Sarah:  Twin sister.  
6.   Tarik:  Twin sister.  Um, and a brother.  The brother never was 
7.   able to have kids.  But the sister did.  So I have a cousin.  Ah, girl and a boy 
8.   cousin.  Older than me both.   
9.   Me:  And where do they live?   
10.  Tarik:  They live in – one of, actually, she still lives in Bugojno I 
11.  know.  Both the kids live in Sarajevo.  But, ah, my guy cousin, he is a pretty 
12.  successful electrical engineer.  And he will soon be going to Paris for at least 
13.  over a year to work.  Which he's worked in Paris before.  He visited us here 
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1.   Sarah:  Yeah, he wants to be in America.  Get out of Bosnia.  And 
2.   all of its political problems and things.    
3.   Tarik:  Yeah.  Just the fact that he can't really advance 
4.   anywhere and how he gets really mad when he talks about how things are. 
5.   Just, you know the corruption –  
6.   Sarah:  [interrupts Tarik] I mean you know you've been to 
7.   Bosnia.  Time stands still.  Literally for the past 20 years.  Every building is 
8.   still affected by the bombs and the –  
9.   Tarik:  [Interrupts Sarah] I mean but they've been fixed.  Every 
10.  building was kind of destroyed.  But this kind of economy just is not really 
11.  going anywhere.  It's slow progress.  [pause…] But, yeah, it was interesting 
12.  because … to have a cousin from there visit us is unique, you know.  Usually 
13.  we go back there almost every year.   
14.  Me:  Oh, you do.   
15.  Tarik:  Yeah.  Sarah has gone twice already.  And we've been 
16.  married two years.  So.  But anyhow, that's kind of going all over the place 
17.  there.  So I don't know.   
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